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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses issues concerning trade effects of a particular RTA: AFTA. In the 
first part of the thesis, 2 different but related gravity frameworks are constructed as to 
evaluate the independent effects of AFTA on relevant countries’ trade flows. The first 
paper proposes examining ‘AFTA-effects’ on members’ trade, specifically within the 
AFTA context. This aims to distinguish trade effects that AFTA has had on early and 
delayed members’ trading patterns. The panel ‘Gravity Model’ is constructed, pointing 
to control for several biases commonly observed in the cross-section model. Although 
the result implies that early members do share trade benefits from AFTA more than 
non-members, the overall ‘AFTA-effects’ on the membership’s trade have not been 
benign. Another paper measures ‘AFTA-effects’ on both members’ and non-members’ 
trade. This aims to assess whether AFTA has played a role as an export base for the 
international market. In this case, ‘AFTA-effects’ appeared positive. Such effects are 
driven by an enhancement in extra-export bias, suggesting that the membership’s 
exports to outside destinations have increased post-AFTA. The last paper provides a 
theoretical framework addressing the incidence of RTA-membership expansion. The 
fact that AFTA was gradually established and empirical results indicating AFTA’s 
impacts on members and non-members brings about the idea that bloc-membership 
expansion could plausibly be explained by the economic effects that these countries 
have received. The corollaries of trading with/without RTA-membership of a potential 
member’s gains of trade and welfare levels are related to the decision towards 
membership. Even though welfare effects are not always greater, the RTA-membership 
status surely benefits member countries in gains from trade more than non-members. 
iii 
 
This can be perceived as one of the important reasons to explain the widespread 
regionalism worldwide and why joining the RTA is often seen as a safe haven strategy 
for a country.  
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Part I: General Information and Related Literature 
  
2 
 
1: Information on the Establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)  
 
1.1 Historical notes on the formation of ASEAN  
 
On 8
th
 August 1967
1
, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the so-called 
ASEAN was formed. This was a product of a joint effort and mutual agreement between 
5 members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei 
joined the group later in 1984 and together they were known as the original ASEAN-6 
since, as far as objectives of establishing the regional formation are concerned, ASEAN 
can be perceived to enhance the region’s political security as well as integrating closer 
economic cooperation. On the subject of an evolution of ASEAN cooperation, Tongzon 
(2002) summarized influential forces driving an ASEAN formation as: 
 
All the signatory countries saw the need to foster their economic development 
and promote regional security in the face of a growing communist threat in 
Southeast Asia, precipitated by the fall of IndoChina to communism and the 
declared intention of the West to withdraw their military forces from the region 
(Tongzon, 2002, p.5). 
 
Basically, ASEAN member states perceived regionalism
2
 not only as a means to 
promote regional identity, but also as a shortcut to strengthen nation building processes 
since at that period the Communist influence was widespread across the region (Frost, 
2008, p. 28). Even though politics had been a major component of this regional 
                                                          
1
 It is the Bangkok Declaration Meeting.  
2
 In this paper, regionalism is defined as a political process whereby a group of countries agree to reduce 
the barriers to trade between each other to lower levels than exist between them and the rest of the world.  
3 
 
formation, according to the statements of the Bangkok Declaration3, ASEAN was, 
however, far from being a purely political assembly. On the contrary, creating formal 
regional integration as well as cultivating developments in economic, social and cultural 
arenas were fundamental areas for ASEAN members. According to the contents stated 
in the first ASEAN Declaration: the Bangkok Declaration, on 8
th
 August 1967, 
membership countries declared that:  
  
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation 
 among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of 
 South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
 
SECOND,  that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:  
1. To  accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
 development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality 
 and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and 
 peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations (“The ASEAN Declaration 
 (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok,” 1967, para. 2). 
 
Despite this far-sighted preparation, it had been a long journey for ASEAN members to 
attain, if not to establish proper practices for regional formation. This is because, not 
only are historical and cultural grounds different across membership countries but, the 
members also vary greatly in terms of social and economic developments. Furthermore, 
at the early stage of this regional formation, membership countries encountered a series 
of post-independence problems: ethnic conflicts, communist insurgencies as well as 
political instability, which had been widespread across the region. It can be understood 
why during the early years of the ASEAN, each member state’s priorities had shifted, 
aiming to solve internal conflicts and planning for each member’s own domestic needs 
                                                          
3
 The Bangkok Declaration is the founding document of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations . It is 
also called the ASEAN Declaration.  
4 
 
instead of pursuing regional objectives. For these reasons, preparations to promote 
economic developments at the regional level were undoubtedly delayed and distressed.  
 
Before proceeding further, the following section briefly highlights key common 
characteristics as well as economic strengths and weaknesses of ASEAN-6 as they are 
regarded as AFTA founders. These countries are, in addition, major economies in 
ASEAN, therefore it is adequate to provide an overview of the ASEAN economies en 
masse. This piece of information is important for anyone who is interested in the setting 
of each ASEAN member before the most concrete form of ASEAN economic 
corporation: the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was officially instituted in 1992.  
 
1.2 ASEAN-6: key characteristics, economic strengths and weaknesses 
 
Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia)  
Indonesia is an archipelagic state comprised of 17,508 islands which was colonized by 
the Netherlands in the early 17
th
 Century. During World War II, Japan invaded the 
country and eventually took control over the land for a short period: 1942-1945. The 
country managed to declare independence soon after Japan surrendered on 17
th
 August 
1945
4
.   
 
Indonesia has the 16
th
 largest land area of all the countries in the world at 
1,919,440 square kilometres (741,050 sq mi). Having a population of 237.6 million
5
, it 
is in fact the world’s largest archipelago in terms of population. It is also the world’s 
                                                          
4
 However, it took 4 years for the Netherlands to transfer sovereignty in 1949 (27 December 1949).  
5
 This information is sourced from the 2010 National Census. 
5 
 
largest Muslim country, and ranks 4
th
 as the most populous democratic country
6
 in the 
world. Given this size and being an archipelagic state, the country stumbled upon severe 
ethnic and political instability problems. In fact, these problems still exist in some parts 
of the country to this day.  
 
Regarding economic conditions, Indonesia is the only country in ASEAN that has 
acquired the G20
7
membership status. This signifies the importance of Indonesia’s 
economy at the global scale. In 2010, it was ranked by WTO as the
 
world’s 27th biggest 
exporting country. Besides large and fertile land areas as aforementioned, the country is 
rich in mineral resources such as petroleum, natural gas, tin, nickel, copper and bauxite. 
These resources have mainly been industrialized and have become one of the major 
sectors of export. Other important industries are textiles, apparels, footwear, foods and 
chemical fertilizers as well as tourism. Because of an abundant labour supply, cheap 
labour costs have become the country’s key comparative advantage in expanding the 
diversification of the economy. Nonetheless, the Indonesian economy still relies heavily 
on its large domestic market. The unemployment rate is still high at approximately 7.9 %
8
.  
 
Malaysia 
On 31
st
 August 1957, the federation of Malaya which was colonized by the British 
during the late 18
th
 - 19
th
 Centuries announced her independence. Similar to Indonesia, 
the area was occupied by Japan during the World War II period; 1942-1945. The 
federation of Malaya together with Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah later formed a new 
                                                          
6
 CIA-The World Factbook. (2010).Retrieved 2010, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/id.html 
7
 G-20 is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 20 major economies.  
8
 CIA-The World Factbook. (2010). Retrieved 2010, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/id.html 
6 
 
country called Malaysia in 1963. Malaysia has an interesting landscape as it is 
comprised of 2 separate land areas: the Peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian Borneo, 
which the South China Sea passes between. Having a land area of 329,847 square 
kilometres (127,350 sq mi), it is regarded as the 66
th
 largest country in the world. In 
2010, the country was ranked 43
rd
 as the world’s most populated country with a 
population of approximately 28 million.   
 
As far as economic strengths and weaknesses are concerned, Malaysia is endowed with 
natural resources suitable for the mining industry: tin, petroleum, timber, copper, iron 
ore, and natural gas. The oil and gas industry has been a major source of income for the 
country as the prices of energy elevated worldwide. In addition, in the mid 1980s, Prime 
Minister Mahathir
9
 had success in diversifying the Malaysian economy from being a 
raw materials producer and exporter to depend more on manufacturing, services and 
tourism sectors (Tongzon, 1998, p.15). In 2010, the country was ranked as the world’s 
29
th
 largest economy in the world with a GDP (PPP) of $414,400 billion
10
. However, 
Malaysia has been experiencing severe inequality issues among different ethnic groups, 
especially between the Chinese-Malay and the Malaysian backgrounds. Such issues are 
a deep-rooted economic problem for the country. In reality, approximately 70 % of the 
country's market capitalization is owned by the Chinese-Malay, despite accounting for 
only a third of the entire population
11
. 
 
 
                                                          
9
 His term covers 22 years: from 1981-2003.  
10
 CIA-The World Factbook. (2011). Retrieved  2011, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html 
11
 Chau, Amy. (2003). Minority Rule, Majority Hate [Newspaper]. Retrieved 2010, from 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/EF07Aa01.html 
7 
 
The Philippines (Republic of the Philippines) 
The Philippines was under the Spanish rule during the 16
th
 Century. It was ceded by the 
United States later in 1898
12
. The country had also gone through Japanese occupation 
during the World War II period. However, with the help of allied troops, the Philippines 
fought Japan and managed to declare her independence in 1946
13
.   
 
The Philippines is another country in this region that has an archipelagic nature. 
Comprised of 7,107 islands with approximately 300,000 square kilometres (120,000 
sq mi), the geographical setting has posed difficulties in governing the country in 
general. Several social as well as economic problems such as inadequate infrastructure, 
bureaucratic inefficiency, poverty, high unemployment rate
14
 as well as rapid population 
growth have been ongoing thus far. With a population of approximately 
103,775,002
15
, it is considered the world’s 12th most populous country. Nevertheless, 
in 2011, the country managed to be the world’s 33rd largest economy with a gross 
domestic product (PPP) of approximately $389.8 billion
16
. Major natural resources are 
timber, petroleum, nickel, silver, gold, cobalt and copper. As the country is endowed 
with natural and human resources, these have been perceived as a comparative edge, 
attracting foreign capital for investment in the manufacturing sector. The country’s 
major industries are, for example, electronic assembly, garments, footwear, food 
processing products, pharmaceuticals, as well as petroleum.  
 
 
                                                          
12
 12 June 1898 (independence proclaimed from the Spain)  
13
 4 July 1946 was date of independence from the United States  
14
 As of 2010, the unemployment rate is 7.5 %. 
15
 CIA-The World Factbook. (2011). Retrieved 2011, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/rp.html 
16
 Ibid. 
8 
 
Thailand (Kingdom of Thailand) 
Thailand is the only country in ASEAN that was not empowered officially by any 
colonial masters. The country was, however, occupied by Japanese in the World War II 
period (1942-1945). Having a size of approximately 513,000 square kilometres 
(198,000 sq mi), Thailand is ranked as the world’s 51st largest country in terms of total 
land area. As there are roughly 64 million people in it, it is considered the world’s 20th 
most populous country.  
 
Thailand is also considered a resource-rich country, being well-endowed with valuable 
natural resources such as tin, tungsten, natural gas, as well as tantalum. In fact, the 
country is the world’s 2nd largest tungsten producer and 3rd largest tin producer17. 
Nonetheless, the country has been relying on labour-intensive industries covering basic 
to advanced products. They are, for example, agricultural commodities, textiles, 
footwear, machinery, electronic equipments, auto parts as well as jewellery. As 
Thailand has attractive natural landscapes and well-developed tourist attractions, 
tourism is another major industry for the country.  
 
With regard to economic weaknesses, Thailand has been experiencing poverty and 
inequality issues as major infrastructure and various forms of development are restricted 
within urban areas. This consequently results in a population density problem in major 
developed cities (Tongzon, 1998, p.15). Thailand was hit hard by the 1997 financial 
crisis which the country did, in fact, start. As the Thai government could not defend the 
baht against the peg to the US dollar, the Thai currency underwent substantial 
                                                          
17
 CIA-The World Factbook. (2011). Retrieved 2011, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/th.html 
9 
 
depreciation. This currency crisis was turned into a financial crisis as many foreign 
funds which were invested in Thailand through the short term banking instruments, 
could not be paid off. Many financial institutions had to call for closure because of 
insolvency. This crisis had serious contagious effects on other countries. However, 
Thailand eventually recovered by turning to the IMF for financial assistance.  
 
Singapore (Republic of Singapore) 
Singapore was a British trading colony from 1819 to 1942. During World War II, 
Singapore was occupied by the Japanese and reverted to British rule again after the war. 
The island became self-governing in 1959. Singapore united with other former British 
territories nearby to form Malaysia in 1963. In 1965, the country separated from 
Malaysia and declared independence
18
.  
 
Singapore is the only country in the region that has no natural resources. In addition, the 
country is a small island, having a total land area of approximately 704 square 
kilometres (272 sq mi) only. The population size is also small; there are approximately 
5.35 million people in Singapore
19
. Though high labour and capital costs have limited 
economic activities, superior infrastructures, efficient bureaucracy and sound economic 
policies, have made Singapore the richest country in the region. In terms of GDP per 
capita, the country is ranked as the world’s 5th richest, having a GDP per capita of 
approximately 59,900US$
20
 (US$ in 2011 value): even higher than most developed 
countries. Because of its strategic location as a port, combined with a highly developed 
free market economy and a well-equipped infrastructure, most of the country’s income 
                                                          
18
 It was on 9
th
 August 1965. 
19
 CIA-The World Factbook. (2011). Retrieved 2011, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/sn.html 
20
 Ibid. 
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is from trade and services. Moreover, Singapore is considered the 14
th
 largest exporter 
and 15
th
 largest importer in the world. The country has the highest trade-to-GDP ratio in 
the world at 407.9 %, emphasizing the importance of trade in this economy. In recent 
years, Singapore has promoted tourism as well as legalized gambling to attract more 
visitors. The country, in addition, tries to set up an image of being a pharmaceutical and 
medical hub of ASEAN.  
 
Brunei (Nation of Brunei, the Abode of Peace) 
Brunei was a British colony in 1888. Like others in the region, the Japanese took over 
the country from 1941-1945 during the World War II period. After that, it was under 
British administration until the country declared independence in 1984
21
. It is 
interesting to note that Brunei is comprised of 2 disconnected pieces of land with a total 
land area of only 5,765 square kilometres (2,226 sq mi).   
 
Brunei is the only country in this region that is largely endowed with oil and natural gas. 
Forbes ranked Brunei as the 5
th
 richest nation (out of 182 nations) due to its extensive 
petroleum and natural gas fields
22
. In fact, oil and natural gas production accounts for 
more than 90 % of its exports which is also the major source of GDP
23
. The Brunei 
government is known to be well-regulated and almost all medical services and 
education through the university level are subsidized. However, the country has a very 
limited domestic market due to a population of only 395,027
24
, of which approximately 
150,000 live in the capital Bandar Seri Begawan. High operating costs and a shortage of 
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 It was on 1
st
 January 1984.  
22
 Too, D. (2012). Forbes Ranks Brunei Fifth Richest Nation [Newspaper]. Retrieved 2012, from   
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/25/forbes-ranks-brunei-fifth-richest-nation.html  
23
 CIA-The World Factbook. (2011). Retrieved 2011, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/bx.html 
24
 Ibid. 
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labour has limited economic activities as well as their expansion. Notwithstanding an 
attempt to increase agricultural production and to further diversify economic activities 
beyond oil and gas industries, there has not been a sign of success.  
 
From the brief overviews provided, it can be seen that diverse characteristics as well as 
distinctive domestic disorders have, undoubtedly, made it difficult for ASEAN 
countries to arrive at agreements which result in mutual benefits. Besides this, the 
primary economies of ASEAN-6 countries appear to be competitive rather than 
complementary as most of them have similar natural resources and rely on intermediate 
if not basic levels of technological advancements in the manufacturing sector. In fact, 
several industries have attracted the same sources of foreign direct investments. It is 
thus not surprising that ASEAN members took nearly a decade to form an official 
institution and to be granted regional development plans. Although ASEAN countries 
are different in many aspects, they had managed to put common trust to strengthen 
economic conditions at the forefront eventually. Indeed, forming a regional agreement 
was perceived as a vital path towards achieving this goal.   
 
1.3 ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreement (ASEAN-PTA)  
 
After the Bali Summit in 1976 which was the first ASEAN Heads of Government 
meeting, ASEAN-6 started to reflect its diplomatic role more clearly as a region. It was 
also as a result of the Bali Summit that ASEAN economic cooperation managed by 
ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) received independence in management from 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers (AFM). The decisions regarding economic cooperation 
12 
 
could then be more direct in aim and agreed upon by the AEM. In consequence, 5 
separate economic committees were formed. These are:   
 
The Committee on Trade and Tourism 
The Committee on Industry, Minerals and Energy 
The Committee on Finance and Banking 
The Committee on Food, Agriculture and Forestry  
The Committee on Transportation and Communications  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the region had imposed multi-channelled economic 
development plans, enhancing economic performance via trade and industry were put 
forth as a top priority. Matters concerning trade promotions, trade liberalization and 
industrial complementation were emphasized
25
. The region also invested in research and 
strategic planning with the hope of constructing well-planned paths for regional 
economic cooperation. ASEAN’s first steps towards trade liberalization worked on 
implementing preferential trading frameworks (tariff and non-tariff preferences), 
comprised of long term quantity contracts and preferences in procurement by 
government entities. As a result, the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement 
(ASEAN-PTA) was officially formed on 24
th
  February 1977. This ASEAN-PTA was 
approved by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In principle, the 
ASEAN-PTA worked on granting tariff preferences (the so-called ‘Margin of 
Preference’ or ‘MOP’) for imports among ASEAN members. The first batch of 71 trade 
                                                          
25
 There were 3 main programmes initially constructed: 1) the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA), 
2) ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJVS) and 3) the Brand to Brand Complementation (BBC) 
Scheme.  
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preferences came into effect on 1
st
 January 1978. By 1981, member countries had 
managed to increase the number of products offered for tariff preferences to 6,581. 
 
The agreement was, in actual fact, targeted to promote higher levels of intra-ASEAN 
trade (Tongzon, 2002, p.42). Nevertheless, with other regional groupings such as the 
European Commission (EC) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
ASEAN members, were concerned by the possibility of losing their bargaining power in 
the international trading system. ASEAN-PTA could thus be perceived as a counter 
strategic plan for ASEAN: acting as a safeguard to protect existing trade relations from 
shocks in global trade regimes. Furthermore, with closer assessment, ASEAN-PTA was 
viewed as a catalyst promoting closer economic ties among member states. This was 
aimed at causing domino effects in growth and development in the region as a whole. 
This point has, in fact, been mentioned by Castro (1980) in the essay on ASEAN 
economic co-operation that: 
 
It might be said that the ASEAN-PTA was an effort to reverse the declining 
 intra-ASEAN trade. That, however, would be only half true, because the thrust 
 behind the ASEAN-PTA was not to arrest a decline but to promote growth and 
 integration (Castro in R. Garnaut (Ed.), 1980, p.63).  
 
Similar to other dimensions of ASEAN development schemes, managing ASEAN-PTA 
was not obstacle-free. Conflicts of interest remained as it was evident that membership 
countries were not straightforward in sharing preferential tariff reduction. A major flaw 
was due to the fact that, at an early state of ASEAN-PTA, trade liberalization processes 
were voluntary in terms of the product selection as well as the timeframe for tariff 
reduction. Basically there were no specific timeframes or deadlines for tariff 
liberalization. In particular, there were 2 types of voluntary offers: unilateral and 
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bilateral. For the unilateral approach, each country put products onto the tariff reduction 
list individually. The tariffs offered would, in consequence, be applicable to all 
membership countries. In the latter approach, member countries were able to request 
that products be put on the list by another trading partner bilaterally, but this had to wait 
for another party’s approval. If the trading partner agreed, every member country would 
also receive the preferential offer on these products. The tariff preference effects would 
then be multilateral eventually. It can be seen that even though ASEAN-PTA had 
constructed an approach in which member countries are able to request products to be 
put onto the list for multilateral acceptance, it seemed that, in general, the majority of 
products offered for preferences were not produced by any member countries or, in 
other words, were unavailable in the regional market. Moreover, most of them had 
given products that have low market value for preference purposes or, sometimes, 
offered tariff preferences on zero-tariff items. According to Frankel and Wei (1996) 
which touched upon the historical setting of the ASEAN-PTA, the case in which 
Indonesia eliminated tariff barriers to the import of snow-removal equipment was 
referred to as one such example. These sorts of practices had, in consequence, delayed 
the primary objective of increasing intra-ASEAN trade as each member continued to 
place individual interests over regional ones. In addition, given that tariff reduction was 
done product-by-product via consensus format, this was time-consuming since each 
country had different products to be put on the list. Each country technically granted 
longer timeframes for important or strategic products to be co-ordinated in the tariff 
reduction process. Last but not least, the issues concerning rules of origin as well as the 
measurement of ASEAN’s content of the products brought further difficulties in 
ASEAN-PTA. According to Acosta (1998) which studied the impact of AFTA on 
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selected agricultural products in ASEAN countries, the ineffectiveness of guidelines 
practiced in ASEAN-PTA in increasing intra-ASEAN trade was as well addressed: 
 
 From 71 listed products in 1977, the products voluntarily offered for tariff 
 reductions increased to 6,581 by 1981. Despite the comprehensive list of 
 products offered Margin of Preferences (MOPs), the intra-ASEAN trade did not 
 grow substantially. The reason for this is that products offered by the ASEAN 
 members have little consequences on their trade with each other (Acosta, 1998, 
 p.6).  
 
Furthermore, while the tariff reduction scheme was in use, non-tariff barriers in the 
form of quotas, dissimilar custom procedures and technical norms instead thrived. All 
of these issues certainly encouraged member countries to rely on extra-ASEAN trade 
rather than pursuing trade prospects at the regional level. As Table 1.1 indicates below, 
the utilization rate of ASEAN-PTA was negligible even a decade after its instalment. 
One can rather conclude that ASEAN-PTA had failed to promote closer economic ties 
within the region and was inept at increasing the volume of intra-ASEAN trade, in 
particular. The level of intra-ASEAN trade remained insignificant and indifferent after 
the PTA was formed.  
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Table 1.1: Utilization of Preferential Trading Arrangements in 1987 
 
Country 
No. of 
Items 
Granted 
PTA 
No. of Items 
in PTA list 
Imports 
granted 
PTA 
US$(‘000) 
Total Imports 
from ASEAN  
of PTA 
Granted Items 
US$(‘000) 
Share of 
No. of 
Items 
(%) 
Share of 
Value of 
Items 
(%) 
 
Indonesia 
 
45 
 
2,754 
 
15,258 
 
50,426 
 
1.6 
 
30.3 
 
Malaysia 
 
86 
 
2,267 
 
28,868 
 
131,286 
 
3.8 
 
22.0 
 
Philippines 
 
Na 
 
3,443 
 
Na 
 
Na 
 
Na 
 
Na 
 
Singapore 
 
114 
 
2,465 
 
35,970 
 
293,608 
 
4.6 
 
12.3 
 
Thailand 
 
95 
 
1,854 
 
21,532 
 
58,336 
 
5.1 
 
36.9 
 
Total 
 
337 
 
12,783 
 
101,628 
 
239,214 
 
2.6 
 
42.5 
Source: Committee on Trade and Tourism (COTT), ASEAN Secretariat (in Pangestu et al, 1992) 
 
1.4 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)   
 
Even almost a decade after the establishment of ASEAN-PTA, there had not been as 
much development in intra-ASEAN trade as expected. Despite several attempts aiming 
to improve the PTA, the result was not at all impressive. Moreover, with substantive 
changes occurring in the world’s trading system including the growth of the regionalism 
concept, especially in Europe and North America, as well as the tightened economic ties 
of neighbouring APEC, ASEAN-6 was eventually aware of the need to finalize a new 
form of regional trade liberalization. This global phenomenon of regionalism was 
perceived as a form of protectionism for ASEAN-6 since non-tariff barriers in the form 
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of anti-dumping duties and voluntary export restraints were deemed to be prevalent 
instead. As a consequence, a better format of regional economic integration had to be 
formed maintaining the region’s bargaining power. Among various forms of regional 
economic integration available, the Free Trade Area (FTA) was agreed to be the most 
feasible format for ASEAN members to establish. The ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) was eventually institutionalized as a result of the fourth ASEAN Summit in 
Singapore in 1992. This point has, in fact, been pointed out in the study concerning 
ASEAN external economic relations by Tongzon (2002); the establishment of AFTA 
was perceived as a counter strategy for ASEAN countries to promote cooperative 
venture attracting trade and investment to the region: 
 
 First, the 1992 decision by the ASEAN countries to establish an ASEAN free 
 trade area by the year 2008 and the recent decision to speed up the process by 
 moving the implementation date to 2002 reflected the ASEAN efforts to 
 maintain, if not improve, the attractiveness of the ASEAN region for trade and 
 investment. At the same time, there has been an attempt to forge linkages with 
 NAFTA and EU countries (Tongzon, 2002, p.126).  
 
Nevertheless, given the disappointment of ASEAN-PTA, it was more than a decade 
before the AFTA could be materialized. Such a delay could still be attributed to the fact 
that ASEAN countries, on the whole, upheld national interests rather than regional ones. 
The essay on ‘Regionalism and Globalism in Southeast Asia’ by Palmujoki (2001) also 
highlighted this point:  
 
 ASEAN ideology has emphasized national resilience, accompanied by regional 
 resilience…Thus, even economic cooperation, requiring national economies to 
 adapt,  to some degree, to regional adjustments, has been difficult for the 
 ASEAN countries. The ASEAN PTA and the failures of some common 
 investment projects provide good examples of the way national interests have 
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 watered down any serious attempts to create supranational economic 
 cooperation in ASEAN (Palmujoki, 2001, p. 50). 
 
In the mid 1990s, the ASEAN’s founders, ASEAN-6, managed to expand, accepting 4 
additional countries into this regional economic integration; Vietnam joined the zone in 
1995, Myanmar and Laos joined the area in 1997 and Cambodia came in last in 1999. 
The admission of Cambodia completed ASEAN-10 which was indeed a remarkable 
achievement for the region in terms of achieving regional peace and political stability. 
As this group of countries is comprised of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, 
they are known as the CLMV. Being official members of ASEAN, this group of 
countries had to simultaneously perpetrate themselves to the trade liberalization 
proposed under AFTA. Even though it was aimed at giving the whole of Southeast Asia 
free trade status, this integrating preparation was a politically-driven process. That is 
because, in practice, the AFTA-membership status was given concurrently with the 
granting of ASEAN-membership
26
. In other words, ASEAN countries made FTA 
politically acceptable.  
 
Political considerations have largely influenced the CLMV to foster economic 
integration with former AFTA-members: ASEAN-6. Taking into consideration that 
these countries were newly emerging economies, they were literally absent from 
international markets. From CLMV’s perspectives, being integrated with ASEAN-6 
politically and economically could thus be perceived not only as a recommended path to 
create good relationships with the rest of the region but also a gateway to international 
environment jointly. Correspondingly, ASEAN-6 also wanted to expand this form of 
                                                          
26
 Not only did they join the free trade area at different times, this group of countries was also given 
different deadlines in completing tariff reduction plans. Deadlines for tariff liberalization were set to be in 
2006 for Vietnam, 2008 for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia. 
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regional cooperation further to include every country in the region. This too was driven 
by political motive as these ASEAN founders intended to respond to the regionalism 
concept that had been practiced widely across Europe and North America and was 
approaching to Asia. In summary, it can be said that the formation of AFTA is 
politically-oriented as it was not caused by high trade level between members. This, in 
other words, implies that AFTA-memberships are exogenous. Yet, having all ASEAN 
countries in AFTA, ASEAN-6 expected to promote the region as well as to strengthen 
the region’s bargaining power further especially in terms of international negotiations. 
However, this course of action was not at all smooth. A number of obstacles were in the 
way that had delayed these CLMV countries opting into ASEAN/AFTA at the same 
time as ASEAN-6.  
 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the CLMV 
countries. Important historical backgrounds, demographic and fundamental social 
settings of these countries will also be explored. This information is not only sufficient 
to spell out the lateness of CLMV’s admission into ASEAN/AFTA but also casts light 
on their motivation in seeking to be a part of this regional cooperation.  
 
1.4.1 Transitional economies: an overview of key characteristics 
 
Cambodia (Kingdom of Cambodia) 
Cambodia was under the joint control of Thailand and Vietnam during the Siamese –
Vietnamese War during 1841-1845. In 1863, Cambodia sought French protection, and 
later became a part of French Indochina in 1887. After the Japanese occupation in 
World War II, Cambodia eventually gained independence from France in 1953. 
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Nevertheless, after declared independence, Cambodia has experienced social turmoil 
and several internal conflicts. One of the major social disruptions was invasion by the 
communist force from the Khmer Rouge which ended with the execution of 1.5 million 
people. With the assistance provided by the UN, the country managed to launch her first 
national election in 1993. Nevertheless, Cambodia was not peaceful until 1999 when the 
remaining Khmer Rouge surrendered
27
. 
 
Geographically, Cambodia has a total land area of 181,035 square kilometres with a 
population of approximately 14.9 million
28
. With regards to the economic conditions, 
agriculture is the most important economic activity although more advanced industries 
have been growing in recent years. Major agricultural exports are rice, fish, timber and 
rubber. Other important industries are tourism, textile and garment sectors. As the 
country is rich in natural and mineral resources, oil exploitation, as well as mining 
industries have recently become one of the fastest growing industries attracting large 
amounts of foreign direct investment. Between 2004 and 2008, the Cambodian 
economy experienced a high growth rate of approximately 10 % annually. In fact, 
according to the IMF report, the country managed to rank as one of the world’s top 10 
countries in terms of annual average GDP growth between 2001 and 2010. Even so, 
Cambodia is still underdeveloped in several areas. As the country has long been 
suffering from wars and political conflicts, more than 50 % of the population is under 
25 years old
29
. This contributes to the lack of a skilled and educated labour force which 
further explains the limited economic activities aforementioned.  
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CIA-The World Factbook. (2011). Retrieved 2011, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/cb.html 
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 Ibid. 
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Laos (Lao People’s Democratic Republic) 
Similar to Cambodia, Laos was a part of Thailand (previously known as Siam) during 
the late 18
th
 Century and was later transferred to French Indochina in 19
th
 Century. The 
country declared independence soon after the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945. 
However, she was under French rule again until receiving autonomy in 1949. After that, 
Laos was controlled by the monarchy which lost power to the Communist Party in 
1975. Laos thus became a one-party socialist republic since then.  
 
With regard to the landscape of the country, Laos is the only landlocked nation in South 
East Asia, having a total land area of only 236,800 square kilometres. The population 
size is also small, with approximately 6.6 million inhabitants. As far as the economic 
condition is concerned, the country still relies heavily on subsistence agriculture for its 
GDP and employment. For example, the rice cultivation sector accounts for 
approximately 30 % of the GDP and 75 % of total employment
30
. In addition, the 
country is rich in natural and mineral resources, of which the majority, have not been 
exploited. The key resources are, for instance, timber, gypsum, tin, gold and gemstones 
as well as hydropower. Other key economic activities are cross-border trade and 
investment, mainly conducted with close neighbours such as Thailand, Vietnam and 
China. Apart from the time of the Asian Financial Crisis, Laos has been experiencing 
consistent and high average growth rates of approximately 6 % per annum since 1988
31
. 
Notwithstanding such high growth rates, the country is underdeveloped in many areas, 
especially in terms of its basic infrastructure. According to the UN Development 
Programme, Laos is still listed among the least developed countries.  
                                                          
30
 CIA-The World Factbook. (2011). Retrieved 2011, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/la.html 
31
 Ibid.  
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Myanmar / Burma (Republic of the Union of Myanmar) 
Historically, Myanmar was under British colonization as part of its Indian Empire for 
more than half a century (1824-1886). The country became independent from the 
Commonwealth in 1948. During the period of 1962-1988, General Ne Win who was the 
military ruler, appointed himself as president. The military deposed General Ne Win 
and formed the ruling stratocracy in 1988. In 1990, the country organized her first 
election, which resulted in a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) headed by Aung San Suu Kyi. However, the ruling military did not hand over 
power and continued to govern the country until 1997 as the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC). Another election in 2010 led to the formation of a 
parliament in 2011 having Thein Sein as a president. This government attempted to call 
for political and economic reforms which aimed to draw the more open economic and 
foreign policies. 
 
With a total land area of 676,678 square kilometres, Myanmar is ranked as the world’s 
40
th
 largest country. The country also has a large population of nearly 60 million, which 
makes it the world’s 24th most populous country32. Myanmar is another resource-rich 
country in the region; having, for example, petroleum, natural gas, timber, tin, zinc, as 
well as precious stones. Nevertheless, the exploitation of these resources has been 
governed by the ruling elites, thus, in general, the majority of the population do not 
benefit from this economic activity. Furthermore, as the country has long been governed 
by the military, sound economic policies have not been provided despite numerous 
socio-economic reforms. Basic infrastructure and welfare systems are underdeveloped. 
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world-factbook/geos/bm.html 
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Inflation has also been a serious problem especially during 2005-2007. At present, the 
country is still considered the poorest country in the region. Specifically, it is recorded 
that about 32 % of the population is living in poverty
33
.  
 
Vietnam (Socialist Republic of Vietnam) 
Vietnam was a part of French Indochina in 1887. The country declared independence in 
1945 after the Communist force won the first Indochina War. As a result of this war, 
Vietnam was divided into the Communist North and the anti-Communist South. 
Conflicts between these states led to the Vietnam War which resulted in the victory of 
Communist rule in 1975. The country then became a socialist republic.  
 
The country has a total land area of 331,210 square kilometres with approximately 91 
million people
34
. This makes the country the 13
th
 most populous in the world. With the 
concern on economic issues, the country has opened up to international markets by 
initiating a major economic reform known as the ‘doi moi’ programme in 1986. Before 
that the country was conservative, being under the centrally-planned form of 
government. Since the reform took place, the country has been experiencing high GDP 
growth rates, especially during 1990-1997. Vietnam is now one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world with an annual rate of GDP growth of approximately 7 % since 
2000. As trade liberalization has been promoted consistently, the country eventually 
managed to join the World Trade Organization in 2007. Despite numerous signs of 
economic development, the country is, however, affected by a high inflation rate. In 
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addition, many economic activities are still state-owned although private ownership has 
been encouraged. With regard to major industries, Vietnam is the world’s largest 
producer of cashew nuts and the world’s 2nd largest rice exporter. The country has, in 
recent years, become the 3
rd
 largest crude oil producer in the region. Other key exports 
are marine products, coffee, tea and rubber. However, agriculture is no longer the 
largest source of GDPs as the manufacturing and industry share has evidently been 
increased. In 2011, the industry share accounted for 40.3 % while the agriculture share 
only accounted for 22 %. Major industries are clothes, footwear, marine products, food 
processing, electrical assembly as well as mining. Another important source of income 
is the tourist industry.  
 
As evidently suggested, these new members have diverse colonial traditions which have 
produced different social, political and economic systems. Such factors made sharing 
similar views difficult, especially with respect to forming any kind of regional 
integration. As these countries were also newly independent countries, they were in a 
transition period of adjusting extensive domestic conflicts when AFTA was formed. All 
of them encountered post-independence problems such as communist insurgency and 
clashes among ethnic groups. For this reason, it was not until the end of the Cold War 
that the first transitional economy, Vietnam, was accepted into ASEAN/AFTA. This 
action was perceived as a sign of readiness of the country to transform her political as 
well as economic interests. As a socialist state, Vietnam had been influenced by the 
Communist ideology from her neighbouring country: China. Given these causes, the 
commitment to ASEAN/AFTA’s rules and regulations indicated one of the greatest 
social and political revolutions of the country’s history. In Tongzon (2002): the book’s 
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chapter concerning AFTA and the transitional Southeast Asian economies, Vietnam’s 
key motivations in seeking ASEAN/AFTA official membership were elaborated: 
 
 In political terms, Vietnam shares the same security and political interests with 
 the other ASEAN countries. Vietnam considers joining ASEAN as an 
 opportunity to make friends with other countries in the region and thus to 
 contribute to the creation of a more friendly and conductive environment for 
 economic development. Vietnam also needs ASEAN to have a more significant 
 and influential voice in the international arena…its membership is necessary in 
 order to maintain the balance of power in the region. The emergence of China 
 with its potential to become a super military power must be balanced in order to 
 avoid any dominance by one country in the region (Tongzon, 2002, p.201).   
 
In a similar vein, the successful admission of Myanmar into ASEAN/AFTA in the 
following years implied that the political instability which was generally caused by the 
military coup d´état’s alleged violation of the agreement to hand over power to the 
political leadership had been, more or less, improved. By being a part of 
ASEAN/AFTA, issues concerning violation of human rights and democratic principles 
can, in addition, be alleviated through opening dialogues with ASEAN’s assistance. 
Laos was another socialist state that struggled to solve a series of post-independence 
problems such as civil strife and political violation. Together with the fact that it is the 
only landlocked country in the vicinity, these issues ended up separating Laos from the 
rest of the region and the world market. For these reasons, Lao’s decision to acquire 
ASEAN/AFTA membership in the same year as Myanmar also implied that there were 
signs of political stability and a serious plan to exercise economic reform: domestically 
and internationally. Lastly, Cambodia’s official membership into this regional grouping 
likewise underlined major developments in her political situation. Cambodia’s 
acceptance into ASEAN/AFTA was not only a success for the country, but was also 
considered a great political achievement for the whole region since ASEAN/AFTA 
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could arrive at its full operation. This is certainly so because, as compared to other 
CLMV countries, Cambodia had numerous serious domestic issues: the longest history 
of internal wars and political clashes as well as foreign-related conflicts, especially 
along her border lines. These problems largely affected diplomatic relationships with 
neighbouring countries and damaged any potential investors’ confidence in the 
country’s long-term stability. Hence, for Cambodia, it can be said that one of the major 
factors in following into ASEAN/AFTA was seeking assistance in settling such 
outstanding internal problems. By coming out of isolation, the country could receive 
help from international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and cooperation 
from its own region. In fact, ASEAN-6 provided various institutional structures to assist 
membership countries resolving relevant social and political issues. In summary, it can 
be said that besides their readiness to be exposed to trade liberalization, governing 
parties in transitional economies turned to regional cooperation as the potential benefits 
in political area are obvious.   
 
1.4.2 Objectives and main instruments of AFTA 
 
AFTA’s objectives, in general, remained similar to ASEAN-PTA. However, in addition 
to increasing intra-ASEAN trade which had long been the key mission for ASEAN 
members, the ASEAN’s FTA was also perceived as a vital path to bring in development 
related factors to the region (Pangestu et al., 1992). That is because the ultimate 
objective of AFTA is to build the region’s competitive advantage as a production base 
geared for the world market. Advancing trade liberalization via an expansion of intra-
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ASEAN trade thus serves as a catalyst to promote efficient production and competition 
in the long term.  
 
Hence, in comparison to ASEAN-PTA era, there were significant changes required 
from all members in order to establish the free trade zone. In spite of many routes that 
could be implemented toward successful regional trade liberalization, a necessary first 
step that ASEAN countries began with was the elimination of tariffs. As a result, the 
‘Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA)’35 was signed in 1992. This so-called ‘1992 CEPT Scheme’ 
applied to all manufactured products including capital and processed agricultural 
goods
36
. In principle, member countries agreed to segregate these goods further into 
numbers of product listings allowing each product category to have different timeframe 
for tariff and non-tariff liberalising requirements. These lists are namely 1) Inclusion 
List 2) Temporary Exclusion List 3) Sensitive List and 4) General Exception List. With 
regards to trade liberalization through reduction in the CEPT, the Inclusion List covers 
products that have to undergo immediate tariff liberalization while the Temporary 
Exclusion List allows products to be excluded from this process for a temporary period 
of time. Nevertheless, these products will have to be transferred to the Inclusion List 
eventually. Given that the so-called Unprocessed Agricultural Products (UAPs) are 
commonly perceived as strategic products within the region, member countries 
therefore agreed to put them into the Sensitive List. These products are thus given a 
                                                          
35
 It is a cooperative arrangement among member countries whereby intra-regional tariffs will be brought 
down to 0-5 %. The CEPT also requires that non-tariff barriers will have to be eliminated. However, in 
order to utilize this scheme, member countries need to meet the rule of origin (ROO) or the local content 
requirement; products produced have to contain a minimum of 40 % of AFTA value if not totally 
produced within AFTA countries.   
36
 In this scheme the unprocessed agricultural products were, however, excluded. See Appendix I for 
details. 
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longer timeframe to meet tariff and non-tariff liberalization targets. In addition, for 
products that are deemed important to a nation security, public morals, human, animal, 
plant life and health and articles of artistic, historic and archaeological value, they are 
excluded from this free trade zone. These products are, for that reason, listed in the 
General Exception List permanently. On top of these diversified product lists, member 
countries also divided the CEPT Scheme further into 2 tariff liberalization schedules: 
the so-called ‘normal track’ and the ‘fast track’ programmes37 aiming to ease as well as 
to speed up this tariff liberalization process. In details, the products listed under the 
‘normal track’ were planned to have 0-5 % tariff levels by 2008, while the ones under 
the ‘fast track’ were aimed to reach the same tariff levels in 2003. Nevertheless, 
according to AFTA-memberships’ acknowledgement of the ‘Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation’ in 199538, the tariff reduction 
implementation was forwarded to 2003 instead of 2008
39
. Thus, for the ‘fast track’ 
programme, products with tariff rates above 20 % were required to arrive at the tariff 
rate of 20 % by 1998 and to attain the target of 0-5 % tariff levels by 2000. In addition, 
products with tariff rates of 20 % and below had to reduce the tariffs to 0-5 % by 1998.  
For the ‘normal track’ programme, products with tariffs rates above 20 % were 
demanded to have the tariff rate of 20 % by 2000. For products with tariff rates of 20 % 
or below, the deadline to achieve tariff rates of 0-5 % was given to be 2003. Other trade 
restrictions and non-tariff barriers were, likewise, planned to be removed by 2003.  
 
                                                          
37
 There were 15 products listed under the ‘fast track’ programme. They are vegetable oils, cement, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fertilizer, plastics, rubber products, leather products, pulp and paper, textiles, 
ceramic and glass products, gems and jewellery products, copper cathodes, electronics, wood and rattan 
furniture. The rest of the products in the ‘1992 CEPT Scheme’ were thus listed in the ‘normal track’ 
programme.   
38
 This agreement was signed during the fifth Summit Meeting in Bangkok in 1995.  
39
 It was forwarded further to 2002. 
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Despite the fact that AFTA’s principle and its key mechanism is similar to ASEAN-
PTA, the major difference is that AFTA worked under the CEPT Scheme which is 
reciprocal and sectoral, making it more encompassing and less cumbersome than the 
unilateral product-by-product approach of ASEAN-PTA (Soloaga and Winter, 1999). 
Under the CEPT Scheme, there is an interchange such that once the goods are accepted 
under the scheme, member countries have to grant preferential tariffs. Nonetheless, the 
new version of CEPT Scheme, the ‘1995 CEPT Scheme’, covered almost all of product 
categories, including the UAPs which are generally exempted in preferential trade 
agreements
40
 (Acosta, 1998, p.9). This move undoubtedly signalled the strong ambition 
of ASEAN countries to form integrated economies, although there were many doubts 
and arguments following such an action. This was so because agricultural products, in 
particular, unprocessed agricultural goods had long been regarded as a strategic and 
politically sensitive sector for most of the membership countries. Given similar natural 
resources in these members, agricultural goods produced are, in addition, perceived as 
competitive rather than complementary. Thus, this progress strongly implies that 
member states were ready to open markets for regional competition. 
 
For these reasons, AFTA could be seen as an advance in the pursuit of regional trade 
liberalization. Most importantly, the major objectives of AFTA are much more 
straightforward than ASEAN-PTA as it focuses on expanding intra-ASEAN trade as 
well as increasing the competitiveness of ASEAN countries specifically. Therefore, 
procedures assembled to support these plans ranged from imposing product standard 
                                                          
40
 In the ‘1995 CEPT Scheme’, agricultural products are defined as 1) agricultural raw materials and 
unprocessed products covered under 1-24 of the Harmonized System Code (HS), and similar agricultural 
raw materials and unprocessed products in other related HS headings: and 2) products which have 
undergone simple processing with minimal change from the original products. (Acosta, 1998, p.9). 
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harmonization, and investing in transport infrastructure in order to facilitate intra-
regional trade liberalization processes, to providing macroeconomic consultations and 
coordination of foreign investment policies. Furthermore, the CEPT Scheme also 
requires member countries to eliminate quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff 
barriers.  
 
After the time limit agreed to adjust tariff reduction, member states could gradually 
exploit the CEPT Scheme to cut tariff lines to fall within the target band of 0-5 %. As of 
2007
41
, AFTA managed to put approximately 98.58 % of total products in ASEAN 
under the Inclusion List, with 93.67 % of these products having tariff within the 0-5 % 
range. The rest of the products having tariffs above 5 % are products that are in the 
Sensitive List and the General Exclusion List respectively. Considering specifically 
ASEAN-6 economies, 98.67 % of products in the Inclusion List were brought down to 
0-5 %. Within this category, 71.44 % of these products had already achieved 0 % tariff.  
For the rest of ASEAN, 97.32 % of their products were included into Inclusion List, and 
86.21 % of these products had achieved the tariff band of 0-5 %. The products that 
remained in the Sensitive List were minimal as they accounted for only 0.51 % of the 
tariff lines in Cambodia, 1.90 % in Laos and 0.25 % in Myanmar. Thus, at the time that 
the research investigated this free trade area in 2007, the average tariff rate under the 
CEPT Scheme for ASEAN-6 was very low at approximately 1.59 %. This amount had 
been hugely reduced considering the average tariff of 12.76 % in 1993. And for the rest 
of ASEAN, the average tariff rate was around 4.4 % in that same year. It can be seen 
                                                          
41
 At the time of writing this thesis: 2009, the most updated data available was in 2007.  
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that in 2007, AFTA was very close to its full realization of the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
status already.  
 
Taking above causes into consideration, the study perceives the year 2007 to be an 
important year in which to examine AFTA. This is because besides average tariffs 
among membership countries were near to the ground in 2007, it was also the time that 
the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) had agreed to enhance the CEPT Scheme as a 
legal instrument. This decision led to the signing of the ASEAN Trade in Goods 
Agreement (ATIGA) later in 2009. With the hope of establishing the single market, 
namely the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), by 2015, this agreement would, in 
fact, act beyond an ordinary agreement: being a rule-based trade facilitating medium 
aiming to enhance the confidence of traders coming from within and outside the 
region
42
. In the case of the ATIGA coming into law, the CEPT agreement and certain 
protocols would be superseded. Therefore, in evaluating the success of AFTA which 
has the CEPT Scheme as the major tool for trade liberalization, the year 2007 is thus the 
appropriate time to account for the effects. With ATIGA and other related developments 
in trading policies, substantive changes could have occurred in the ASEAN economies 
after 2007. In that case, it would clearly be more complicated, if not impossible, to 
isolate the effectiveness of the key liberalization mechanism: the CEPT Scheme 
exhibited in AFTA from other sources. Secondly, at the time of conducting this piece of 
research, which was in early 2009, the best available data on ASEAN countries was 
complete up to 2007. Last but not least, 2007 was also the year that the last AFTA 
member, Cambodia, had transferred the remaining products under the Temporary 
                                                          
42
 See Appendix II. 
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Exclusion List into the Inclusion List. With this progress, there were no products left in 
the Temporary Exclusion List under the CEPT Scheme.   
 
1.5 Organization and scope of the thesis  
 
In pursuing the upcoming plan to create the AEC in 2015, ASEAN require a more 
integrated approach, especially in the trade dimension. Prior to that, it is, however, 
important to state the performance of the current form of regional economic integration, 
the long-established free trade zone: AFTA. The fundamental question often addressed 
by economists and policy makers within the region, is whether the creation of AFTA 
has brought about the desired effects for the member states over this time. The question 
of ‘how far have we come?’, even though it sounds simple, is very important and indeed 
necessary to allow AFTA members to consider and realize their position before 
strategizing any appropriate actions in order to obtain the best economic outcome from 
regional economic integration of any type. Otherwise, even if the most profound 
regional economic formation is established, it could end up as nothing more than the so-
called ‘vision’ statement.   
 
Given this background, the advanced progress of AFTA (in 2007), plus an improvement 
in ASEAN’s trade data prompt this study to reflect on examinations made regarding the 
past studies on ‘AFTA-effects’. An updated empirical account is essentially required for 
an evaluation of AFTA which is also vital for the whole region’s future plan regarding 
economic integration. The following chapter, Chapter 2, therefore deals with the 
concept of the ‘Gravity Model’ in the study of international trade as it is the empirical 
tool that this thesis relies on. The chapter starts by describing why, in comparison to 
33 
 
other empirical tools, the ‘Gravity Model’ has become one of the most popular means to 
study RTA(s)-effects on countries’ trade flows. The origin of the model in the subject of 
international trade is also elaborated here. As far as theoretical foundations of the 
‘Gravity Model’ are the concern, the chapter selectively presents key literature that 
justified the model’s theoretical grounds. The chapter additionally explains various 
forms of empirical specification of the model that are commonly employed to study the 
issue. Last but not least, the chapter points out the format of the empirical gravity 
specification that the thesis will be used as a benchmark.   
 
Chapter 3 discusses the application of the ‘Gravity Model’ to ASEAN’s trade database; 
ASEAN’s trade ties are examined in general and ‘AFTA-effects’ on intra-ASEAN trade 
flows are assessed, in particular. The chapter starts off reviewing related research in 
detail. Concerns regarding methodologies and modelling issues from past studies are 
also discussed. Aiming to control for several biases found in traditional cross-sectional 
work, the panel data framework is, in consequence, proposed as the solution. The time 
dimension of panel structure makes it possible to consider the role of the ‘business 
cycle’ or the time dimension in the long period panel data. Furthermore, it allows 
heterogeneities between trade-pairs to be observed and controlled for: the area in which 
traditional cross-section analysis ceases to function. By relying on the panel data 
structure, the upshot of ‘AFTA-effects’ on countries’ trade flows can therefore be 
evaluated using a time-variant AFTA dummy variable which captures not only 
membership status but also the point in time that each member joins the cooperation. 
Chapter 4 continues to work on the application of the ‘Gravity Model’, extending the 
domain of the analysis to cover membership countries and ASEAN’s top 10 most 
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important trading partners outside the region. In general, trade impacts of AFTA are 
assessed but this time the analysis covers both intra-regional and extra-regional trade 
flows. In the same manner as Chapter 3, the first part of this chapter discusses literature 
reviews. In aiming to control for several biases found in conventional cross-section 
estimation techniques, the panel data setting is thus, again, anticipated as an empirical 
framework in this appliance. By relying on a similar approach, the result from this study 
can, in addition, be perceived as the robustness test for the estimated results concerning 
‘AFTA-effects’ obtained in the previous chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 provides an independent theoretical account illustrating pure economic 
motives underlying the incidence of RTA-membership expansion. The idea stems from 
the standard political economy framework: the ‘Domino Theory of Regionalism’ of 
Baldwin (1995). Even so, the theoretical model developed is original, focusing 
specifically on conceptualizing the pure economic reasons underlying non-members’ 
decisions towards calling for RTA-membership in differing circumstances. In brief, this 
chapter aims to point out cases where RTAs are an outcome of large trade flows rather 
than a source: RTAs are endogenous. Even though this theoretical chapter is not directly 
related to AFTA as it was largely driven by political motives, this theoretical 
development can be used to analyze other forms of RTAs that involved large (trade) 
countries or developed nations. The theoretical model is then set up under the standard 
symmetric-tariff and countries’ size assumptions. Given the positive model of the RTA, 
trading partners’ gains from trade and their welfare effects are then compared and 
contrasted between the case whereby of one of them decides to join the existing RTA, 
and the case that she continues to trade without having RTA-membership. The 
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outcomes of these actions which are observed in the form of profits and welfare gains 
are assumed to be the only factors that drive countries to engage in the existing RTA in 
this application. The chapter finishes by relaxing this symmetric-tariff assumption. With 
asymmetric tariffs, countries’ gains from trade as well as welfare effects are then re-
examined in a set of differing circumstances. In this case, beside the country’s status of 
being the RTA-membership, the status of her trading partners, whether or not they are 
RTA members and their tariff levels as well as the size of the bloc, would play an 
important role in determining the gains/losses from trade as well as welfare effects in 
this specific country. The chapter illustrates that with a simple alteration: the 
asymmetric tariff assumption, calculating a country’s gains from trade, especially in the 
form of welfare, can be markedly complicated.    
 
Chapter 6 briefly provides the conclusion of the whole thesis.  
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2: Description of the Model Concept: Theoretical Framework of the ‘Gravity Model’ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
For more than half a century the ‘Gravity Model’ or so-called ‘Gravity Framework’ has 
been used extensively in international trade studies. Even though the research’s focus is 
to use the ‘Gravity Model’ to evaluate impacts of AFTA or intra-bloc bias, its usages 
are, in fact, versatile ranging from, for instance, examining trade flows, identifying trade 
patterns both within and across countries, quantifying trade effects of various forms of 
economic integration, to evaluating impacts of other trade-related policies. Even so, 
before moving on to discuss the model’s theoretical foundations in this chapter, it is 
worth providing some backgrounds as to why the ‘Gravity Model’ had become one of 
the most famous empirical tools in studying the issue.  
 
Apart from the celebration of the ‘Gravity Model’, some trade economists, however, 
relied on a simple method called ‘trade-share statistics’ to measure RTA(s)-effects or 
any intra-regional bias of sampling countries. This statistical assessment is, in fact, 
described in the form of a ratio, having the numerator as the trade share that country 
pairs carry out with each other and the denominator as the total trade undertaken by 
particular RTA-membership countries. From the definition given, it can be seen that this 
method actually measures the concentration of trade within a particular bloc. Because of 
this simple setting, the ‘trade-share statistics’ contained few shortcomings, but those 
which are present are major. Firstly, it does not adjust for the size of the RTA; secondly, 
it fails to take into account any divergent characteristics of each RTA and, lastly, it 
37 
 
cannot control for any impacts of the time dimension. As a result, it was usually found 
that the larger the RTA is, the higher its intra-regional trade ratio becomes. On several 
occasions, the intra-regional trade share of many RTAs had, in addition, been found to 
have progressively increased, in spite of the fact that those RTAs did not appear to be 
active in reality at all.  
 
As far as reliable RTA(s)-effects on countries’ trade flows are concerned, Frankel and 
Wei (1996), which aimed to measure intra-regional biases of numerous RTAs across the 
globe, had also addressed negative aspects found using the ‘trade-share statistics’ to 
examine APEC’s and Western Europe’s intra-bloc biases. In particular, the high values 
of intra-regional trade shares within these blocs were perceived to be driven by their 
large size (size is influenced by the number of membership countries and/or the size of 
each trading country), instead of the large amount of trade that was actually conducted. 
For this reason, Frankel and Wei (1996), in addition, disclosed that this trade-share ratio 
actually measures the ‘effects of bilateral trade’ instead of evaluating effects of 
preferential tariffs or other trade-related policies as many have understood. In order to 
adjust for any measurement errors which may occur from an increase in size of each 
country plus biases found from the overall bloc’s size effects, Frankel and Wei (1996) 
therefore suggested that researchers have to consider including all countries that are 
trading in the world at that moment in order to obtain a ratio of 100 % as a benchmark. 
By doing so, the statistical value indicating a particular bloc’s trade share can thus be 
comparable to this world setting that is fixed at 100 %. This basically explains that any 
particular bloc’s bias or their intra-regional trade share has to be adjusted for its 
importance against the world’s trade or the particular reference group being discussed. 
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Otherwise, the intra-regional trade share obtained is not informative as there is no 
comparative sector to be judged upon. The high statistical value from the ‘trade-share 
statistics’ only implies that the concentration of trade within the group is large which, as 
aforementioned, could probably be because that particular region has many membership 
countries and/or this group of countries is comprised of large trading partners. Even 
with this adjustment, the ‘trade share statistics’ are yet able to control for any impacts 
across the time dimension. Any special events occurred within the group of RTA-
members or even nearby regions at a particular timeframe may play a part in shaping 
RTA-members’ trade patterns to be lower or higher than it is supposed to be. In 
measuring the true effects of a RTA, a good empirical tool should therefore be able to 
control such time-driven factors that could potentially manipulate sampling countries’ 
trade flows. In their paper, the ‘Gravity Model’ was therefore concluded as an empirical 
tool.     
 
Given the downside of the simple ‘trade-share statistics’, an alternative method 
suggested measuring RTA(s)-effects on members’ trade flows by dividing the intra-
regional trade share abovementioned by that particular region’s share of world trade. 
This term is known as the ‘concentration ratio’ or the ‘intensity ratio’ as it, in fact, 
evaluates whether the level of bilateral trade observed is geographically concentrated 
(Frankel and Wei, 1996). If this ratio is larger than 1, it implies that trade is 
concentrated within this group of countries while if the ratio is less than 1, its means 
that there is no regional bias found within this group of countries. If, however, this ratio 
is fairly close to 1, it means that the level of bilateral trade that takes place in this 
specific region is proportionate to these countries’ total trade. Despite such 
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developments, the statistical method is still not able to distinguish the source of intra-
regional concentration. Intuitively, regional bias may be caused by geographical 
influences, RTA-memberships or even other unobserved or unknown factors. Trade 
economists as well as policy makers were, for this reason, interested to find out what 
forces truly drive or influence regional concentration in trade. In this regard, the 
standard ‘Gravity Model’ with proper estimating technique will still, nonetheless, be 
able to tackle these issues.  
 
As the key empirical task was then to disentangle trade effects of a particular RTA from 
any other RTAs and whichever changes in an economy that could affect trade flows, 
another empirical method that has been invented to scrutinize RTA(s)-effects on trade 
flows is the Computable General Equilibrium model: the so-called ‘CGE’ model. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the ‘trade-share statistics’, the ‘concentration ratio’ and the 
‘Gravity Framework’ that aim to study trade effects of RTA(s) ex-post, this technique 
focuses on examining RTA(s)-effects from an ex-ante perspective. It, in addition, claims 
to evaluate these effects in the form of welfare. In principle, the CGE model usually 
assumes tight theoretical structures with specific functional forms, particular parameter 
values as well as fixed terms of trade in representing countries of interest in a base year 
with the pre-RTA situation. Furthermore, most CGE studies usually do assume across 
the board elimination of tariffs in order to ease the calculating procedures (Dee and 
Gali, 2003). In general, the model then works on a counterfactual analysis, assuming 
there is a removal of tariffs in order to calculate the potential welfare effects of a 
particular RTA or trade bloc. However, because of these strong assumptions, many 
trade economists have cast doubted on the CGE model’s findings. This is because, for 
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example, the fixed terms of trade assumption directly prohibits the research from 
finding the terms of trade changes from the RTA which is in fact the key empirical 
question in this field of research. Such simple yet rigid assumptions aforementioned 
have furthermore ignored the complex patterns of real RTAs, which if comparing to the 
‘Gravity Model’, the latter does not, examining actual RTAs, taking into consideration 
real trade data as well as other complexities of RTAs at the same time. In this regard, 
the ‘Gravity Model’ is, hence, perceived to be able to explain the reality of international 
trade flows better than the CGE model which works on the simulated RTAs. By 
examining RTA(s)-effects in the form of an ex-ante evaluation, the CGE model is, in 
addition, considered a rough estimation when compared to the ‘Gravity Model’ which 
directly measures RTA(s)-effects ex-post. In addition, the ‘Gravity Model’ not only 
estimates the level of bilateral trade that is supposed to be within and between trade-
pairs but also enables the user to segregate RTA(s)-effects from the actual trade flows 
that have occurred. This can be done via the cross-sectional, the time-serial as well as 
the panel data frameworks according to each research’s interest. Nevertheless, 
concerning an evaluation of the welfare effects of RTA(s), readers have to keep in mind 
that the ‘Gravity Model’ does not measure welfare effects from RTA(s) directly but 
focuses on finding their trade effects (trade creation and trade diversion). This is so 
because the model perceives that welfare is an unobservable term and the link between 
RTA(s)-effects and welfare terms should not be as straightforward as usually assumed 
in the CGE-based research.  
 
From the choice of empirical tools discussed thus far, this, to a certain extent, explains 
why the ‘Gravity Model’ has been vindicated eventually. Nevertheless, it is important to 
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address here that the research is far from saying that the ‘Gravity Model’ is flawless but 
given the limitations of other empirical tools, the model is certainly a better-quality 
medium for dealing with the subject of interest. Eichengreen and Irwin (1998), which 
studied the role of history in bilateral trade flows, had even regarded the ‘Gravity 
Model’ as the workhorse in this field of research, 
  
 The rise of regionalism continues to post challenges for specialists in 
 international trade. One classic question is the aggregate welfare effects of 
 regional trade liberalization. Another is the political economy of 
 regionalism…A third question, with which we are concerned in this paper, is 
 how important regional arrangements actually have been for the pattern of trade.  
  
 The gravity model of international trade has been the workhorse for empirical 
 studies of this question to the virtual exclusion of other approaches 
 (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998, p. 33).  
 
To date, the ‘Gravity Model’ has, in fact, been used to evaluate trade effects of 
numerous RTA(s) across the globe. This chapter selectively reviews a few key 
empirical accounts that studied these issues on major RTAs, especially during early 
2000s as it was at this time that the trend of regionalism was strong. For instance, 
Martinez-Zarzoso (2003) employed the ‘Gravity Model’ to evaluate effects of well-
known RTAs: the European Union (EU), the North-American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Centro-American Common 
Market (CACM), on 47 countries’ trade flows during 1980-1999. The model was 
estimated on the panel data set using several methodologies: the year-by-year OLS 
estimator, the between estimator and the within estimator to compare estimated results. 
With respect to an evaluation of RTA(s)-effects, in conclusion, the estimated 
coefficients on dummy variables for memberships in RTAs provide mixed results. 
Briefly, the coefficients are positive and significant from 1985 onwards for EU                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
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,but for NAFTA, they are positively significant only from 1995. For CARICOM, the 
coefficients are positive and significant from 1980-1985 only. Estimated coefficients for 
CACM present positive coefficients in all years but they become insignificant in the 
second half of the 1990s. 
 
Marinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003) employed the ‘Gravity Framework’ 
when investigating MERCOSUR-EU trade on 20 countries’ trade flows43 from 1988 to 
1996. Constructing the panel data, the ‘Gravity Model’ was estimated using the fixed 
effects specification. When emphasizing intra-bloc effects for both MERCOSUR and 
EU, these RTA-membership dummy variables present a positive sign and are 
statistically significant as expected. To be precise, the estimated results on the 
MERCOSUR dummy variable implied that intra-MERCOSUR is approximately 49 % 
above the expected level while intra-EU trade is about 18 % higher than what the 
gravity variables assumed.   
 
Focusing only on Sub-Saharan countries, Kirkpatrick and Watanabe (2005) focused on 
finding trade effects of the famous East African Trade Cooperation (EAC) on Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Examining 84 countries
44’ trade flows during 1970-2001, the 
‘Gravity Model’ analysis which was estimated using the Tobit Maximum Likelihood 
estimator, indicates a mean coefficient on intra-bloc trade of EAC equal to 1.08. 
However, considering yearly estimates of the EAC, the intra-bloc trade coefficient is 
volatile over time
45
. Such changes were perceived to be related to the collapse and 
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 They are 15 EU countries and 5 MERCOSUR countries. 
44
 This includes 40 reporting countries: 16 Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 South Asia, 6 Southeast Asia, 5 Latin 
America and 7 Middle East countries and 44 partner countries.  
45
 The estimated value is 2.28 in 1970 which then fell to 0.04 in 1978 and went up to 1.90 in 1996.  
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redevelopment of the the whole East African Integration that occurred during the same 
period. However, the study concluded that the formation of EAC supports the expansion 
of trade between membership countries.   
 
Additional literature that employed the ‘Gravity Framework’ to study trade effects of 
renowned RTAs are briefly summarized as follows. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
studied trade effects of the European Economic Community (EEC) - and the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) from 1956 to 1992. Gros and Gonciarz (1996) and 
Nilsson (2000) studied RTA(s)-effects of the EU and the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) in the early 1990s. Sapir (2001) examined trade effects of EU and 
EFTA from 1960-1992. McCallum (1995), Dhar and Panagariya (1994), and Hassan 
(2001) attempted to evaluate NAFTA-effects together with other RTAs in the same 
study
46
.  
 
Even though today there is a large amount of gravity-based literatures available, in the 
early days, the ‘Gravity Model’ was criticized for a lack of theoretical foundations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Thus any empirical tasks that had applied this gravity framework were doubted as being 
a result of mere intuitive notion. Because of the fact that numerous significant and 
robust empirical verifications have been delivered, many have agreed those pieces of 
evidence ought to be more than accidental phenomena. As time goes by, more than a 
few theoretical accounts have succeeded in finding theoretical foundations for the 
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 McCallum (1995) studied trade effects and trade potential of NAFTA and The U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSTA) in 1988, Dhar and Panagariya (1994) studied trade effects of the European 
Commission (EC), East Asia as well as NAFTA from 1980-1991. Hassan (2001) investigated RTA(s)-
effects of The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), ASEAN, EEC and NAFTA 
from 1996 to 1997.  
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‘Gravity Model’, of course under differing circumstances47. It can be said that concerns 
over the model being set up without theories are rather outdated. Nevertheless, before 
proceeding to employ the ‘Gravity Model’ to evaluate AFTA’s performance in 
promoting intra-regional and extra-regional trade, this chapter perceives it is worthwhile 
casting light on key literature that has laid out the fundamental theoretical grounds of 
the model.  
 
As the focus of this chapter is to lay out some theoretical foundations of the ‘Gravity 
Model’, the paper is comprised of 3 subsections. This research goes back to the time 
when the ‘Gravity Model’ was brought into the study of international trade in Section 
2.2. This is also where the research reviews early gravity-based accounts that claimed to 
justify the model theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, in Section 2.3, the research 
specifically highlights Anderson (1979) as it was pioneering research, attempting to 
validate the model’s theoretical foundations as well as its (gravity) equation as 
commonly specified. The section explains the simplest form of the ‘Gravity Model’ 
which was derived from the linear expenditure systems. The chapter closes by 
reviewing theoretical settings of an applied work by Oguledo and Macphee (1994) in 
Section 2.4. This piece of research was, in actual fact, developed further from Anderson 
(1979). However, in contrast to the conventional setting of the ‘Gravity Model’ in which 
the price term was generally omitted, Oguledo and Macphee (1994) theoretically 
included price as one of the factors that influences trade flows between countries 
explicitly. The theoretical concepts as specified in Oguledo and Macphee (1994) are, in 
fact, to be relied upon throughout the empirical analyses in this thesis. Not only is this 
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 See for examples, Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Helpman (1987), Bergstrand (1989, 1990). 
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approach perceived to be a more realistic theoretical set up of the ‘Gravity Model’ as the 
notion of price is directly included, but more importantly, as far as the research’s 
objective is concerned, its purpose is also akin to this thesis’s interest i.e. evaluating 
RTA(s)-effects on trade flows.    
 
2.2 Origin of the ‘Gravity Model’ in the study of international trade  
 
‘Laws of Universal Gravitation’ or, briefly, ‘Laws of Gravity’ came into existence in the 
16
th
 Century. Natural phenomena in which objects with mass attract one another were 
considered to be more than coincidental occurrences. Isaac Newton proved that these 
incidents occur systematically via interactions of mass, distance and gravitational 
forces. Since then, ‘Newton’s Laws of Gravity’ have been applied to other disciplines.  
 
The very first ‘Gravity Model’ of social sciences was brought into the field by Carey in 
the 1860s, using the metaphor of Newtonian physics to define gravitational interactions 
of social incidents, in order to explain human behaviours, in particular. Carey (1858) 
remarked on his observations concerning social gravitation that:  
 
“Gravitation is here, as everywhere else in the material world, in the direct ratio      
  of the mass and in the inverse one of the distance” (Carey ,1858, p. 644). 
 
 
Even so, it was not until the 1950s that the so-called ‘Gravity Framework’ came into 
practice in the subject of international trade. Walter Isard
48
 noticed that the ‘Gravity 
Model’ applied in the social sciences could plausibly be modified to explain trade flows 
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 He is regarded as the principal founder of regional sciences.  
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among countries. Nevertheless, this was examined as a part of the ‘Location Theory’49 
and the ‘Regional Analysis’50 during that period. Following ‘Newton’s Laws of Gravity’, 
trade flows between countries are hypothetically related to their respective sizes and the 
distance between them. The traditional setting of the ‘Gravity Model’ of trade was thus 
of the form:  
 
                                                           
  
   
 
   
                                                            (2.1) 
 
From the equation above, Xij represents trade flows between countries i and j and Dij 
denotes the distance between them. Yi and Yj signify countries’ sizes which are written 
in the form of national incomes and γ is given as the constant term.  In addition, α and β 
are and λ are parameters to be estimated. While α, β are imposed to capture income 
elasticity of country i and country j respectively, λ is imposed to indicated a distance 
elasticity. As is evident, bilateral trades were assumed to be positively related to size 
and negatively obstructed by distance between trade-pairs.    
 
What made the ‘Gravity Model’ stand out? This is certainly an interesting question to 
ask. The answer, in fact, lies amidst contradictions between trade theories and the 
empirical evidence found. As far as empirical evidence was concerned, it was, to a large 
extent, observed that countries did engage in the type of ‘Intra-Industry Trade’ in which 
(differentiated) products under the same industry are traded. At that period, such 
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 The subject is concerned with the geographic location of economic activity. Later, it became a part of 
economic geography.  
50
 It is commonly known as ‘Regional Sciences’. It is a field in the Social Sciences that are generally 
concerned with spatial dimensions of societies. Analyses cover urban, rural as well as regional issues.  
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findings undoubtedly challenged the classical views underlined by the factor abundance 
theory
51
. Further investigations as well as alternative theories were called for, as many 
agreed that considering only factor endowments as a way of quantifying a country’s 
comparative advantage and as a key economic reason to trade was deemed too 
contracted a way to explain the reality of international trade. This is where the ‘Gravity 
Model’ was employed formally as an innovative empirical tool to assess international 
trade flows. As a result, bilateral trade relationships, as well as global trading patterns 
were made evident for the first time.  
 
In this regard, Nobel laureate Tinbergen is considered the first to have conducted 
empirical research applying the ‘Gravity Model’ (it was then regarded as the gravity 
equation) to the study of international trade flows. Aiming to provide a report 
determining normal patterns of international trade in the absence of trade impediments, 
the gravity equation was estimated on 18 countries’ trade flows in the year 195852. In 
addition to the basic gravity variables: countries’ sizes and bilateral distance, dummy 
variables were also employed to capture effects of preferential trade agreements
53
. 
Basically, each preferential dummy variable was given the value of 1 if particular trade-
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 The classical Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model is one of the fundamental theoretical trade models that 
build on Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. It assumes that countries are completely specialized 
and only trade (export) products in which their factors of production are abundant. In such a setting, input 
costs are perceived as a key factor determining a country’s profitability. This further implies that 
production output is of a constant return to scale type where the same levels of technological 
developments are also restricted. In conclusion, such strong restrictions allow no room for (different types 
of) firm to exist, as production functions consequently have to be identical for all countries. It can be said 
that, as long as these assumptions hold, this type of intra-industry trade would not be allowed to occur in 
the H-O world.  
52
 They are Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa, Japan, Canada, USA, Austria, BLEU, Denmark, France, 
Western Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and Australia. The study 
was also extended to include 42 countries’ trade flows in 1959 as a robustness check.    
53
 The dummy variables were imposed to capture preferential treatment of the British Commonwealth and 
Benelux.  
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pairs belonged to the same trade agreement: otherwise, the value would be 0. Tinbergen 
(1962)’s model was: 
 
           
  
  
  
    
 
  
  
  
     
 
      
                                           (2.2) 
 
where G is a constant term, the first and second terms of the numerator capture 
countries’ incomes written in the form of income per capita times population. Dij 
represents physical distance between particular trade-pairs. 
 
The above model was extended further to capture preferential effects in the following 
form: 
 
                                          
  
  
  
    
 
  
  
  
     
 
      
          
      
                     (2.3) 
 
where G is a constant, N denotes a set of dummy variables posted to capture neighbouring 
countries. The PRC dummy variable was posted to account for any trade effects from 
the Commonwealth preference. PRB was, in the same manner, posted to capture the 
Benelux preference on trade.  
 
Almost concurrently but independently, PÖyhonen (1963) used the gravity concept to 
examine the exchange of goods between 10 European countries in 1958
54
. The strength 
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of the ‘Gravity Model’ was notably acknowledged as Pullianen (1963) extended this 
same data set, testing the validity of the model on a larger scale with 62 (non-
communist) countries over the period of 1948-1960. The results showed that the pattern 
of trade flows in these 62 countries did not alter much over the period of study. This 
then implied that trade flows were rather consistent over a period of years and the 
1958’s estimate was therefore concluded as a reliable outcome. In that period, Leamer 
and Stern (1970) also acknowledged the use of the ‘Gravity Model’ in studying 
international trade flows in their book: ‘Quantitative International Economics’. 
Provided with the consensus of these empirical studies the ‘Gravity Model’ has been a 
subject of study ever since.  
 
Notwithstanding its empiric origin, the ‘Gravity Model’ became widely known after it 
was used to test trade theories of interest in various applications. In general, the 
empirical success of the ‘Gravity Model’ was deemed to be in support of the 
monopolistic competition explanation of intra-industry trade
55
. Even so, formal 
associations between theories and empirical work were criticized as absent. It can be 
said that while, on the one hand, the ‘Gravity Model’ has been employed to test trade 
theories of interest, on the other hand the model itself was searching for its own 
backbone. 
 
Despite the doubt concerning similarities between physical gravitation and trading 
relationships, Linneman (1966), nonetheless, derived the ‘Gravity Model’ to explain 
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 In the world in which intra-industry trade exists, each country is assumed to specialize in different 
product varieties. The firms in different countries may produce the same product varieties in Autarky, but 
because it is also assumed that, with trade, they can choose to produce a variety that is profit maximizing, 
it ends up that there is trade in these product varieties.  See, Helpman (1987) and Hummel and Levinsohn 
(1995), for examples.   
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international trade flows. As a result, his account was the earliest attempt that provided 
theoretical explanations for the ‘Gravity Model’ in the international trade arena. In his 
setting, gravitational relationships were linked with international trade flows under a 
quasi-Walrasian general equilibrium framework. Countries’ incomes were proxied as 
the level of demand in the importing country and the level of supply in the exporting 
one. The basic reason for countries to trade was assumed to be the mismatch between 
levels of demand and supply in each country. In addition, countries were perceived to be 
different in terms of comparative advantages, which could be explained by economies 
of scale and levels of technological development. Linneman (1966) basically asserted 
that the ‘Gravity Model’ was a reduced form of a (four equations) partial equilibrium 
model of export supply and import demand functions. Distance was used as a proxy for 
transport cost as its impacts could drive demand and supply away from an equilibrium. 
The price terms were treated as endogenous and thus implicit as they were adjusted to 
equate supply and demand in this setting. In the same vein as Tinbergen (1962), a set of 
trade-preferential dummy variables were employed to capture any positive effects of 
trade agreements on membership trading partners. Although Linneman (1966)’s 
framework was an eye-opening contribution, it was still considered too simple to 
explain the reality in cross-country trade relationships. 
 
2.3 The pioneering research: theoretical foundations of the ‘Gravity Model’ of trade 
 
Despite the lack of rigid theories, early research continued to favour the use of the 
‘Gravity Model’ in empirical studies. This was so, simply because of its high estimating 
power that often provided statistically significant results. In fact, it was not until the late 
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1970s that the proper theoretical justification of the model was established. In this 
sense, Anderson (1979) was regarded as the first account that provided legitimate 
theoretical grounds for the model; the simple form of the ‘Gravity Model’ was shown to 
be derived from a linear Cobb-Douglas expenditure system. As his work has been 
developed further into various applications, empirically and theoretically
56
, this section 
of the thesis perceives it is important to underline the essential arguments stated in his 
findings.  
 
In brief, Anderson (1979) started off the analysis by assuming that bilateral trade 
between country i and country j was costless (no tariffs or transport costs) and each 
country was completely specialized in the production of its own good. The latter 
assumption consequently implied that there is only one good produced in each country. 
Having identical Cobb-Douglas preferences applied, this led to symmetry in the share 
of traded goods in all countries and income elasticities always sum to unity. In 
consequence, country j’s consumption (imports from) on countrcy i’s products was 
denoted as:  
 
                                                                                                                          (2.4) 
 
where Mij represents consumption in value or quantity of goods i in country j, bi denotes 
the share of income spent on country i’s products by country j, and Yj symbolizes 
country j’s income. With the assumption of trade balance assumed, country i’s income: 
Yi, has to be equal to its product’s sales to country j. Thus, this accordingly implies that: 
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 Theoretical frameworks that progressed further from Anderson’s (1979) work are, for instance, Oguleo 
and Macphee (1994) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).  
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                                                             (2.5) 
          
Given Eq. (2.4) and Eq. (2.5), bi was solved and substituted back into Eq. (2.5) giving 
the simplest form of the ‘Gravity Model’ as: 
 
           
     
    
                                  (2.6)                        
    
Even though the above equation can be estimated using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method
57
, it has not been employed in any applications. This is because, given 
the assumptions previously used: identical preferences, income elasticities of unity as 
well as the same and constant prices across countries, the above model is considered too 
basic to capture the truth in international trade relationships. In order to disclose the 
more realistic scenarios, Anderson (1979) further assumed that countries (i and j) 
basically produce 2 types of goods; traded and non-traded goods. Another assumption: 
identical preferences which imply income elasticities of unity as well as the same and 
constant price across countries, was also relaxed. In addition, variations in traded goods 
shares of total expenditure were allowed to depend on income (Yi, Yj) and population 
(Ni, Nj) across countries
58
. As Фi and Фj symbolize country i’s and country j’s shares of 
all traded goods in the total expenditure, their relationships with income and population 
were stated accordingly as: 
 
     Фi = Fi(Yi, Ni)      (2.7) 
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 This can be done by disregarding the error structure or assuming it is well-behaved. 
58
 This notion was originally suggested in ‘Patterns of Industrial Growth’ by Chenery (1960).  
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     Фj = Fj(Yj, Nj)                 (2.8) 
         
In this setting, each country’s utility function was thus written as: 
 
    U = u [g (traded goods), (non-traded goods)]            (2.9) 
           
where g is preference function. Considering Eq. (2.9), it further implies that this 
preference function was assumed to be weakly separable with respect to the partition 
between traded and non-traded goods. 
 
As Eq. (2.9) portrays, it can be seen that the expenditure on traded goods-shares is 
determined as if it is a homothetic utility function in traded goods alone. The country’s 
traded goods-shares are thus functions of traded goods’ prices. The demand equation of 
an importing country: country j’s consumption on country i’s goods (Mij) was thus 
derived as:  
 
                          (2.10) 
       
where Ɵi denotes the expenditure on country i’s traded goods in country j’s total 
expenditure on tradable goods. As the trade balance condition was, again, assumed to 
hold, country i’s income could be described as: 
 
                         (2.11) 
  
54 
 
Finally, the ‘Gravity Model’ was subsequently derived as:  
 
                                                                    
        
       
               (2.12) 
 
The above equation can be specified under the condition of zero-transport costs or the 
free trade assumption. It is however important to note that the true objective of 
Anderson (1979) was to theoretically justify one of the most common empirical 
specifications of the gravity equation of this form: 
 
                                                         
    
    
    
     
                    (2.13) 
         
where Mijk represents the flow of good k from country i to country j, and Yi and Yj 
denote the incomes of country i and country j, respectively. Ni and Nj represent the 
population of country i and country j, Dij represents the distance between trade-pairs and 
Uijk is a log normally distributed error term.  
 
In order to obtain the above equation, the ‘Gravity Model’ as stated in Eq. (2.12) had to 
be re-derived. Anderson (1979) complicated the aforementioned assumptions further to 
incorporate a many goods case (k variations of product) and non-zero trade costs which 
is assumed to be an increasing function of distance. Hence, with Cobb-Douglas 
preference, country j’s demand was, as a result, described as: 
  
                                                              
 
      
                  (2.14) 
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where     denotes aggregate trade flows between country i and country j,       
represents the common aggregate traded-good expenditure share for country i’s goods, 
     is the total expenditure on traded goods of country j, and f(dij) represents transit 
cost factor (τijk) that is an increasing function of distance and is assumed to be the same 
across commodities ; thus, in this case, τijk = f(dij) with f(0) = 1 and f´ >0). The Uij is a 
log normally distributed error term with E (ln Uijk) = 0. Again, with the trade balance 
condition assumed implying               ,country i’s income was written 
accordingly as:  
 
                                                                      
 
      
               (2.15) 
     
In this case, the ‘Gravity Model’ was derived accordingly as: 
 
              
           
      
  
 
      
    
    
      
  
 
      
                  (2.16) 
 
Considering the ‘Gravity Model’ in Eq. (2.16) and the common empirical specification 
in Eq. (2.13), it can be seen that the major difference is the term
59
   
    
      
  
 
      
   .  
Given that the majority of traditional research was conducted on cross-section analysis, 
this famous form of the gravity specification could thus be prone to omitted variable 
biases as such a term was not usually taken into consideration in the specification. 
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 In fact, there are 2 other distinctive points 1) the ‘Gravity Model’ derived is in an aggregated form and  
2) the 1/f(dij) is not in the log-linear form.  
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Nevertheless, Anderson (1979) acknowledged the cross-section specification as stated 
in Eq. (2.13), seeing that the bias was negligible
60
 and the simplicity of estimating the 
general form of the gravity specification surmounted it. It is thus not surprising if one 
were to generally observe the form of the gravity equation as indicated in Eq. (2.13) in 
practice, since it is one of the most renowned versions of the ‘Gravity Model’ 
commonly specified.  
 
Following Anderson (1979) in employing the product differentiation by country of 
origin assumption, Bergstrand (1985) however investigated on the supply side of 
economies in an attempt to provide theoretical explanations for the ‘Gravity Model’. He 
started by criticizing the conventional specification of the gravity equation that 
generally inhibits the inclusion of the price term. In order to derive the theoretical 
‘Gravity Model’, the standard general equilibrium model of trade in which countries 
maximize the CES utility functions subjected to constraints on countries’ resources and 
trade impediments was conducted. Additional assumptions: 1) bilateral trade between 
country i and country j is small relative to the rest of the world
61
 and 2) identical utility 
and production functions across countries were also imposed to simplify the calculation. 
Even though Bergstand (1985) accepted the theoretical grounds used to derive the 
‘Gravity Model’ in Anderson (1979), the latter was perceived to work under the 
restriction of certain assumptions: for example, perfect substitutability of goods in 
consumption and production as well as perfect commodity arbitrage. Regarding this, 
Bergstand (1985) inserted empirical evidence to support the claim that there are 
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 This is especially so when countries of interest are in the same region (Anderson, 1979, p. 113). 
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 This is to imply that certain price levels can be treated as exogenous. 
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differences in products’ price levels across countries and suggested that the price term 
should be included in deriving the theoretical ‘Gravity Model’.   
 
Since Bergstand (1985), several theoretical analyses have followed to provide 
alternative justifications for the ‘Gravity Model’. For instance, Helpman (1987) and 
Bergstrand (1989, 1990) employed the monopolistic competition framework of the new 
trade theory to provide theoretical grounds for the ‘Gravity Model’. In brief, the basic 
assumption whereby the product is differentiated by country of origin was replaced by 
the assumption that the product is differentiated among firms. Given this assumption, 
the intra-industry trade is allowed to exist. This notion later became the area that the 
empirical success of the ‘Gravity Model’ was deemed to explain. Deardorff (1998), on 
the other hand, imposed the assumption that there is a differentiation among products. 
He, in fact, explained further that the ‘Gravity Model’ or the form of gravity-like 
equations, does characterize many trade models inclusive of the standard H-O model
62
 
which many had, on the contrary, claimed was theoretically inconsistent with the 
‘Gravity Model’. Because of this claim, Deardoff (1998) concluded that the empirical 
results from the ‘Gravity Model’ were regarded as a ‘fact of life’: 
 
 “For reasons I have already indicated, I suspect that just about any plausible 
 model  of trade would yield something very like the gravity equation, whose 
 empirical success is therefore not evidence of anything, but just a fact of life” 
 (Deardoff ,1998, p.12). 
 
Even though the theoretical foundations of the ‘Gravity Model’ have been clarified, the 
debate over which particular theory best describes the empirical findings of the ‘Gravity 
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Model’ is ongoing. This is not the core of this research, however. What matters more is 
whether the ‘Gravity Model’ is able to capture RTA-effects of AFTA as well as 
explaining trading relationships across countries in the form of trade flows in particular. 
From theoretical accounts reviewed thus far, it is reasonable to state that even the 
simplest form of the ‘Gravity Model’ has theoretical grounds.  
 
2.4 The augmented ‘Gravity Model’: theoretical foundations and an application to  
      study RTA-effects on trade flows  
 
As the research aims to employ the ‘Gravity Model’ to evaluate impacts of regional 
trade agreements such as AFTA on its membership’s trade flows, an empirical 
framework has to be constructed. Nevertheless, as far as the theoretical grounds of the 
‘Gravity Model’ and its empirical specification are concerned, this part of the research 
highlights a theoretical note from Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) which has the same 
objective: assessing the trade effects of the RTA(s).  
 
In brief, Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) differs slightly from Anderson (1979)’s study in 
the area, in that the notion of price was directly addressed. This concept is also different 
from other traditional settings of the ‘Gravity Model’ as price terms were commonly 
omitted or perceived to be implicit. Thus, besides all necessary assumptions previously 
imposed in Anderson (1979) (Cobb-Douglas utility functions, productions of traded 
goods and non-traded goods and a preference function that is weakly separable with 
respect to the partition between traded goods and non-traded goods), the study explicitly 
included price terms in the function determining the share of all traded goods in the 
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country’s (i and j) total expenditure63.  As Фi and Фj represent the country’s (i and j) 
shares of all traded goods in the total expenditure, these were therefore described as: 
 
     Фi = Fi (Yi, Ni, Pi)    (2.17) 
              Фj = Fj (Yj, Nj, Pj)     (2.18) 
         
where, as previously, Yi and Yj represent the income of country i and country j, 
respectively. Ni and Nj denote the population size of country i and country j. In this 
setting, the terms Pi and Pj were imposed to capture price levels in both countries. To 
complicate the scenario further, trade costs which were accounted in the form of 
distance were incorporated in this setting. Country j’s imports from country i were thus 
defined as: 
 
          
 
   
              (2.19)         
 
where Mij refers to the value of imports, Tij represents the distance from country i to 
country j
64
 and    symbolizes the share of traded goods i in country j’s total expenditure 
on tradable goods. As the trade balance condition is assumed, the above equation further 
implies trade relationships for country i: 
 
                                                           
 
   
                (2.20) 
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 This is perceived to represent the income effects whereby Фi and Фj are changed because of the change 
in relative price. 
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 Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) in fact explained that besides distance, ad-varolem tariffs might be 
included in order to capture total trade resistance. 
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The study solved for         and substituted it back into Eq. (2.19); the ‘Gravity Model’ 
was therefore derived as: 
 
          
             
          
         (2.21) 
         
where        
 
   
 . In this application, TCij can be seen as the total trade resistance 
variable of which, distance is only a part
65
. However, this term was elaborated further to 
include ad- varolem tariffs as: 
 
               
                   (2.22) 
           
where     
  denotes transport costs from country i to country j and tj represents the ad-
valorem tariffs that are imposed by country j on imported goods from country i. Since 
the denominator of Eq. (2.21) was treated as a constant (k), Oguledo and MacPhee 
(1994) substituted Eq. (2.17) and (2.18) into Eq. (2.21), the gravity equation was, as a 
result, specified as: 
 
       
 
 
  
    
    
    
    
    
       
   
       (2.23)          
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communal languages, common borders as well as ad-valorem tariffs, have also been found to play a role 
in influencing bilateral trade flows across countries 
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In their application, a set of dummy variables was, in addition, added to capture any 
preferential effects from trade agreements
66
. The above equation was rewritten as the 
log-linear form giving the estimating gravity equation as: 
  
 logMij = log(γ/k) + α1logYi + β1logYj + α2logNi + β2logNj + α3logPi + β3logPj + 
                δlogTC^ij + ωlogtj + τlogdij + logUij    (2.24) 
          
where dij represents a set of trade preferential dummy variables.  
 
As evaluating effects of trade preferential policies or regional trade agreements has been 
one source of issues that the ‘Gravity Model’ has exploited, forms of the empirical 
model as well as those following specifications similar to the set-up stated above have 
been relied on in a number of studies
67
. As far as the objective of assessing RTA(s)-
effects is concerned, it can be said that Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) has not only 
confirmed theoretical supports for the augmented ‘Gravity Model’ generally employed 
in empirical studies, but also justified one of the most common specifications of the 
gravity equation being used. As briefly aforementioned, more than a few studies have 
attempted to derive a theoretically-driven ‘Gravity Model’. The fact that different 
economic theories could be used to provide grounds for the ‘Gravity Model’ primarily 
explains why there have been various forms of the gravity equations specified in 
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 They aimed to examine effects of preferential trade arrangements among 11 major preferences giving 
countries. The gravity model is estimated on a cross-section of imports by 11 major preference giving 
countries from 162 countries in the year 1976.  
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 In practice, the dependent variable has been specified as export, import, or total trade (export plus 
import). See, for instance, Frankel (1993a), Frankel and Wei (1993, 1996), Leamer (1993), Frankel, Stein 
and Wei (1995,1998), Shamar and Chua (2000). 
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empirical research. In summary, it is fair to say that the standard ‘Gravity Model’ has 
valid theoretical foundations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Part II : Empirical Analysis 
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3: Regionalism With (Without) Regionalization? : The ‘Gravity Model’ as an    
     Empirical Tool to Assess ‘AFTA-Effects’ on Intra-ASEAN Trade  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The preceding chapter has presented formal links between the conventional ‘Gravity 
Model’ and economic theories. The augmented ‘Gravity Model’ as well as the gravity 
equation commonly applied to assess RTA(s)-effects have, in addition, shown that they 
are supported by theoretical justifications. This chapter, therefore, moves one step 
further, applying the gravitational approach to evaluation of the most important form of 
ASEAN’s economic cooperation: the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). As AFTA was 
established more than a decade ago, during this time
1
, to what extent has AFTA shaped 
trade relationships within ASEAN? This question is yet to be answered.  
 
Even though regional trade agreements have been practiced worldwide, it is somewhat 
surprising that empirical investigations that touch upon AFTA are still limited. This is 
especially so when the scope is specific to the gravitational approach as it appears that 
traditional researches, on the whole, do apply the ‘Gravity Model’ to access effects of 
closer (geographical as well as political) integration i.e. ‘ASEAN-effects’, rather than 
effects of regional trade agreements such as ‘AFTA-effects’ per se. In other words, it can 
be said that ‘regionalism’ which is a political process whereby a group of countries 
agree to liberalize trade between each other against the rest of the world was a centre of 
attention in traditional research instead of ‘regionalization’ which explains an economic 
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process whereby relevant economies in the region actually become more entwined. 
Considering Southeast Asian counties, ASEAN is indeed a politically-driven 
corporation that developed a formal form of economic integration: AFTA, with the hope 
of generating forces of ‘regionalization’ among membership countries. As 
‘regionalism’ may or may not lead to ‘regionalization’ in reality, ASEAN, despite 
having AFTA, may not necessarily bring about success in preferential trading between 
its members as expected. Nevertheless, it has been found that a significant amount of 
the literature concerning an evaluation of RTA-effects of AFTA actually used the terms 
‘ASEAN-effects’ and ‘AFTA-effects’ arbitrarily without giving much attention to 
differentiating their properties. The chapter perceives that this is one of the major 
reasons that mixed results on ‘AFTA-effects’ have been found. The choice of countries 
included in the examination is another vital factor that influences whether ‘AFTA-
effects’ are estimated to be greatly different across them. The limitation of econometric 
techniques used in traditional gravity research is furthermore perceived to obstruct 
examining the true effects of AFTA on relevant countries’ trade flows as more than a 
few accounts are suspected to contain biases. As concerns were raised whether previous 
gravity estimates on ‘AFTA-effects’ are reliable, such aforementioned issues are, briefly, 
areas that this chapter aims to improve on. In summary, the paper plans to provide the 
most consistent estimates of ‘AFTA-effects’ on intra-ASEAN trade flows using the 
gravity framework.   
 
Thus, the next section of this chapter therefore reviews related literature as well as 
summarizing drawbacks found to be associated with the traditional gravity-based 
settings. Considering the unique character of AFTA as well as its historical formation, 
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in Section 3.3, the research then proposes the use of the panel data framework to solve 
for any outstanding estimating issues and various biases commonly found in previous 
cross-sectional/ time-series categories. By implementing the panel data framework, the 
research is able to capture AFTA’s progress on its memberships trade flows at each 
point in time throughout the whole period of study. In addition, in contrast to the time-
invariant ‘regional dummies’ that are commonly employed in cross-sectional research, 
with the panel structure constructed, this chapter is able to impose the so-called 
‘dynamic regional dummies’ which are time-variant to evaluate the evolution of AFTA 
even before its official formation in 1992. Nevertheless, as the research focuses on 
constructing the correct setting of the panel gravity specification, Section 3.4 reviews 
another set of related literature and discusses relevant procedures used to find the most 
appropriate panel data model in this application. In Section 3.5, the research applies the 
aforementioned knowledge, estimating the gravity equation on the ASEAN’s actual 
panel trade data. Trade effects of AFTA on the membership’s trade ties are evaluated 
for the long period between 1970 to 2007. A brief description of the data used and 
econometric issues concerning panel data techniques are also provided in this section. 
Results of various specifications are in addition compared and discussed in order to 
select the correct and the most consistent estimation. Section 3.6 extends the scope of 
research to examine trade relationships between early and delayed members of AFTA : 
ASEAN-6 countries as one group and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam as 
another group. The ‘AFTA-effects’ are in consequence evaluated on these 2 groups of 
countries’ trade flows using a similar gravity framework. Lastly, Section 3.7 concludes.  
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3.2 Related Literature  
 
One of the earliest empirical accounts that focused on the ASEAN region was Endo 
(2000); the research, in fact, aimed to examine trade relationships of countries within 
the Asia-Pacific region during the post-World War II period. Under the cross-section 
setting, the ‘Gravity Model’ was estimated using 80 countries’ trade flows at intervals 
of 5 years from 1960 to 1995. In order to control for regional effects in each region, 4 
sets of regional dummies: ASEAN, APEC (89), EAEC and APEC (95) were added 
accordingly in the gravity specification
2
. Nevertheless, issues concerning overlapping 
memberships in these regional blocs as well as differences in the objectives of each 
regional formation were not carefully considered. With regard to ASEAN economies, 
the result suggested no significant ‘ASEAN-effects’ on the membership’s trade flows3.  
 
With a shorter timeframe, 1980-1995, Sharma and Chua (2000) studied whether 
ASEAN would be affected by larger neighbouring regional economic cooperation at 
that period : APEC. In order to do so, trade flows of 33 Asia-Pacific countries were 
investigated. Aiming to capture ‘ASEAN-effects’, the ‘Gravity Model’ was estimated on 
time-series data of ASEAN-5’s trade flows individually4. This result indicated no 
                                                          
2
 Besides basic gravitational variables which are countries’ income, populations and distance, the ‘Gravity 
Model’ was augmented to include an adjacency dummy variable, a common language dummy variable 
and  4 regional dummies: ASEAN, EAEC, APEC(89) and APEC(95). In this study, each regional dummy 
variable was further elaborated into: 1) the import dummy captures trade flows from non-member to 
member countries 2) the intra-region trade dummy captures trade flows within the region and 3) the 
export dummy represents trade flows from members to non-member countries.  
3
 The study focused on ASEAN-5 countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. Brunei was eliminated because the research claimed that data was scarce.  
4
 The augmented ‘Gravity Model’ was specified following Frankel (1993b) as the sum of exports and 
imports were used as a dependent variable. However, unlike Frankel (1993b), this paper used GDP 
instead of GNP as an independent variable. The GDP for countries was entered as a product form in the 
gravity equation. The paper also included GDP per capita in the product form in the equation. Concerning 
RTA-effects, there were 2 regional dummy variables, ASEAN and APEC, imposed to capture whether 
there are any preference membership effects.  
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significant ‘ASEAN-effects’ on the membership’s trade flows5. As this was the case, the 
paper went further to conclude that ASEAN-PTA which was signed in 1977, failed to 
boost intra-ASEAN trade flows. An increase in intra-ASEAN trade that had become 
visible was instead perceived to be driven by the increase in size of the economies. In 
this setting, such an increase was deemed to come from the side of APEC-membership 
countries rather than ASEAN members. However, it is worth noting that the fact that 
AFTA was established in 1992 was not taken into account in this case despite the time 
frame of the study extending up to 1995.  
 
Another example can be seen in Elliott and Ikemoto (2004). As the study attempted to 
investigate ASEAN’s trade relationships pre- and post-AFTA as well as finding out 
whether AFTA’s objective in increasing intra-regional trade was negatively affected by 
the 1997-Asian financial crisis, the ‘Gravity Model’ was estimated on 35 countries’ 
trade flows during the period between 1982-1999
6
. Numbers of regional dummies were 
accordingly posted in order to control for any RTA(s)-effects on the membership’s trade 
flows for APEC, ASEAN, EU and NAFTA, respectively. Using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method on the Time Series Processor (TSP), the result pointed out that 
trade flows of ASEAN-5 were not significantly influenced by AFTA especially in the 
years immediately following its formation. Much to the surprise of many, the 1997-
Asian financial crisis was not found to obstruct AFTA’s goal as imports among 
                                                          
5
 The exception covers the Philippines as the coefficient estimated portrayed the positive sign.  
6
 In their study, the standard ‘Gravity Model’ was augmented to include both GDP and per capita GDP. 
Imports were used as the dependent variable. In addition to gravitational variables, the dummy variable: 
ADJij was applied to capture whether trade-pairs share a common land border. The complementarily 
index: COMij was introduced into the specification in order to capture factor endowment differences 
between trading partners. The regional variables were elaborated further into 3 dummy variables: RTAijk, 
imRTAijk and exRTAkijk.. These were posted to capture any trade preferential effects when trade-pairs are 
members of the RTA-k, when only an import country is member of the RTA-k ,and when only an export 
country is member of the RTA-k, respectively.   
69 
 
members were perceived to have increased, in comparison with imports from non-
members.   
 
Instead of relying on the cross-sectional data setting, Kien and Hashimoto (2005) tried 
to examine AFTA members’ trade flows during 1988-2002 using the panel data 
framework. The ‘Gravity Model’ was estimated using the Hausman-Taylor (HT) 
instrumental variable estimation method on 39 countries’ panel trade data7 in order to 
measure ‘AFTA-effects’. As this paper implemented the panel data setting, it was 
distinguished further from other research in the use of regional dummies. In contrast to 
cross-sectional research in which regional dummies are usually specified as time-
invariant variables, this paper stated these terms in the dynamic form
8
, allowing for 
changes through time in the panel database. The main result implied that AFTA 
significantly affected trade (export) flows of membership countries. The estimated 
result suggested that AFTA members had increased trade among themselves 
approximately 87% more than would have otherwise occurred without AFTA.    
 
Other empirical applications that indirectly touch upon ASEAN as well as AFTA can be 
found in the realm of research concerning an evaluation of RTA(s)-effects across the 
globe during the mid-1990s to 2000s in general. Soloaga and Winters (2001) measured 
                                                          
7
 Under the panel data framework, the ‘Gravity Model’ was specified in the 2-way error component 
model incorporating the time effects and export effects. The dependent variable is value of exports from 
country i to country j at time t. Apart from standard gravitational variables (GDPs, distance and 
population), the study additionally incorporated bilateral exchange rate and communal language variables 
into the specification. With regards to regional dummy variables, EU, AFTA, NAFTA and MERCOSUR 
were included in this application.  
8
 The regional dummy variables were written in the dynamic form as FTA (ijk)t, imFTA(ijk)t and exFTA(ijk)t. 
Intra regional trade was captured by FTA (ijk)t  aiming to measure any trade effects when both countries i 
and j belong to the FTA-k at time t. The dummy imFTA(ijk)t was imposed to capture trade effects when an 
import country j belongs to the FTA-k at time t, and the dummy exFTA(ijk)t  was specified to evaluate trade 
effects when an export country i belongs to FTA-k at time t.  
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‘ASEAN-effects’ along with other RTAs (ANDEAN, CACM, EU, EFTA, GCC, LAIA, 
MERCOSUR, NAFTA) on 58 countries’ trade flows for the period of 1980-1996. 
Employing the Tobit model as an estimator, the estimated results from the ‘Gravity 
Model’9 implied no significant intra-bloc effects for the case of ASEAN, despite the fact 
that the negative sign on intra-ASEAN dummy variable was actually obtained. 
Nevertheless, when annual estimates were observed, there were significant and negative 
effects of ASEAN on memberships’ trade flows, especially throughout the 1987-1995 
period. The study also extended the analysis to examine overall bloc imports and overall 
bloc exports which account for trade conducted among members themselves and 
between members and non-members in each regional bloc. The result, however, 
signified that ASEAN’s imports and exports had increased on the whole. Since this was 
the case, Soloaga and Winters (2001) concluded that it was the consequence of ASEAN 
countries practicing outward-oriented trading strategies so strongly.  
 
On a different note, Tang (2005) augmented the ‘Gravity Model’ to study trade effects 
of 3 RTAs: NAFTA, ANZCER and ASEAN, from 1989 to 2000
10
. Employing both 
                                                          
9
The ‘Gravity Model’ was estimated cross-sectionally using the Tobit model on non-fuel import data. In 
addition to intra-bloc effects which aimed to measure any trade effects occurring when both traders i and j 
are bloc members, the study imposed 2 additional dummy variables to capture members’ total import 
effects and members’ total export effects, respectively. The members’ total import effects are specified to 
account for any trade effects when country i is the bloc member, regardless of whether country j is in the 
bloc. In a similar vein, the members’ total export effects are posted to evaluate any trade effects expected 
when country j is in the bloc, regardless of whether country i is also a bloc member.  
10
 Besides finding trade effects of the 3 RTAs, the analysis aimed to test for the Linder hypothesis. Thus, 
the variables indicating income similarity and its interaction terms with developed and developing 
countries were, in addition included into the gravity equation. The study conducted 2 analyses: 1) the full-
period analysis where the gravity model is estimated on 1989-2000 data and 2) the sub-period analysis in 
which the time frame was divided into 3 sub-periods (1989-1992, 1993-1996 and 1997-2000).  Regional 
dummy variables were specified to capture intra-regional effects considering when trade-pairs are in the 
RTA, and trade diversion effects accounting for times when only one of them belongs to a particular RTA 
of interest.   
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OLS and 2SLS estimating procedures on 21 countries’ trade flows11, the estimated 
result revealed that being ASEAN had benefited intra-regional trade for the entire 
period of study. In contrast to Soloaga and Winters (2001)’s findings, such a positive 
outcome was perceived to persist throughout the 1990s. As AFTA was established in 
1992, the study isolated ‘AFTA-effects’ by comparing coefficient estimates from the 
sub-period estimations
12
. The result however suggested that ASEAN’s trade among 
member countries and with non-member trading partners had been increased even after 
the establishment of AFTA. The study therefore concluded that AFTA not only 
facilitated trade flows within the membership but also promoted trade relationships with 
non-member countries.   
 
Regardless of their objectives, it is evident that the empirical accounts stated above have 
one common character; ASEAN was perceived as one form of RTA and is usually 
treated as if it is homogeneous to AFTA in general. With regard to examining RTA(s)-
effects, this research views that such an approach could be problematic as ASEAN, 
albeit being one form of regional integration, was far from being a trade agreement 
since its commencement. Hence, even though ASEAN’s and AFTA’s founders are the 
same group of countries and AFTA eventually managed to incorporate all ASEAN-
membership countries as its affiliates, it should not be forgotten that this process took 
more than a decade to accomplish. In addition, given AFTA’s formation in 1992, it is 
evident that AFTA members have taken a long time to realize the free trade status as it 
                                                          
11
 They are comprised of 3 NAFTA countries (the United States, Canada and Mexico), 2 ANZCER 
countries (Australia and New Zealand), 5 ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand 
and the Philippines) and 11 other countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Spain, Japan, South Korea, China and Hong Kong).  
12
 The study divided the timeframe into 3 sub-periods which were 1) 1989-1992 , 2) 1993-1996 and 3) 
1997-2000. 
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is formerly indicated in Chapter 1 that AFTA was close to full tariff liberalization in 
2007. Therefore, ASEAN and AFTA were not the same form of regional integration. 
Regrettably, given the amount of literature reviewed, it seems that this piece of 
important information has been overlooked area until now.  
 
Taking this viewpoint into consideration, doubt is cast on the traditional empirical 
approach in which ‘ASEAN-effects’ and ‘AFTA-effects’ were referred to 
interchangeably. As aforementioned, these 2 effects are certainly different in their 
meanings. Even though ASEAN was established in 1967, it was not until 1977 that 
membership countries agreed to form their first formal RTA: ASEAN-PTA. Since then, 
ASEAN has taken another 25 years to construct plans for trade liberalization concluding 
with AFTA in 1992. Given these facts, research that simply considers the membership 
statuses of ASEAN and AFTA without taking into account the difference in the timings 
of their formations and other diverse characteristics are worth revisiting.  
 
To the extent that differences between ‘ASEAN-effects’ and ‘AFTA-effects’ are 
concerned, Frankel and Wei (1996) appears to be the only account that discerns the 
issues. As the study planned to examine ASEAN’s trading relations, the standard 
‘Gravity Model’ was estimated on 63 countries’ trade flows using yearly data for 1980, 
1990, 1992 and 1994 timeframes. Employing the OLS regression technique, the result 
suggested that there was an intra-regional bias in ASEAN. Specifically, the positive 
coefficient estimated on the ASEAN-regional dummy implied that the 2 ASEAN 
countries appeared to trade 6 times more than 2 other trading partners
13
. Contrary to 
                                                          
13
 The study relied on the coefficient estimated in the year 1992 which was 1.8. As trade was expressed in 
logs, the exponential of the coefficient:  exp (1.8) = 6.  
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conventional interpretations, the study was cautious to note that such an outcome was 
influenced ,if not driven by, the very first formal regional integration which was 
ASEAN, rather than effects from regional trade agreements that had been formed at a 
much later date such as ASEAN–PTA and AFTA. The study, last but not least, pointed 
out the sensitivity of the estimated result on ‘ASEAN-effects’ in that it was highly 
dependent on the choices of other regional trade blocs that were included in the model’s 
specification at the same time. In their words, Frankel and Wei (1996) stated that: 
 
 A question like ‘what is the effect of ASEAN on trade among its members’ can 
 change radically, depending on what other bloc effects are being tested at 
 the same time. When we test for an East Asian bloc effect simultaneously with 
 an ASEAN effect, the latter disappears completely. If one is interested solely in 
 formal regional arrangements, then one can accept at face value…the strong 
 bloc effects for ASEAN (Frankel and Wei, 1996, p.15). 
 
Because AFTA was limited to its institutional formation when it was first formed, 
Frankel and Wei (1996), in addition, was among the earliest accounts that suggested 
stating the starting point of examining ‘AFTA-effects’. As evident in empirical accounts 
abovementioned, it can be straightforwardly said that there had not been a standard 
approach set to identify the specific timeframe in assessing the RTA-effects of AFTA. 
Hence, for the case of AFTA, it was suggested that the year 1992 should be considered 
as the first year to begin observing whether there have been any trade effects generated 
from AFTA given it was the year of its establishment. This viewpoint could be one of 
the reasons explaining why many early empirical findings were unable to find 
significant ‘AFTA-effects’, as they started observing such effects before AFTA had even 
been established.  
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Furthermore, the fact that ASEAN took many years to complete its first FTA can be 
regarded as one of the best explanations for the limited amount of research concerning 
‘AFTA-effects’, in particular. With large amounts of empirical research concerning an 
evaluation of RTA(s)-effects worldwide, it is true that AFTA was usually dismissed. 
While other RTAs had already been at work for years, AFTA was still being 
constructed. It was because of this sluggish establishment of AFTA that almost all of 
the available accounts disclosed only the key AFTA-founders: ASEAN-5
14
 or at best 
ASEAN-6
15
 economies. Nevertheless, as AFTA has now expanded and is complete, 
updated empirical evidence is, undoubtedly, needed to evaluate its performance. To the 
knowledge of the author, however, this has not been done under the so-called ‘Gravity 
Framework’ research in recent years.  
 
This chapter of the thesis therefore aims to fill in this research gap, aiming to provide a 
case study to evaluate impacts of AFTA, ‘AFTA-effects’, on all of ASEAN’s trade. As 
ASEAN has been involved in multi-dimensional regional development programmes, by 
focusing on AFTA, the study is able to shape the research’s scope to focus on the trade 
channel specifically. An important question that the chapter aims to answer is whether 
AFTA has performed its role in increasing intra-regional trade thus far. In order to 
answer this query, an empirical investigation is indeed required. Even though the 
conventional ‘Gravity Model’ is to be relied on, an update on the data set, 
improvements in methodologies and econometric techniques deemed to be lacking in 
previous analyses will be inserted into this application. 
 
                                                          
14
 See, for examples, Endoh (2000), Soloaga and Winters (2001), Sharma and Shua (2000), Elliott and 
Ikemoto (2004), Tang (2005).   
15
 See Kien and Hashimoto (2005). 
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3.3 Conceptual frameworks to investigate trade effects of AFTA or the so-called 
‘AFTA-effects’ 
 
In quantifying RTA(s)-effects on trade flows, dummy variables have typically been 
used to indicate whether trade-pairs belong to a particular RTA or a certain form of 
economic cooperation of interest hence the given name of ‘regional dummies’. This 
approach has, in fact, been set as the tradition since Tinbergen (1962). The underlying 
concept is straightforward; while the conventional ‘Gravity Model’ works to suggest 
‘normal’ levels of bilateral trade flows, the so-called ‘regional dummies’, on the other 
hand, work to capture ‘atypical’ effects generated by the particular RTA, if any 
(Carrere, 2006). The norm in this field of research is to give these ‘regional dummies’  
the value of 1 if trade-pairs belong to the same RTA, otherwise, they are equal to 0. In 
order to interpret the result, the positive sign on a specific regional dummy’s estimate is 
inferred if that particular RTA has increased the membership’s trade whereas the 
negative sign simply suggests the opposite. Conforming to international trade theories, 
such positive effects on ‘regional dummies’ can be interpreted further as trade creation 
from the RTAs whilst negative effects implied trade diverting RTAs.  
 
However, considering that AFTA was not constructed all at once but had been slowly 
expanded over time, this is one of the most obvious features that differentiates AFTA 
from other RTAs. From its commencement in 1992, AFTA took another 8 years to 
technically arrive at free trade status for the entire region. In the year 1999, ASEAN’s 
free trade zone was completed: it was comprised of all 10 countries in South East Asia. 
Nevertheless, as elaborated in Chapter 1, the region’s tariff liberalization was not 
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achieved immediately. In order to reap the benefits of the FTA status, AFTA put in the 
deadline for the key founders, the ASEAN-6 countries, to complete the target of 0-5% 
tariffs in 2003, while the new members; Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, 
known as the CLMV, had until 2008 to do so
16
. The following chart summarizes the 
timeline of AFTA development.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Comparison of the Year of Entry into the Free Trade Zone by Each ASEAN Member 
Source: Author’s own presentation.   
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the founding ASEAN members: Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, agreed to sign the ASEAN-FTA in 
1992. From this point onwards, the rest of the region automatically received AFTA-
membership status once it joined ASEAN. Vietnam was accepted into the zone in 1995, 
                                                          
16
 Cambodia has until 2010 to do so.  
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Laos and Myanmar joined in 1997 whilst Cambodia was the last member to join in 
1999. At the time of this research: 2009, major structural changes to the region’s trade 
sector that have occurred because of AFTA should have become visible, if there are 
any. In addition, as far as ‘AFTA-effects’ are concerned, the fact that the CLMV joined 
the zone at a later date is predicted to play a part in swaying ‘AFTA-effects’ that early 
and delayed membership countries could have received.  
 
Considering details of AFTA’s formation and its sluggish progress, this is where 
traditional empirical accounts may no longer be the best source of reference regarding 
the true effects of AFTA on its members’ trade flows as usually the different times at 
which the countries had joined the corporation were not taken into account
17
. In 
addition to the lengthy formation of AFTA, the building structure of this free trade zone 
is different from other types of regional integration. This can be seen by comparing 
levels of commitments required across forms of regional formation as summarized in 
the study concerning the growth of regionalism by Gibb and Michalak (1994). AFTA, 
as a free trade association, is presented as one of the most primitive forms of regional 
integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
The exception covers Kien and Hashimoto (2005) as the panel data framework was conducted. 
However, their application employed the Hausman Taylor (HT) estimator and only ASEAN-6 was 
investigated during the period of 1988-2002.   
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Table 3.1: Different Levels of Regional Integration  
 
 
         Details 
 
 
 
Level 
 
Removal of 
Internal quotas & 
tariffs 
 
Common external 
customs tariffs 
 
Free movements 
of land, labour, 
capital & services 
 
Harmonization of 
economic policies 
& development of  
a supra national 
institution 
 
Unification of 
political & 
powerful supra 
national 
institutions 
Sectoral 
Cooperation 
 
 
    
Free Trade 
Association 
 
 
    
Custom Union      
Common Market      
Economic Union      
Political Union      
 
Source: Gibb and Michalak (1994, p.24) 
 
 
From Table 3.1, it can be seen that each form of regional integration is distinctive, not 
only in terms of commitments required but also in their objectives. Therefore, the 
conventional method of measuring RTA-effects across various forms of regional 
integration by using ‘regional dummies’ to capture RTA-membership statuses alone is 
perceived to be inequitable. Even so, most gravitational research in this field does not 
seem to distinguish types of regional integration. As aforementioned, the norm is that as 
long as it is evident that the 2 trading partners are members of the same regional 
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grouping, a dummy variable is given the value of 1, otherwise it is 0. Concerns arise as 
this method simply implies all forms of regional integration are alike if not identical; 
this assumes each of them brings in similar trade effects which, according to the 
information provided in Table 3.1, should not be the case. In principle, the more 
advanced form of regional integration is supposed to bring in larger trade effects to 
membership countries in comparison to the less advanced form. With tighter forms of 
regional integration, such effects are expected to be positive even though this is not 
always what occurs in reality.  
 
What is worth investigating further is that, in traditional gravitational exercises, 
standard cross-section or time-series analyses are often relied on and the simple 
estimation method such as the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS)
18
 has been 
commonly used. This paper perceives that research which employs such methods is 
prone to an unobserved heterogeneity problem that is often found when correlations 
between observable and unobservable factors exist. In international trade flows, the 
unobserved heterogeneous issue can be defined as all omitted and indeterminate 
variables that have an influence on countries’ trade relationships. They can be referred 
to as many things including differences in tastes or preferences, habits or demographics, 
and historical as well as political factors. To explain this scenario in a real world 
example, the circumstances in which countries trade or export different amounts to 2 
trading partners which are of the same size and are located at an equal distance, are 
plausibly explained by unobserved heterogeneous factors or unknown specific 
characteristics within those particular trade-pairs. Thus, when considering international 
                                                          
18
 See Endo (2000) and Elliott and Ikemoto (2004). 
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trade relationships in a given gravity equation, it is highly likely that, among observable 
and unobservable factors, one could expect to find correlations between explanatory 
variables and such unobservable factors which if uncontrolled will bring about bias and 
erroneous statistical inferences. In Arellano (2003)’s book: ‘Panel Data Econometrics’, 
this unobserved heterogeneity bias is also highlighted as an enduring problem in cross-
section regression: 
 
 There are several instances in which we would expect correlation between 
 observables and unobservables….there may be correlation due to unobserved 
 heterogeneity. This has been a pervasive problem in cross-sectional regression 
 analysis. If characteristics that have a direct effect on both left- and right-hand 
 side variables are omitted, explanatory variables will be correlated with errors 
 and regression coefficients will be biased measures of the structural effects 
 (Arellano,2003, p. 8). 
  
Even though previous cross-sectional research did not pay much attention to fixing this 
issue, the paper perceives that this problem can, in fact, be startling because the failure 
to control for unobserved heterogeneities not only brings about bias to the whole 
specification in general but also produces unreliable estimates, especially on any 
RTA(s)-effects of interest. Certainly, the estimated results on the RTA(s)-effects from 
previous cross-sectional accounts may be biased upward as they may have accumulated 
effects from persistent unobserved heterogeneous factors. What has been done thus far 
in order to control for heterogeneous biases among trade-pairs is to include additional 
variables as well as sets of dummies that are perceived to influence countries’ trade 
flows on top of the standard gravitational variables and ‘regional dummies’ imposed. 
Nevertheless, it shall not be forgotten that these factors are not always determinate and 
observable in reality; as the name suggests they are unobservable heterogeneous factors. 
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This chapter therefore argues that the conventional procedure of controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneous bias is still far from sufficient. 
 
3.4 Econometric issues and methodologies 
 
In order to reduce, if not eliminate, drawbacks found in cross-sectional gravity research, 
this paper starts off bringing the panel data framework into consideration. As 
controlling for unobservable heterogeneous bias is one of major concerns here, the use 
of the panel data framework has been regarded by a number of researchers to be well 
suited to tackling the issues
19
. According to Gardner (1998)
20
 which discussed ways to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneous bias, the advantage of using the panel data 
structure in this fashion has been highlighted:  
 
 “A benefit of combining time series and cross sectional data is the ability to 
   account for unobservable individual effects” (Gardner, 1998, p.39).  
 
In his application, the panel data model was explained in this form: 
 
                              (3.1) 
  
and:                                       (3.2) 
 
                                                          
19
 See, for instance, Gros and Gonciarz (1996), Mátyás (1997)
 
.
 
20
 Nevertheless, Gardner (1998) aimed to control for unobserved heterogeneity issues by implementing 
the instrumental variables panel data model. The use of the Hausman Taylor (HT) instrumental panel data 
model was proposed to solve the issue.  
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From Eq. (3.2), it can be seen that the unobserved heterogeneous term; ui  is a part of 
the error component term; Uit. When there are relationships between explanatory 
variables and unobservable factors, the biasedness exists. One thus needs to control for 
such biases in order to obtain consistent estimates as a result. Specifically, there are a 
number of econometric methods that can be employed to ease this specific area of 
concern. The panel data framework is, undoubtedly, one of them.  
 
However, before moving on to discuss the application of the panel data model, adding 
to the above point, the book ‘Econometric Analysis of Panel Data’ by Baltagi (2001) is 
another example that addressed several benefits of using the panel data framework. Key 
contents stated in the book are summarized below: 
 
 1. Panel data is able to control for individual heterogeneity whereas cross- 
                section or time-series studies are not.  
 2. Panel data provides more information yet less collinearity among variables, 
      while time-series often suffer from multicollinearity.  
 3. Panel data is more suitable for studying the dynamics of adjustments over 
     time such as unemployment, poverty and policy changes.  
 4. Panel data is able to quantify effects that are not noticeable in cross-section or  
                time-series data.  
 5. Panel data can be modelled to test for complicated behavioural models. 
 6. Panel data affords empirical studies on microeconometric applications.  
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From the list of advantages above, it can be seen that the panel data framework is not 
only able to control for unobserved heterogeneous bias, but also facilitates an empirical 
analysis that demands more information in general. Furthermore, the fact that the panel 
data setting is suitable for the long period study matches this study’s requirements in the 
area such that the role of time or the so-called ‘business cycle’ can be observed and 
controlled for. For example The question of whether the long episode of AFTA 
establishment has influenced or shaped trade relationships over time can be clarified. 
Thus, in comparison to traditional techniques, cross section or time-series analyses, it is 
thus undeniably superior to conduct an analysis under the panel data framework in this 
study.  
 
This section turns to the econometric specification in detail. Under the panel data 
framework, the standard ‘Gravity Model’ can be specified in view of the error 
component model as stated below: 
 
                                                                                 (3.3)  
  
and:                                                                                                                                  (3.4) 
 
where:   
 
Xijt   : Real exports of country i to country j at time t,  
Yit,Yjt   : Real GDP of country i and country  j at time t, respectively  
Pit,Pjt    : Population of country i and country j at time t, respectively   
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Dij   : Geographical distance between countries i and country j,  
            : Set of dummy variables; h i.e. trade resistance or trade facilitating 
              variables; T that country i and country j share at time t,  
                       : Error component terms,  
γ0                     : An unknown constant term,  
γij   : Unobserved heterogeneities, 
       : The remaining error term. 
 
As can be seen, the unobserved heterogeneities or bilateral specific effects (γij) are 
posited in the empirical ‘Gravity Model’ specified above. The common method of 
dealing with them is basically to treat this term as a catch all term for random variables 
or fixed parameters that can be estimated. Intuitive explanations have generally been 
employed to choose the fitting panel data models. In most applications these unobserved 
heterogeneities (γij) are treated as fixed as long as they are believed to be non-random. 
In studies relating to an investigation of RTA-effects on trade flows, these factors are 
often assumed to be associated with historical, political and geographical factors that are 
correlated with the volume of bilateral trade yet invariable over time and specific to 
each country
21
. Thus, if one employs the traditional approach to select the desired panel 
data models, the terms ‘random effects’ and ‘fixed effects’ which are often understood 
and referred to as the random effects model (REM) and the fixed effects model (FEM) 
respectively, actually suggest how that particular research identifies unobserved 
heterogeneous terms (γij) in the data set. This can be seen, for instance, in Egger (2000) 
where proper econometric specification of the gravity equation was studied. The paper 
                                                          
21
 See Egger (2000) and Cheng and Wall (2005).  
85 
 
provided the explanation that the unobserved heterogeneities (γij) were perceived as 
fixed parameters when specific (non-random) sampling procedures were conducted. 
Besides political, geographical and historical factors that are usually perceived to be 
particular to each country, he additionally pointed out the intuition underlying an 
application of the FEM that is shown below :  
 
 In many applications the gravity model is used to calibrate integration effects 
 and thus to project trade flows between EU or OECD and the Central and 
 Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In that cases one is not interested in the 
 estimation of typical trade flows between a randomly drawn sample of 
 countries but between  ex-ante predetermined selection of  nations...Under such
 circumstances the FEM would be the right choice, since the sample is  
 exhaustive (Egger, 2000, p.2).  
 
 
Another methodological paper by Mátyás (1997) also supported the use of FEM in 
estimating the gravity equation. In his study, the heterogeneous terms (γij) are assumed 
to be observable and are specified as fixed parameters. These ‘fixed effects’ were 
elaborated further into time-specific effects, export- and import-country specific effects 
in order to control for variations in bilateral trade flows of relevant trading countries 
over spanning years. In a similar vein, Cheng and Wall (2005) perceived that the FEM 
is suitable for controlling heterogeneity biases as it allows unobserved or unknown 
factors that explain trade volume between country-pairs to be included in the gravity 
specification. In their words, the FEM was in actual fact regarded as the result of 
ignorance: 
 
 …cultural, historical, and political factors are often difficult to observe, let 
 alone  quantify. This is why we control for these factors using a simple fixed-
 effects  model…It is in this sense that fixed–effects modelling is a result of 
 ignorance: We do not have a good idea which variables are responsible for the 
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 heterogeneity bias, so  we simply allow each trading pair to have its own dummy 
 variables (Cheng and Wall, 2005, p.54). 
 
On the other hand, Mátyás (1998) stood for the REM in the modelling econometric 
setting of the ‘Gravity Model’. In his application, it was suggested that treating 
unobserved heterogeneities (γij) as random variables is appropriate as long as the sample 
i.e. countries in the data set, is large and the subject of interest relates to observing 
general relationships of variables. In contrast to the FEM where heterogeneous factors 
are treated as observable, the REM perceives these terms as unobservable random 
variables. With regard to examining effects of RTA(s), this REM was therefore claimed 
to be better suited to large-scale research i.e. the world model (Mátyás, 1998). 
Nevertheless, if the REM is assumed, one has to test for the homogeneity of the data set, 
as one of the fundamental assumptions in the REM is that all parameters are the same 
across the sample
22
.  
 
In contrast to traditional research, Wooldridge (2002) argued that viewing the 
unobserved bilateral effects (γij) as random variables or as fixed parameters to be 
estimated is in conflict with microeconometric theoretical foundations. This is because 
in the panel data structure where large numbers of cross sections exist, it is adequate to 
view unobserved heterogeneities (γij) as a random draw from a normal distribution of 
the population. However, it does not necessarily designate which setting of the panel 
data models that should be applied. Instead, one should be concerned with whether there 
are correlations between explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneous terms 
(γij). Wooldridge (2002) certainly mentioned:  
                                                          
22
 In Mátyás (1998), the Chow test and the poolability tests for panel data (Baltagi, 1995) were suggested 
to construct the stability test.  
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 In modern econometric parlance, “random effects” is synonymous with zero 
 correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the unobserved 
 effects…the term “fixed effects” does not usually mean that ci is being treated as 
 non-random; rather, it means that one is allowing for arbitrary correlation 
 between the unobserved effect ci and the observed explanatory variables Xit
23
... 
 (Wooldridge,2002, p.252). 
 
Taking Wooldridge (2002)’s viewpoint into consideration, in order to obtain consistent 
estimated results under the REM, one has to satisfy the fundamental assumption that 
explanatory variables have to be uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneous terms 
(γij). This is a strong assumption to meet especially when the long panel format is 
observed. This is because the likelihood that the unobserved heterogeneities (γij) are 
correlated with some of the explanatory variables will be high. In the case of this 
assumption being violated, the REM’s estimates are no longer consistent. While the 
REM suits the case in which there is no correlation between explanatory variables and 
unobserved heterogeneous terms (γij), the FEM allows for arbitrary correlations among 
such terms. The FEM is, for these reasons, always accepted as a consistent estimator 
regardless of whether correlations between unobserved heterogeneous terms (γij) and 
explanatory variables are presented. This is so because the FEM consistently estimates 
partial effects of time invariant omitted variables which are arbitrarily related to the 
explanatory variables. By allowing for correlations between unobserved effects (γij) and 
explanatory variables, this makes the FEM more robust than the REM. However, this 
robustness comes with a cost as the FEM estimation procedure is not fully efficient. As 
unobserved heterogeneities (γij) are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with each 
element of explanatory variables under the FEM, one thus cannot distinguish whether 
effects are from time-invariant observables or time-invariant unobservable 
                                                          
23
 The unobserved effects model is written as   yit = Xitβ + ci + uit    t=1,2,…,T where Xit is 1x K 
observable variables that change across t but not i, variables that change across i but not t, and variables 
that change across i and  t  while ci represents unobserved heterogeneity in the application.  
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heterogeneities (γij) (Wooldridge, 2002, p.266). Without further assumptions, time-
invariant factors cannot be included in the explanatory variables as a result.  
 
Even so, it depends on the type of research as to whether there are any negative aspects 
in using the FEM in an applied empirical work. Wooldridge (2002) certainly affirmed 
this point;  
  
 The fact that Xit cannot include time-constant explanatory variables is a 
 drawback in certain applications, but when the interest is only on time-varying 
 explanatory variables, it is convenient not to have to worry about modelling 
 time-constant factors  that are not of direct interest (Wooldridge,2002, p.266). 
 
Considering relevant discussions thus far, it can be summarized that in order to choose 
the most appropriate panel data models between the REM and the FEM, one has to find 
whether unobserved bilateral effects (γij)  are correlated with other observed explanatory 
variables or not. Indeed, this chapter perceives examining correlations between 
unobserved heterogeneities (γij) and explanatory variables as crucial as it not only 
specifies the appropriate panel data model but also ensures the empirical results 
obtained are consistent. In order to check for this, the Hausman Test (1978) provides an 
uncomplicated way to detect this issue. This test is certainly a standard procedure 
employed in the panel data analysis testing for inconsistency of an estimator. In 
practice, it is often used to select between 2 alternative panel data models: the FEM and 
the REM.  
 
According to Hausman (1978), the simple panel model is firstly specified as; 
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                                                                                  (3.5) 
     
where i = 1,2,…, N ; t = 1, 2,…,T and    is the individual effect. If the choice of 
specification is the REM, it is crucial to highlight key assumptions stated in the REM 
that    has to be drawn from an idd distribution:          
   and it also needs to be 
uncorrelated with the     and    . The REM’s specification can therefore be rewritten in 
the form of a variance component model as; 
 
                                                                                                                       (3.6) 
 
where                                                                 (3.7) 
 
From assumptions above,      and the covariance matrix is block diagonal. The 
appropriate estimator for the model stated above is the General Least Squares (GLS). If, 
on the contrary, the FEM is to be elected, Hausman (1978) stated that the FEM only 
requires treating    as a fixed but unknown constant terms differing across individuals. 
As deviation from means are used to estimate  , it is also known as the within 
estimator.  
 
Taking into consideration that the correctness of the panel model’s specification is vital, 
the key area that requires close assessment is whether the conditional mean of    is 
independent of or uncorrelated with the regressors:   . Considering the panel model 
stated above, that is to find whether            . Hausman (1978), for that reason, 
provides the null hypothesis testing for the independent of     by simply observing the 
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difference of estimates derived from the 2 panel specifications: FEM versus REM. If the 
REM is correct, the estimates from the REM:       should not be too different from the 
FEM’s estimates:     . Given that   is the difference between 2 models’ estimates: 
             , on the condition that the REM assumption holds,    should be close 
to 0. Otherwise, the Hausman Test suggests that there is misspecification in the REM; 
the model ends up with biased and inconsistent estimates. In case this occurs, the FEM 
is, as a result, preferred as it remains unbiased and consistent even if the null hypothesis 
is rejected.   
 
However, with the help of a statistical package such as STATA, one can observe 
whether there is large value of the Chi-squared statistic from the Hausman Test as this 
accordingly implies that the high degree of correlation between unobserved 
heterogeneous factors (γij) and explanatory variables exists. If this is so, the null 
hypothesis testing for the independent of     has to be rejected and the FEM will, 
instead, be relied on as a consistent estimator. Nevertheless, estimated results derived 
from the REM and the FEM are to be compared in this application as the study plans to 
provide additional evidence to support the claim that previous practices that simply 
employed intuitive notions to select the desired panel data models could be severely 
biased.   
 
In the following section, the specification of the gravity equation formerly stated in Eq. 
(3.3) is augmented to examine ASEAN’s trade relationships in general, as well as to 
investigate whether there is any evidence of ‘AFTA-effects’ on intra-ASEAN trade 
flows, in particular. Unlike many empirical accounts that are generally designed to 
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compare and contrast RTA(s)-effects in different parts of the world, it is important to 
stress here that this chapter intends to study the effects of AFTA on its intra-ASEAN 
trade exclusively. For this reason, instead of including RTAs across the globe, this study 
draws the domain of the analysis to be within the ASEAN region wherein only AFTA is 
observed.  
 
Recall the discussion made by Frankel and Wei (1996) where the sensitivity of any 
RTA(s)-effects estimated could partly be explained by the choice of RTAs or countries 
that are being incorporated in the empirical specification of the ‘Gravity Model’ at the 
same time. The chapter agrees with this view and observes that the inclusion of larger 
and more efficient RTAs is one of the main factors that drives the mixed results of 
‘AFTA-effects’ on the membership’s trade thus far. In order to explain these issues, it 
can be said that these estimates are derived in comparative terms. Any ‘AFTA-effects’ 
observed are not independent effects but are their effects weighed against other RTAs or 
trade blocs in that particular study. Hence, by taking an alternative approach in 
specifying the scope of an investigated area in this way, the chapter will be able to draw 
the focal point underlying detailed relationships between AFTA-membership and 
ASEAN-membership countries’ trade ties specifically. As ASEAN’s territory is 
independently observed, the analysis can be conducted without having to be concerned 
about the effects that nearby RTAs may have, overshadowing AFTA. Certainly, this 
research can be viewed as a case study on AFTA rather than a general overview of 
RTA(s)-effects worldwide. With improved econometric techniques and an updated data 
set, the coefficient estimates on ‘AFTA-effects’ which will be determined can thus be 
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observed as an additional piece of evidence to verify whether AFTA has actually been 
effective in increasing intra-regional trade flows.  
 
3.5 An empirical strategy proposed to evaluate ‘AFTA-effects’ on intra-ASEAN trade 
 
To examine ‘AFTA-effects’ on intra-ASEAN trade flows, all 10 AFTA members are 
accessed longitudinally in this application. The timeframe covers 38 years dating back 
to the year 1970 when regionalism flourished worldwide yet was rather a new concept 
to ASEAN. With the use of the panel data setting, this study is able to observe the trend 
in intra-ASEAN trade covering periods before and after AFTA’s establishment. Apart 
from qualitative and narrative accounts that discussed the prospects as well as the 
performance of AFTA in increasing intra-ASEAN trade, there is no quantitative study 
that includes all ASEAN members in the gravity-based research for this long period of 
time. To the knowledge of the author, this is, heretofore, the most comprehensive 
account in terms of data coverage on studies relating to an evaluation of AFTA. The 
study constructs an unbalanced panel of 90 trading pairs over 38 years comprised of 
3,420 observations in total.  
 
3.5.1 Variables and data sources  
 
Trade data  
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Trade data in the form of bilateral export value
24
 is derived from the COMTRADE data 
set developed by the United Nations (UN)
25
. In this application, the current value is 
converted to real terms (2005 US$) using an historical GDP deflator from the Economic 
Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture (ERS/USDA)
26
. The reason 
that the dependent variable is bilateral exports (country i exports to country j, and vice 
versa), rather than their total trade (export plus import) is to allow one to estimate the 
difference in income elasticities for exports and imports.  
 
Gross Domestic Products (GDP)  
In the gravitational concept, GDP data is categorized in terms of size variables. The size 
of countries’ economies can be reflected in their income levels. In this application, the 
data is sourced from ERS/USD in the form of annual real gross domestic products. The 
units are standardized in billions of 2005US$. The basic ‘Gravity Model’ specifies that 
trade between 2 countries is proportionate to their GDPs. Hence, these income variables 
(Yi, Yj) are expected to have a positive sign. In addition, as the coefficients of GDPs can 
imply the income elasticities of trade with respect to an exporter’s and importer’s 
income, an increase in income also indicates greater production available for exports, and 
given a relatively high marginal propensity to import, will lead to an increase in imports. 
 
Population    
                                                          
24
 Export value in UN COMTRADE is reported in terms of the local currency. It is converted from the 
national currency into US dollars using exchange rates supplied by the reporting countries or derived 
from money market rates and volume of trade.  
25
 See http://comtrade.un.org/ 
26
 See http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-macroeconomic-data-set.aspx#.UWxVwqKsiSp 
 
94 
 
Population is perceived as another size variable in the gravity equation. The data is also 
collected from ERS/USDA and the units are in thousands. Even though the population 
variable is categorized to represent the size of the economy, its effects on trade flows 
are in fact indeterminate
27
. This is because: on the one hand, a large population 
plausibly indicates that the economy is efficient as economies of scale are present. Thus, 
considering an exporter, the expected sign on the estimated population coefficient is 
therefore positive as a country is able to increase exports once the size of population 
increases. On the other hand, large population also implies that the country’s demand is 
large. As export trade is observed, ceteris paribus, the exporter has little left to export 
after satisfying her large-sized demand domestically. If this is the case, the estimated 
sign on the population variable is expected to be negative. In case the importer is 
observed, on the other hand, an increase in the population size may indicate that the 
economy is increasingly efficient in terms of production. This further implies that fewer 
goods may be imported since the country’s domestic supply would be large enough. 
When this relationship is observed, the expected sign on the population variable is 
therefore negative. However, it is also possible that an importing country may import 
more once the population size has increased as the domestic demand may no longer be 
sufficient. In the case of this correlation occurring, the estimated sign on the population 
variable of the importer is therefore positive.   
 
Distance  
The distance variable is sourced from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales
28
 (CEPII) database. It is measured in the form of 
                                                          
27
 See, for instances, Oguledo and Macphee (1994), Kien and Hashimoto (2005). 
28
 Institute for Research on the International Economy (in English)  
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geodesic distances calculated following the great circle formula which uses the latitudes 
and longitudes of the capital cities or the most important cities. The units are in 
kilometres. As distance is perceived as a form of trade resistance variable relating to 
trade costs, the estimated coefficient is expected to be negative.  
 
Communal languages 
The measure of linguistic similarity is also sourced from CEPII. Degrees of communal 
language between trading partners are collected if at least 9 % of the population speak 
the same language. As this variable is qualitative in nature, it is denoted in the form of a 
dummy variable. If 2 trading countries share a linguistic similarity, the communal 
language dummy is set equal to 1, otherwise it is 0. As communal languages 
characterize cultural and historical similarities between trade-pairs, which are thought to 
facilitate trade between countries, the expected sign on this variable’s estimated 
coefficient is therefore positive.  
 
Real exchange rate  
The real exchange rate is readjusted to be in the form of bilateral real exchange rates. 
That is the value of a unit of the exporter’s currency in terms of the importer’s currency. 
Each local currency unit is standardized into real term using 2005 US$ value as the base 
year. The data is sourced from ERS/USDA. The higher real exchange rate denotes that 
country i’s currency depreciates compared to country j’s currency. Given this 
relationship, country i’s exports should increase, implying that the expected sign on the 
estimated coefficient of bilateral exchange rate is positive.  
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3.5.2 Methodological and modelling issues  
 
Regional dummy issues  
Let us begin by considering the traditional method that uses ‘regional dummies’ to 
capture whether trade-pairs belong to the RTA of interest. If trade-pairs are members of 
that particular RTA, the dummy is given the value of 1, otherwise it is 0. As only 
countries’ RTA-membership statuses are concerned, ‘regional dummies’ are usually 
specified as time-constant variables. Even though this paper agrees that this traditional 
method is not incorrect, it is only appropriate to the case when a group of countries are 
given RTA-membership status at the same period. This point is, without a doubt, not the 
case in AFTA as it is evident from Figure 3.1 that the CLMV countries attained AFTA-
membership status at different times. This paper views that such timing differences 
between ASEAN-6 and CLMV countries attaining AFTA-membership should affect the 
trade effects that they have received from this free trade zone differently. Therefore, in 
these circumstances, the conventional way of specifying ‘regional dummies’ as a time-
invariant variable to capture only countries’ free trade status is certainly not the best 
empirical strategy for the analysis of AFTA.   
 
Employing the panel data framework, this allows the research to apply the so-called 
‘dynamic regional dummies’ to capture AFTA’s membership which has not been static 
through time. This approach was also used by Kien and Hashimoto (2005)
29
 as earlier 
reviewed. An assumption, in which timing differences in joining AFTA are influential 
in determining ‘AFTA-effects’ that countries receive, can be investigated if the 
                                                          
29
 Nevertheless, Kien and Hashimoto (2005) conducted an Instrumental Variable Approach to estimate 
the ‘Gravity Model’ which is different from the empirical procedure that will be used in this study.  
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conventional time-invariant AFTA dummy variable is specified as a time-variant 
variable instead. This is truly different from the yearly cross-section framework in 
which the time-invariant AFTA dummy variable only captures whether trade-pairs 
belong to AFTA in a particular year. By allowing for the time dimension in the panel 
data framework, one is able to examine whether ASEAN’s overall trade flows have 
been greatly improved since AFTA was implemented. In spite of the fact that the 
ASEAN’s trading environment was foreseen to be altered after the establishment of 
AFTA in 1992, early and delayed members should not be affected in the same way. 
This is another point which the time-invariant AFTA dummy variable commonly 
specified in the cross-section estimation is unable to distinguish since only countries’ 
AFTA-memberships are observed. Certainly, the detailed examination of this area has 
thus far been neglected.  
 
In addition, as far as potential endogeneity of ‘regional dummies’ is concerned, 
previous gravity-based studies that commonly conducted the simple cross-sectional type 
of research employing the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method could contain biased 
and consistent estimates in general. The effects of RTAs on trade flows, in particular, 
could have been wrongly estimated if RTAs of interest are actually endogenous. 
Endogeneity of RTA(s) can be caused by 1) omitted variables or unobserved 
heterogeneities 2) simultaneities and 3) measurement errors (Woolridge, 2002).  
However, it is interesting to note that almost all of the available gravity-based research, 
thus far, treated RTA(s)-memberships as an exogenous variable. This might be due to 
the fact that the research’s question only focuses on finding RTA-effects, given that a 
particular RTA already existed. Among recent literature, there are only a few accounts 
98 
 
that deal with issues concerning the endogeneity of RTAs:  Magee (2003) and Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004, 2007). In this regard, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) attempted to 
control for endogeneity bias of RTA(s)-memberships in the cross-section gravity 
analysis by applying the instrumental variable (IV) and the Heckman control function 
procedures. However, results were far from satisfactory as they themselves admitted 
that the average treatment effects of RTAs were unstable; considering all forms of 
specifications, estimated treatment effects of RTAs were found to cause a decline in 
trade of up to 92% to an increase in trade of 1100%. This is not informative as the 
estimated values cover such a wide range. Estimated results were, in addition, sensitive 
to the instruments chosen and there was a difficulty in finding suitable instruments. In 
their application, there were only 2 specifications where the null hypothesis was not 
rejected while, in most specifications, the test for overidentifying restrictions rejected 
the null hypothesis that the instruments were exogenous. Similar problems were 
observed in Magee (2003) as the IV approach was also used; the average treatment 
effects of RTAs were found to cover a wide range of large positive to large negative 
effects of RTAs on trade flows and the difficulty in finding appropriate instruments 
remained. The RTA(s)-effects estimated are, again, also sensitive to the choice of 
instruments used. Considering problems found from controlling for endogeneity issues 
in the cross-section gravity equation, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) concluded in their 
work that the IV estimation method and the Heckman control function were thoroughly 
inappropriate tools in this regard. That is because a number of variables that are 
correlated cross-sectionally with a particular RTA-membership are usually correlated 
with trade flows at the same time. Thus, when using cross-sectional estimating 
techniques such as the IV and the Heckman control function, they will not be able to 
99 
 
eliminate such bias completely. In contrast to previous findings, Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) therefore proposed the use of the panel data framework; the fixed effects model 
with country-and-time fixed effects and the first difference estimator were employed to 
control for the potential endogeneity of RTA(s). Comparing with the OLS estimates in 
the cross-section gravity equation, their paper found that RTA(s)-effects of interest  
were much improved and more consistent. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) certainly 
mentioned that  
 
 …Standard cross-section techniques using instrumental variables and control 
 functions do not provide stable estimates of these ATEs in the presence of 
 endogeneity and tests of overidentifying restrictions generally fail. However, 
 we find convincing empirical evidence using panel data of unbiased estimates of 
 ATEs ranging from 0.61-0.76. These estimates are five to six times those using 
 OLS (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, p. 92). 
 
As there was a need for a continuous variable in order to capture progress of RTA-
effects at each point in time, the ‘dynamic regional dummies’ or time-variant regional 
dummies were employed in this panel data setting. In addition, the lagged effects of 
RTA(s) on trade were also introduced to capture the so-called ‘phased-in’ effects from 
RTA(s) instead of imposing the static value of 0 or 1 on the time-invariant ‘regional 
dummies’ that the cross-section gravity equation usually employed. In this regard, Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007) perceived that a particular RTA may take some time to produce 
any economic effects on member countries after the day of its establishment. Thus, one 
or two lagged regional dummies are added in order to capture any delayed in terms of 
trade changes. In this regard, the ‘dynamic regional dummies’ that this paper aims to 
implement is thus appropriate. Even though the chapter does not include lagged effects 
of AFTA this setting is able to evaluate RTA(s)-effects throughout the whole period of 
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study because it covers a long time span of nearly 4 decades, starting before this 
particular free trade zone is implemented.  
 
Nevertheless, in order to control for the potential endogeneity of RTA(s), this paper 
believes that one, first of all, needs to identify factors that drive the formation of a 
particular RTA. In the case that the RTA of interest is endogenously formed, common 
causes of RTA formation are, for example, that countries have similar levels of GDPs, 
countries are closer to each other than they are to any other countries as well as the high 
degree of difference in their factor endowments. As these features are the same reasons 
that explain large trade flows between countries, in order to judge whether a particular 
RTA should be treated as an endogenous variable, a simple question to ask is whether 
RTA causes trade or trade causes RTA? This point conforms to Baier and Bergstrand 
(2004, 2007) as they likewise mentioned that countries that have large trade flows with 
each other tend to jointly initiate the RTA because they foresee mutual benefits from 
these RTA(s)-memberships. However, in Baier and Bergstand (2004) in which 
economic determinants of RTAs were studied, they found that although such 
aforementioned issues: similar GDPs levels, the close distance between trade-partners 
as well as the high trade value among them, are perceived as key indicators driving 
countries to form RTAs with each other, other unobserved factors remain that most 
likely influence countries’ decisions in engaging in RTA formation. Considering causes 
of endogeneity in RTA(s)-memberships as aforementioned, Baier and Bergstand (2007) 
in fact addressed the omitted variable, usually known as the unobserved heterogeneity, 
as one of the most important sources of endogeneity of RTAs in the cross-section 
gravity equation. Indeed, there are factors that are not accounted for in the gravity 
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variables but may be correlated with the decision to form a RTA. In other words, there 
may be correlations between the gravity equation’s error terms and RTA(s) dummies.  
 
Hence, relating this discussion to the context of AFTA, it is worth revisiting the 
historical note described in Chapter 1 which states that AFTA was a politically driven 
free trade area. Considering the low level of intra-ASEAN trade pre-AFTA, it moreover 
highlights the fact that ASEAN countries did not actually form AFTA because of the 
high level of trade that they have conducted with each other. AFTA was, in fact, a 
consequence of ASEAN regional cooperation. As elaborated in the introductory chapter, 
this regional integration aimed to raise the membership’s negotiating power as a group 
against larger and more powerful countries as well as other RTAs which were 
expanding. Thus, strengthening intra-regional trade ties among membership countries 
was not the first priority. Yet, member countries did hope for more as well as better 
opportunities to increase intra-regional trade and, later on, this motive led to the 
formation of AFTA after ASEAN had been successfully established. Given this 
relationship, it can be considered that the formation of AFTA may cause (future) trade 
in this application. However, as AFTA’s establishment was certainly not driven by the 
high level of trade between member countries. In other words, it can be simply said that 
the relationship between AFTA and (changes in) trade is definitely not simultaneous. 
This therefore contradicts the classification of endogenously formed RTAs. However, 
one may question the delayed entrance of CLMV countries in terms of whether their 
decisions in following into AFTA were driven by trade between them and former 
AFTA-members: ASEAN-6 countries. Once again, the history of AFTA provided in 
Chapter 1 is useful in this matter. In brief, CLMV countries do not have any alternatives 
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but to join AFTA as they are geographically situated in the South East Asia region. 
Moreover, AFTA-membership was given automatically once CLMV countries were 
officially approved as part of ASEAN regional cooperation. As aforementioned, these 
procedures were principally political; forming AFTA was perceived as one channel of 
ASEAN economic development. Thus, it can be said that regardless of trade that the 
early AFTA-members  ASEAN-6, have conducted with the CLMV group of countries, 
every country in the region had to join the zone in the end. Otherwise, their 
relationships with the rest of the region would be hampered as they would be ruled out 
of the whole region’s administration politically and economically. One would expect 
that the trade changes seen for early AFTA-memberships would have affected CLMV’s 
decisions on whether to follow into AFTA. The study perceives that this rationale does 
not apply here as elaborated earlier that, in this setting, political reasons were major 
factors in this region’s integration. As far as trade effects or terms of trade changes from 
AFTA to CLMV countries are concerned, they would probably delay or hasten time at 
which the countries joined the cooperation but would not alter the decision whether to 
join the bloc. That is because the commitment as well as the deadlines for joining 
AFTA were earlier agreed by the ASEAN/AFTA founders. However, the extent to 
which the trade effects of early AFTA-members could have influenced CLMV countries 
in choosing when they joined the zone is beyond the scope of this chapter. As far as 
political drives dominate ASEAN integration as a whole and considering the fact that 
the deadlines that CLMV countries have to join AFTA were set even before they joined 
the bloc, this paper perceives that AFTA-memberships, both early and delayed, are 
exogenously specified. This implies that the standard gravity framework in which the 
RTA-membership is treated as an exogenous variable is valid here. After all, the 
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question that this research aims to answer is, given the establishment of AFTA in this 
region, what can we expect from this free trade zone in terms of trade effects: trade 
creation or trade diversion?    
 
For these reasons, by employing the panel data framework, the setting of the so-called 
‘dynamic regional dummies’ in this application is therefore AFTAijt. This dummy 
variable is assumed to start capturing any trade effects of AFTA on the original 6 
AFTA-founders from when they first formed the free trade zone in 1992. Indeed, this is 
to quantify whether the ‘regionalization’ process has occurred after AFTA members 
engaged in the process of ‘regionalism’. Given the time dimension as an observable 
year: t, the dummy variable AFTAijt is imposed to pick up a joint AFTA-membership 
status for every set of trade-pairs in the same year. If AFTA is effective in improving 
intra-regional trade, in principle, it is supposed to transfer ‘AFTA-effects’ to early 
members’ trade flows from 1992 onwards. The full trade effects from AFTA are, in 
addition, expected to have been delivered to the whole region when the last member, 
Cambodia, had entered the free trade zone receiving AFTA-membership status in 1999. 
When AFTA has a full house, any trade benefits arising because of this free trade zone 
are supposed to bring in the positive sign on AFTAijt estimated. If, however, AFTA is 
unable to meet its goal in liberalizing trade in the region, the negative sign will instead 
be observed.  
 
Moreover, by implementing this so-called ‘dynamic regional dummies’ mechanism, it 
allows the study to examine whether trade effects caused by AFTA have been 
significantly different from years prior to the formation of the zone. In the past, when 
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the time-invariant AFTA dummy was used, the question had been addressed, at best, by 
testing for effects of AFTA on the membership’s trade flows throughout the whole 
period of study. Hence, the ‘dynamic regional dummies’ approach not only facilitates an 
analysis which captures effects of AFTA but also enables detailed examinations relating 
to its formation, contraction or expansion altogether. On top of that, this approach is 
useful in assessing directions of intra-ASEAN trade flows which is essential for the 
analysis concerning trade-creation and trade-diversion effects of AFTA. Considering the 
fact that AFTA is unique in having been developed gradually, once again, the traditional 
approach which employs time-constant ‘regional dummies’ cannot identify directions of 
trade clearly as only the overall trade effects of AFTA are identified. Undoubtedly, it 
will thus be difficult to distinguish if AFTA has been the cause of trade creation or trade 
diversion on the region’s trade flows.   
 
Taking into account modelling issues, the ‘Gravity Model’ as previously stated in Eq. 
(3.3) is re-specified including the AFTA dummy in the ‘dynamic regional dummies’ 
format. On top of standard gravitational variables, the econometric specification is 
augmented to incorporate bilateral exchange rate variables and communal language 
dummies in order to account for any preferential impacts in each trade-pair, if any.  
 
As a result, the ‘Gravity Model’ is specified as:  
 
                                                                 
                                                                           (3.8) 
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where : 
 
Xijt  : Real exports of country i to country j at time t,  
Yit,Yjt  : Real GDP of country i and country  j at time t, respectively  
Pit,Pjt   : Population of country i and country j at time t, respectively  
Dij  : Geographical distance between countries i and country j,  
Langij : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j  share 
   communal languages. Otherwise, it is 0, 
REXijt  : Bilateral real exchange rate of country i to country j at time t,   
AFTAijt : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j are     
                members of  AFTA at time t. Otherwise, it is 0, 
γ0  : An unknown constant term, 
γij  : Unobserved heterogeneities or bilateral effects specific to each trade-pair,  
εijt    : An error component term which is assumed to be well-behaved; i.i.d with zero 
     mean  and constant variance.  
 
Time effects 
As the period of study covers a long time span of nearly 4 decades, controlling for the 
‘time effects’ is perceived necessary. In applied work, the statistical test checking for the 
inclusion of the ‘time effects’ is conducted in order to confirm the importance of the 
time dimension in the specification of the estimating gravity equation. This is aimed at 
explaining whether the natural representation of trade flows within ASEAN have been 
influenced by any special events which occurred at any specific time. If they have been 
influenced, by how much? In addition to standard gravity variables, dynamic AFTA 
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dummy (AFTAijt) and bilateral unobserved effects (γij), much variation in intra-ASEAN 
trade relationships over the long term could, to a certain extent, be entwined with the 
effects of time.   
 
Therefore, if the test result suggests the importance of the time dimension in this data 
set, the gravity equation previously specified in Eq. (3.8) has to be re-specified again so 
as to incorporate the ‘time effects’. The gravity equation can thus be rewritten as:    
 
                                                                 
                                                              (3.9) 
       
and, 
 
          
    
                                       (3.10) 
 
 
   ; if T = t    : T = year 1970, 1971,…, 2007                  (3.11)  
    =                           
                                    ; if T ≠ t 
 
where: 
 
Xijt  : Real exports of country i to country j at time t,  
Yit,Yjt  : Real GDP of country i and country  j at time t, respectively  
Pit, Pjt   : Population of country i and country j at time t, respectively  
1 
0 
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Dij  : Geographical distance between countries i and country j,  
Langij : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j  share 
   communal languages. Otherwise, it is 0, 
REXijt  : Bilateral real exchange rate of country i to country j at time t,   
AFTAijt : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j are   
   members of  AFTA at time t. Otherwise, it is 0, 
γ0  : An unknown constant term (the portion of intercept that is common to all   
                years and trade-pairs),  
γij  : Unobserved heterogeneities or bilateral effects specific to each trade-pair,  
γt   : Time effects,  
εijt    : An error component term which is assumed to be well-behaved; i.i.d with zero 
    mean  and constant variance. 
 
3.5.3 Empirical results  
 
This section proposes that proper econometric specification of the ‘Gravity Model’ does 
affect results and their interpretations significantly. This paper theoretically specifies the 
‘Gravity Model’ according to the microeconometric foundations abovementioned. 
Firstly, when aiming to control for unobserved heterogeneous factors (γij), there are 
basically 2 panel data models to rely on. The study starts by estimating the panel 
specification of the gravity equation as stated in the form of Eq. (3.8). Without 
including an AFTA dummy variable, one gets the benchmark specification. The results 
of the REM and FEM are compared in Table 3.2 as presented below.  
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Table 3.2: Benchmark Results of the ‘Gravity Model’ Estimates: the Random  
       Effects Model (REM) versus the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) 
 
Dependent Variable :  
Real Exports 
Benchmark  
(REM) 
Benchmark 
(FEM) 
AFTA-context 
(REM) 
AFTA-context 
(FEM) 
Exporter's GDP (Yit) 
0.83504332*** 
(0.0944128) 
1.2625494*** 
(0.1490019) 
0.76556786*** 
(0.0961348) 
1.2650253*** 
(0.1486844) 
Importer’s GDP (Yjt) 
1.104903*** 
(0.0999292) 
0.76365671*** 
(0.143694) 
1.0668093*** 
(0.1047656) 
0.66269796*** 
(0.1474501) 
Exporter’s Population 
(Pit) 
-0.1109362 
(0.1275723) 
0.46315927 
(0.4209273) 
-0.10611319 
(0.1193209) 
0.47643632 
(0.4200477) 
Importer’s Population 
(Pjt) 
-0.30413774** 
(0.1463451) 
-1.1779267** 
(0.4815456) 
-0.29923965** 
(0.1369165) 
-1.5138585*** 
(0.493943) 
Distance (Dij) 
-1. 0708428** 
(0.4798482) 
- 
-0.99773284** 
(0.4416461) 
- 
Real Exchange Rate 
(REXijt) 
0.15865857*** 
(0.0193996) 
0.21570279*** 
(0.0211948) 
0.15039822*** 
(0.0192496) 
0.21372023*** 
(0.0211601) 
Common Language 
(Langij) 
1.5326144** 
(0.6696509) 
- 
1.6258342*** 
(0.6169108) 
- 
AFTA-effects 
(AFTAijt) 
- - 
0.17004253 
(0.1067602) 
0.33486034*** 
(0.1140395) 
Constant 
-18.233884*** 
(3.958709) 
-23.430507*** 
(3.479263) 
-16.46413*** 
(3.829214) 
-15.896729*** 
(4.316955) 
Hausman Test  
Within vs. GLS 
Chi
2
(5) = 70.49 
Prob >Chi
2
 =0.0000 
Chi
2
(6) = 112.28 
Prob >Chi
2
 =0.0000  
 
     Note: *** denotes significant at 99%, ** and * denotes significant at 95% and 90% respectively 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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The benchmark specification provides the traditional way of estimating ‘normal’  trade 
levels when the AFTA dummy variable (AFTAijt) is excluded. As is evident, 
coefficients’ estimates in the benchmark REM and FEM frameworks are, in general, 
similar to estimates in the REM and FEM in the AFTA-context’s specification. The 
latter however measures ‘atypical’ effects resulting from AFTA in terms of signs, 
values and significance levels. This simply implies that the ‘Gravity Model’ specified is, 
to a certain extent, sturdy enough to determine the trade relationships of this data set.  
 
As one of the main objectives of this paper is to evaluate AFTA’s impacts on intra-
ASEAN trade relations, the regression results in the AFTA context under the REM and 
the FEM are presented in the last 2 columns of this table. It is evident in the third 
column that the REM provides the estimated coefficients with expected signs. Since 
coefficients estimated on GDPs (Yit, Yjt) imply the income elasticities of trade in an 
exporter’s and importer’s income, with the estimated values of 0.76556786 on Yit and 
1.0668093 on Yjt, an exporter’s income is perceived to be less elastic to trade (exports) 
than an importer’s income elasticity on trade (imports). However, their estimated 
coefficients are both highly significant at the 99% level. Considering population 
variables (Pit, Pjt), as they reflect market sizes, the negative estimated coefficient on Pit 
implies that the exporting country has to satisfy a large demand. As the population 
grows, the exporting economy therefore decreases the amount it exports. However, the 
estimated coefficient is not significant in this application. Considering the importing 
economy, the negative coefficient estimated on Pjt  likewise implies that  the country 
reduces imports once the size of population has increased. Given that the estimated 
coefficient is significant at the 95% level, this implies further that the economy is 
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efficient in terms of production and thus it is less reliant on imports. Bilateral trade is, as 
theoretically predicted, negatively affected by the distance (Dij) between the 2 trading 
partners. As these countries are located within the same region, the distance variable 
strongly implies that the trade costs i.e. transportation costs between countries are still 
high even though they are neighbours. The bilateral real exchange rate (REXijt) appears 
to play a supporting role in driving trade flows in the region as the estimated coefficient 
portrays an expected positive sign and is highly significant at the 99% level. Once the 
exporting country’s currency depreciates, this implies that exported goods are cheaper 
than previously. Hence, ceteris paribus, the amount of goods being exported should 
increase. Historical and cultural characteristics which are proxied by the communal 
languages dummy variable (Langij) provide evidence to support the claim that speaking 
similar languages is a trade facilitating factor. In addition, the estimated coefficient 
presents a positive sign and is also significant with the 99% level. It can be summarized 
that, despite the fact that each country in the region having a different official language, 
in general, they use ‘English’ when conducting international trade activity. With regards 
to the significance levels of all the coefficients estimated, it is worth highlighting that 
although almost all the estimated coefficients are highly significant
30
, the coefficient of 
the variable of interest AFTAijt is not so, despite having the desired positive sign. 
 
The last column shows results from the FEM’s estimates. While the majority of 
estimated coefficients do attain their signs, the exporter’s population variable (Pit) 
changes its sign in this specification: a positive sign is observed. Although the estimated 
coefficient on Pit is not significant, this nonetheless conforms to results found in 
                                                          
30
 The exception is on the exporter’s population variable (Pit). 
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numerous gravitational researches where the expected signs on population variables are 
inconclusive
31
. Oguledo and Macphee (1994) which studied trade flows of 162 
countries using the gravity framework affirmed this point;  
 
 Population size can be trade-enhancing as well as trade-inhibiting. On the one 
 hand, a large population may indicate large resource endowment, self-
 sufficiency, and less reliance on international trade. On the other hand, it is 
 possible that a large domestic market (or population) promotes division of 
 labour and thus creates opportunities for trade in a wide variety of goods 
 (Oguledo and MacPhee,1994, p. 114)  
 
 Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that, in general, significance levels of 
estimates still hold and even improve for some of the variables. It can be seen that 
estimated coefficients on GDP levels (Yit, Yjt), the bilateral real exchange rate (REXijt), 
and the importers’ population (Pjt) are all significant at 99%. This also includes the 
variable of interest: AFTAijt as it is now highly significant at 99% and maintains the 
expected positive sign.  
 
Taking a closer look at results on the AFTA-context, both REM’s and FEM’s estimates 
are markedly different. The Hausman Test (1978), based on differences between these 2 
estimators has to be conducted in order to test for the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneous factors (γij). As the 
statistical results of the Hausman Test (1978) are shown in the last row of Table 3.2, the 
test statistic reveals a high value for Chi-squared, equal to 112.28. The null hypothesis 
is, as a result, rejected. This implies further that the REM’s estimates are not consistent 
                                                          
31
 See Brada and Mendez (1983), Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) and Kien and Hashimoto (2005).  
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even though estimated coefficients present the expected sign and the most of them are 
highly significant. The preference is thus posted on the FEM’s estimates.  
 
However, as briefly discussed earlier, the empirical investigation does not end here. 
Because the study covers a long time span of 38 years, the joint test signifying the 
importance of the time dimension has to be carried out. By performing the joint test, 
the result portrays the F-statistic of F (37,1731) = 2.09 with Prob > F = 0.0001. This 
test therefore indicates the significance of the time dimension in this gravity 
specification. By including the ‘time effect’ in the selected FEM as aforementioned in 
Eq. (3.9), the so-called two-way fixed effects model (2-way FEM) is constructed 
(Baum, 2006). Consequently, the gravity equation’s estimates of the 2-way FEM is 
provided in the last column of Table 3.3 below.  
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Table 3.3: Results of the ‘Gravity Model’ Estimates:  the Fixed Effects Model     
        (FEM) and the Two-Way Fixed Effects Model (2-Way FEM) 
 
Dependent Variable :  
Real Exports 
AFTA-context 
(FEM)  
AFTA-context 
(2-way FEM)  
Exporter's GDP (Yit) 
1.2650253*** 
(0.1486844) 
1.2153623*** 
(0.1712207) 
Importer’s GDP(Yjt) 
0.66269796*** 
(0.1474501) 
0.73517878*** 
(0.1812397) 
Exporter’s Population (Pit) 
0.47643632 
(0.4200477) 
0.79549044* 
(0.4721928) 
Importer’s Population (Pjt) 
-1.5138585*** 
(0.493943) 
-1.0911003 
(0.6771392) 
Distance (Dij) - - 
Real Exchange Rate (REXijt) 
0.21372023*** 
(0.0211601) 
0.20079673*** 
(0.0217708) 
Common Language (Langij) - - 
AFTA-effects (AFTAijt) 
0.33486034*** 
(0.1140395) 
-0.35077028** 
(0.172958) 
Constant 
-15.896729*** 
4.316955 
-28.379009* 
(15.89954) 
 
Note: *** denotes significant at 99%, ** and * denotes significant at 95% and 90%, respectively 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The time-effects are not included here in order to save space. 
The estimates are, however, available upon request. 
 
As evidence suggests, Table 3.3 compares results from the fixed effects model (FEM) 
and the two-way fixed effects model (2-way FEM). It can be seen that substantial 
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changes occur in the 2-way FEM’s results. First of all, the estimated coefficient of the 
variable of interest: AFTAijt has changed to have a negative sign yet becomes 
significant at 95%. This chapter perceives that such a negative and significant estimate 
on AFTAijt is the result of controlling both country-pairs as well as time specific effects. 
This approach, defining the AFTA dummy variable in a dynamic setting plus 
incorporating the ‘time effects’ in the FEM specification, provides a clearer picture of 
‘AFTA-effects’ on regional trade flows. From the empirical evidence stated in the 2-way 
FEM, it seems that AFTA has not been effective in increasing intra-trade for the region. 
In contrast to the bulk of gravity-based accounts earlier reviewed, ‘AFTA-effects’ found 
here are not as beneficial as has been claimed. Considering the positive ‘AFTA-effects’ 
in Kien and Hashimoto (2005) and Tang (2005) as an example, it is important to note 
that these accounts included AFTA among other larger RTAs in the specification. This, 
as previously discussed, could have brought certain effects to AFTA which are being 
estimated at the same time. In addition, these studies did not examine all AFTA-
members; while Kien and Hashimoto (2005) selected only 6 AFTA-members
32
, Tang 
(2005) only chose to study 5 AFTA-members
33
, hence the trade effects found could 
probably be referring to this group of countries but not the whole region. Furthermore, 
their econometric techniques are rather outdated. Kien and Hashimoto (2005) employed 
the Hausman Taylor estimating procedure in order to correct for unobserved 
heterogeneity bias where estimates were sensitive to instrumental variables chosen. In 
addition, there was a difficulty finding appropriate instrumental variables as this matter 
is in fact subjective. And, Tang (2005) relied on simple OLS and 2SLS procedures in 
finding the trade effects of AFTA without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                          
32
 They are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  
33
 They are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
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issues. Considering these points, though ‘AFTA-effects’ estimated were satisfying as the 
positive sign was obtained, the chapter perceives that biases existed in these results.   
 
With proper specification imposed in the estimating gravity equation, despite the fact 
that the unconstructive effects of AFTA on the membership’s trade are found in this 
part of the thesis, the rest of the estimated coefficients retain their signs. Furthermore, 
estimated coefficients on GDP levels (Yit, Yjt) and bilateral real exchange rates (REXijt) 
are positive and stay highly significant at 99%. Considering specifically GDP variables 
(Yit, Yjt), by allowing for the ‘time effects’ in the 2-way FEM, this implies that trade 
remains positively related to both the exporter’s and the importer’s incomes. The 
positive and highly significant estimate of the bilateral real exchange rates variable 
(REXijt) confirms the fact that the depreciation in exporting country’s currency 
increases trade (exports) in this data set, ceteris paribus. For population variables(Pit, 
Pjt), it can be seen that significance levels of the estimates on the exporter’s population 
(Pit) and the importer’s population (Pjt) are greatly affected in the 2-way FEM. The 
estimated result of the exporter’s population (Pit) which was insignificant in the FEM, 
has now improved: become significant at the 90% level in the 2-way FEM. Conversely, 
the estimated result of the importer’s population (Pjt) which was significant at the 99% 
level in the FEM, has become insignificant in the 2-way FEM. As the population 
variable is one of the channels determining market size and economies of scale, this 
suggests that, ceteris paribus, the large exporting country (in terms of population) 
would be able to enjoy economies of scale which allow the country to increase exports. 
For importing countries, besides having economies of scale, the large population size 
may also imply that countries’ per capita incomes have decreased. These countries will 
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thus tend to be self-reliant, reducing cross-border imports. Once again, the estimated 
results on the population variables are similar to previous gravity research in the sense 
that they are not conclusive.  
 
Hence, considering results of the FEM and the 2-way FEM, this study has shown that 
the 2-way FEM is, to a certain extent, able to control for unobserved heterogeneities (γij) 
as well as the effects of the time dimension (γt). It is evident that ‘AFTA-effects’ 
previously captured in the FEM are observed to be markedly influenced by the time 
dimension in this case. Certainly, a positive sign on AFTAijt’s estimate under the 
conventional FEM contains effects from the unobservable heterogeneous factors (γij) 
that plausibly contribute to an increase in AFTA members’ trade over this long period 
of time. Hence, omitting the importance of the time element could result in 
measurement errors, especially on the ‘AFTA-effects’ estimated as much variation 
would be absorbed in AFTAijt . For these reasons, findings in the FEM and the 2-way 
FEM as compared in Table 3.3 post a cautious remark on numerous panel data analyses 
that have examined long period studies especially those that have shown positive effects 
of AFTA. The chapter believes that a failure to control for the time-dimension is 
another plausible reason that previous gravity-based literature provided mixed results on 
‘AFTA-effects’ estimated. On many occasions, the importance of the time dimension 
can be large, and proper econometric techniques are essentially required in order to 
control for its influence. This is indeed what this research has presented. Although the 
‘time effects’ estimated for each year are plausibly minimal, the time span of 38 years is 
more than adequate to consider whether ‘time’ is one of the important dimensions that 
has influenced intra-ASEAN trade relationships during these years.  
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In addition, as far as the degree of fitting of the estimating ‘Gravity Model’ is 
concerned, one of the ways to check this is to conduct the test for homoskedasticity or 
constant variance. Given that the null hypothesis is homoskedastic, if the test result 
suggests rejecting this null, this implies that the residuals are heteroskedastic. Even 
though values of estimated coefficients are not affected as they will still be consistent 
regardless of whether heteroskedasticity in residuals is observed, standard errors 
obtained can be inflated if the degree of heteroskedastictiy is large. Taking this point 
into consideration, the study therefore employs STATA commands to test whether there 
is constant variance or homoskedasticity in the 2-way FEM specified
34
. The result of the 
modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the regression model is indicated 
in Figure 3.2 below : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 : Results of the Heteroskedasticity Test in the Two-Way Fixed Effects Model. 
  
From the statistical test above, it suggests that there is an indication of 
heteroskedasticity. Thus, the null hypothesis has to be rejected. One can, in addition, 
observe the graphical presentation for detecting degrees of heteroskedasticity. If the null 
hypothesis is true, there should be no discernible pattern to the residuals against the 
fitted value in the data set. That is because the average residual for each country-pair 
                                                          
34
 The command ‘xttest3’ is used after the normal fixed effects  model regression.  
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
H0 : sigma (i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (85) = 5.2e+06 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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would be 0. The STATA programming command is, once again, employed to plot the 
residuals versus the predicted values;  patterns of the 2-way FEM estimation’s residuals 
across country-pairs are shown in Figure 3.3.    
 
 
Figure 3.3 : The Scatter Plot of the 2-Way FEM’s Residuals by Trade-pairs 
 
As evidently illustrated in Figure 3.3, the graphical presentation does not exhibit the 
obvious pattern of scatter plots of the 2-way FEM’s residuals. Despite the modified 
Wald Test indicating signs of heteroskedasticity in residuals, the shape of scatter plot 
implies that the degree of heterogeneity is not strong in this case. As previously 
mentioned, the incidence of heteroskedasticity does not affect the values of estimated 
coefficients thus, researchers, every so often, do nothing with the results as long as the 
graphical presentation does not portray a strong pattern in the graph of the residuals 
against the fitted values. Nevertheless, standard errors given may be incorrect. For this 
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reason, the chapter reports estimated results with robust standard errors in order to 
adjust for heteroskedasticity in residuals although values of estimated coefficients 
obtained are unaltered. This is, in fact, common practice to control for the incidence of 
heteroskedasticity in the fixed effects panel data estimation. The detail of this empirical 
results are presented in Appendix III.  
 
Hence, by controlling for all sources of potential biases commonly found in estimating 
the gravity equation, the empirical ‘Gravity Model’ given in this application is correctly 
specified. Therefore, from 1970 to 2007, the panel estimates for patterns of intra-
ASEAN trade flows recorded by trade-pairs are accordingly presented in Figure 3.4 
below. This figure in fact portrays trade flows of all ASEAN members covering pre- 
and post-AFTA periods exclusively.  
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                                          Figure 3.4: The Estimation of the ‘Gravity Model’ for intra-ASEAN Trade Flows; Represented by Trade-pairs 
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As can be seen from Figure 3.4, in most cases, the predicted trade flows and the actual 
trade flows are closely related suggesting that the panel gravity specification employed 
here is, to a certain extent, efficient. There are only a few trade-pairs where actual trade 
patterns do differ markedly from the predicted trade flows. In particular, those trade-
pairs that have actual trade higher than the predicted value are all involved with Brunei 
which is the major, if not the largest, oil and gas exporting country in the region. By 
including oil and gas trading activity, the value of bilateral trade flows are usually larger 
than the usual commodity trade that is estimated by the standard gravitational variables. 
Figure 3.4, in addition, provides an important piece of information that though intra-
ASEAN trade flows have shown to have improved slightly over years, there was no 
significant bound on intra-ASEAN’s trade flows in 1992 given it was the time of AFTA 
establishment.  
 
3.6 Extending the test to focus on trade with CLMV countries:  evidence on trade  
      creation and trade diversion effects of AFTA 
 
Thus far, the research has examined the overall ‘AFTA-effects’ on intra-ASEAN trade 
flows over the period from 1970 to 2007. Recall that not all ASEAN members entered 
into this free trade zone at the same time. The research hence extends the scope to 
scrutinize ‘AFTA-effects’ in detail: explaining the incident in which a group of ASEAN-
6 were AFTA’s early members, whilst the rest remained outside the zone. To do so, the 
research divides this state of affairs into 2 cases, considering each trade-pair when 1) the  
AFTA member is an exporter and 2) the AFTA member is an importer. By applying the 
‘dynamic regional dummies’ concept, this chapter is able to observe ‘AFTA-effects’ at a 
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country-pair level. The chapter denotes I-AFTAijt to capture effects from AFTA that are 
specific to the case in which only the export country is a member of AFTA. These can 
be referred to as ‘export-effects’. J-AFTAijt is, on the other hand, imposed to gauge 
‘AFTA-effects’ assumed to occur when the import country is in AFTA. These are 
therefore described as ‘import-effects’.  
 
Basically these regional dummies: I-AFTAijt,, J-AFTAijt, work to pick up any ‘AFTA-
effects’ hypothesized to transfer to AFTA-membership exporters and AFTA-
membership importers at a particular time. This empirical specification not only 
measures ‘AFTA-effects’ on trade flows of early and delayed members but also 
differentiates their trade patterns, which are assumed to be influenced by AFTA 
differently when trading statuses, exporter versus importer, are being observed. Again, 
with issues concerning potential endogeneity of AFTA, it is worth mentioning that the 
time at which each CLMV country was allowed to join AFTA was set by 
ASEAN/AFTA founders. In fact, the plan was set since ASEAN-6 planned to expand 
AFTA to cover all ASEAN members. This simply explains the scenario in which 
AFTA-membership was given at the same time as countries were accepted into 
ASEAN. For these reasons, one is able to rule out issues concerning potential 
endogeneity of AFTA-memberships in this case as firstly, AFTA was definitely not a 
trade-induced FTA. Secondly, the late entrances of CLMV countries were politically 
planned as ASEAN-6 aimed to put everyone in this form of regional economic 
integration. Thus, the use of ‘dynamic regional dummies’ which assumes exogeneity of 
AFTA-membership is suitable here. This study, in addition, intends to avoid 
specification issues associated with the use of nested dummies i.e. multicollinearity 
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problems that are likely to occur when all regional dummies are included in the same 
specification. For this reason, there will not be a specification that includes all 3 
regional dummy variables: AFTAijt ,I-AFTAijt,, J-AFTAijt altogether in this application.  
Again, before estimating the gravity equation, the necessity to control for the influence 
of the time trend has to be tested. The result of the joint test checking for the inclusion 
of ‘time effects’ portrays the F-statistic of F (37,1730) = 2.02 with Prob > F = 0.0003. 
This test therefore confirms that the inclusion of the ‘time-effects’ is necessary in this 
specification. Thus, for the ‘export-effects’ and ‘import-effects’ case, the ‘Gravity 
Model’ assumes that, in a given year, trade flows from exporting country i to importing 
country j can be estimated using: 
 
                                                               
                                                                                (3.12)         
 
               
    
                 (3.13) 
 
 
              ; if T = t    : T = year 1970, 1971,…, 2007                  (3.14)  
    =                            
                                    ; if T ≠ t 
                          
where :  
 
 Xijt  : Real exports of country i to country j at time t,  
1 
0 
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Yit,Yjt  : Real GDP of country i and country  j at time t, respectively  
Pit,Pjt   : Population of country i and country j at time t, respectively  
Dij  : Geographical distance between countries i and country j,  
Langij : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j  share 
   communal languages. Otherwise, it is 0, 
REXijt  : Bilateral real exchange rate of country i to country j at time t,   
AFTAijt : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j are  
   members of AFTA at time t. Otherwise, it is 0, 
           : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 when an export country is a member
         of AFTA. Otherwise, it is 0, 
          : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 when an import country is a member 
        of AFTA. Otherwise, it is 0, 
γ0       : An unknown constant term (the portion of the intercept that is common to  
        all years and trade-pairs),  
γij       : Unobserved heterogeneities or bilateral effects specific to each trade-pair,  
γt        : Time effects,  
εijt         : An error component term which is assumed to be well-behaved; i.i.d with 
          zero mean  and constant variance.  
 
The chapter, on top of that, considers the case in which only one country in the trade-
pair: either country i or country j, is in AFTA. This can be regarded as a robustness 
check for ‘AFTA-effects’ that early AFTA members, regardless of whether they are 
exporters or importers, could have attained. For this reason, the name ‘one country-
effects’ is thus imposed. The dynamic regional dummy variable: One-AFTAijt is 
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specified to segregate such effects accordingly. This specification also tests for the 
inclusion of the time trend in the same manner. The joint test stating the necessity to 
include the ‘time effects’ in the estimating ‘Gravity Model’ as the F-statistic found is F 
(37, 1731) = 2.02 with Prob > F = 0.00. As the time trend is shown to be important in 
influencing the trade flows of AFTA members, the specification is therefore written as: 
 
                                                                   
                                                                    (3.15) 
  
and, 
 
                      
    
                (3.16) 
 
 
                                       ; if T = t    : T = year 1970, 1971,…, 2007                                   (3.17)     
        =                     
                      ; if T ≠ t 
 
where : 
 
Xijt  : Real exports of country i to country j at time t,  
Yit,Yjt  : Real GDP of country i and country  j at time t, respectively  
Pit, Pjt   : Population of country i and country j at time t, respectively  
Dij  : Geographical distance between countries i and country j,  
1 
0 
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Langij : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j  share 
   communal languages. Otherwise, it is 0, 
REXijt  : Bilateral real exchange rate of country i to country j at time t,   
            : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 when only one country in the  
                          trade-pairs is a member of AFTA. Otherwise, it is denoted as 0,  
γ0           : An unknown constant term (the portion of intercept that is common to all 
  years and trade-pairs),  
γij          : Unobserved heterogeneities or bilateral effects specific to each trade-pair,  
γt            : Time effects,  
εijt         : An error component term which is assumed to be well-behaved; i.i.d with zero       
               mean  and constant variance. 
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Table 3.4: Results of the ‘Gravity Model’ Estimates:  All Specifications of the  
       Two-Way Fixed Effects Model (2-Way FEM) 
Dependent Variable :  
Real Exports 
AFTA-context 
(overall ‘AFTA-
effects’) 
 
AFTA-context 
(‘export-effects’ 
and  ‘import-
effects’) 
AFTA-context 
(‘one-country effects’) 
Exporter's GDP (Yit) 
1.2153623*** 
(0.1712207) 
1.1922973*** 
(0.1707177) 
1.2112282*** 
(0.1710902) 
Importer’s GDP (Yjt) 
0.73517878*** 
(0.1812397) 
0.77707078*** 
(0.1807994) 
0.74518733*** 
(0.1810327) 
Exporter’s Population (Pit) 
0.79549044* 
(0.4721928) 
0.73239736 
(0.4708321) 
0.787251* 
(0.471831) 
Importer’s Population (Pjt) 
-1.0911003 
(0.6771392) 
-1.0353871 
(0.6748922) 
-1.0848037 
(0.6765866) 
Distance (Dij) - - - 
Real Exchange Rate (REXijt) 
0.20079673*** 
(0.0217708) 
0.20165476*** 
(0.0216812) 
0.20062192*** 
(0.0217388) 
Common Language (Langij) - - - 
AFTA-effects (AFTAijt) 
- 0.35077028** 
(0.172958) 
- - 
One-country effects 
 (One-AFTAijt)  
- - 
0.45393583*** 
(0.1727708) 
Export-effects (I-AFTAijt) - 
0.53951921*** 
(0.1742912) 
- 
Import-effects (J-AFTAijt)   - 
-1.778512** 
(0.7074945) 
- 
Constant 
-28.379009* 
(15.89954) 
-28.66017* 
(15.84234) 
-28.474607* 
(15.88603) 
 
Note: *** denotes significant at 99%, ** and * denotes significant at 95% and 90%, respectively 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The time-effects are not included here in order to save space.  
The estimates are, however, available upon request. 
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It can be seen in Table 3.4 that when ‘AFTA-effects’ are analysed in detail, the research 
is able to explain why the overall ‘AFTA-effects’ are not positive as many expected. 
Considering the case in which exporters are AFTA members or the so-called ‘export-
effects’, the estimated result on I-AFTAijt portrays a positive sign with the value of 
0.53951921 and is significant at 99% level. This implies that AFTA-membership 
exporters have increased their trades with non-members
35
. As this study covers 
ASEAN-10, these non-members simply refer to CLMV countries. This result can be 
interpreted further in that the exporting markets have expanded in size and these include 
new trade ties created from the side of early AFTA-membership exporters among 
themselves as well as between them and the delayed members. With AFTA, early 
members’ products could be more competitive especially in terms of price as they 
incurred less tariffs and, for some products, they do not even have to pay tariffs. Even if 
they keep their prices unchanged, countries could earn more than the pre-AFTA 
situation since there are lower tariffs to be paid post-AFTA. Ceteris paribus, their 
profits could be higher post-AFTA as the cost of production would be lowered with no 
tariffs incurred. Basically, in comparison to delayed members, early AFTA-members 
have a better chance of becoming efficient or cost-effective producers/exporters. Thus, 
it is possible that they would want to increase the amount of exports to existing markets 
as well as to expand their exports to new markets which include the CLMV group of 
countries.  
 
Conversely, when ‘import-effects’ are considered, the coefficients estimated on J-AFTAijt 
are negative and significant at 90% level. With a large estimated value of -1.778512, 
                                                          
35
 Even though trade has been created, this research avoids the use of the term ‘trade creation’. This is 
because, according to the original Viner’s (1950) definition, trade creation refers to an increase in trade 
among an RTA’s members after the elimination of tariffs are applied to the region.  
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this implies that early AFTA-membership importers have reduced imports from the 
delayed members. Intuitively speaking, this is possible as cross-border trading 
regulations as well as tariffs remain unchanged in the CLMV group of countries even 
when AFTA is established. With tariff liberalization, trading activities, especially 
importing between AFTA members and non-AFTA members, are definitely more costly 
in comparison to those among AFTA members themselves. Thus, given that goods are 
similarly produced and tastes and preferences do not play a major role when it comes to 
intra-ASEAN trade, it is highly likely that early members would want to reduce their 
trade (imports) from delayed members but to increase trade (exports and imports) 
among themselves instead.   
 
Last but not least, considering the ‘one country-effects’ specification, the estimated 
coefficient on One-AFTAijt as portrayed in the last column of Table 3.4 presents a 
positive sign and is highly significant at 99% level. With the estimated value of 
0.45393583, this does confirm that AFTA members, regardless of whether they are 
exporters or importers, do benefit from joining AFTA early. Considering this result, it 
sounds realistic as it is known that AFTA was driven by political concerns rather than 
economic ones especially at the beginning of its formation. Since 1992, early AFTA-
members had enjoyed tariff liberalization or tariff preferences which the CLMV 
countries did not. Not only could they take this opportunity to increase exports among 
themselves but they could also do the same to all other trading destinations. In addition, 
they could even establish new trade ties with existing traders or new trade partners as, 
with tariff liberalization, they are relatively more cost-effective than previously.  
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Considering estimated coefficients on other explanatory variables through all 3 detailed 
specifications in this AFTA-context, it is worth pointing out that they do retain their 
signs and the majority are still highly significant. All of them, in addition, do provide 
the expected signs. This can therefore be perceived as another piece of evidence to 
affirm the consistency of estimated results as well as the stability of empirical 
specifications of the ‘Gravity Model’ in this study.  
 
Given the empirical evidence above, this brings us to a famous study by Baldwin (1995) 
: the so-called ‘domino theory of regionalism’. The theory elaborates that the formation 
of the new RTA as well as the expansion of the existing one is the factor that triggers 
trade loss among the now non-membership countries. What can be analysed further 
from the result is that the timing differences in joining this free trade zone do affect 
trade flows of early and delayed members of AFTA. When AFTA was incomplete, 
having only ASEAN-6, trade benefits from this formal economic integration were found 
to be shared by these early members. Delayed members, CLMV countries, are on the 
contrary, found to be negatively affected by AFTA as their exports (from early 
members’ import ties) have been clearly reduced. In addition, estimated results appear 
to suggest that early members, regardless of their trading statuses as exporters or 
importers, do benefit from the free trade zone. In order to explain this outcome, it can be 
said that with tariff liberalization, early birds in AFTA could expand their exports to 
non-members while old trade (export) lines with other members could still be 
maintained. The delayed members, on the other hand, would be affected by relatively 
higher trade costs, ceteris paribus. In comparison to early AFTA-members, even though 
product prices in CLMV countries would be lower pre-AFTA, it is still possible that the 
131 
 
trade conducted with early AFTA members would have become more expensive after 
AFTA’s establishment. In this setting, early AFTA members would have better 
alternatives in seeking similar products from member trading partners at more 
competitive prices while delay ones could have lost certain market shares entirely, 
ceteris paribus. Despite it being for such a short time, from 1992 to 1999, that early 
members could enjoy preferential tariffs and enlarged exporting markets, their trade 
effects are shown to be outstanding as the estimated coefficients portray highly 
significant levels; I-AFTAijt is significant at 99% with a positive sign of 0.53951921 and 
J-AFTAijt is significant at 90% with a negative sign of 1.778512. These results imply 
that any trade created by early AFTA-members to non-members (delayed-members) 
was outweighed by the decrease in their imports from delayed members. As trade 
diversions in imports are more prominent than the creation of exports, it is 
straightforward to indicate why the overall ‘AFTA-effects’ have appeared to be negative 
in this case.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
The empirical frameworks in this chapter have improved a number of aspects of those 
used in previous studies. First of all, with regards to AFTA’s members coverage, this 
study is among the latest few empirical accounts that cover all 10 early and delayed 
members of AFTA. Having collected intra-ASEAN trade data for nearly 4 decades, this 
is, secondly, the largest coverage in terms of trade data of this region. Thirdly, while 
traditional gravity analyses commonly conduct the comparative type of empirical 
investigation measuring ‘AFTA-effects’ against other RTAs worldwide, this study aims 
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to draw the focus to be specific within the AFTA context. Discussions have been 
provided in this fashion as to why this method could be one of the most appropriate 
empirical strategies if the objective of research is to examine a particular RTA’s effects 
on its intra-regional trade exclusively. Instead of relying on simple cross-section 
analyses, this study employs the panel data framework; the 2-way FEM is imposed to 
control for unobserved heterogeneous biases as well as shocks that could have occurred 
to countries’ trade flows over a long period of time. The effects of AFTA on the 
membership’s trade are, last but not least, examined via the use of the ‘dynamic 
regional dummies’, enabling detailed examinations of ‘AFTA-effects’ on each trade-pair 
at a specific time. This chapter strongly asserts that the ‘dynamic regional dummies’ 
method is vital if not necessary in the case of AFTA, as membership countries entered 
into the zone, receiving membership status at different times. Moreover, under this 
‘dynamic regional dummies’ method, one is able to separate ‘AFTA-effects’ that may 
have influenced exporting-members and importing-members differently; the ‘export-
effects’ and ‘import-effects’ can be further specified in the estimating gravity equation.  
 
As these empirical developments are employed, the findings suggest that trade effects 
from the establishment of AFTA, even though they are beneficial, are not proven to last. 
Given the fact that a group of countries had entered the free trade zone first, this action 
certainly played a role in affecting the trade relationships of early and delayed members 
as well as the overall trade effects delivered to the region as a whole. In this case, any 
new trade created was, in large part, due to the expansion of early members’ trade 
(exports) to delayed members during the period between 1992 and 1999. At the same 
time, these early members had, on the contrary, reduced trade (imports) from delayed 
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members. Provided that such a reduction in imports has outweighed the increase in 
exports that early members traded with delayed members, the incident of trade diversion 
was therefore concluded as an overall trade effect of AFTA. Although ASEAN 
countries started to experience rapid growth in the 1980s and the size of intra-ASEAN 
trade was expected to increase substantially soon after the formation of AFTA, findings 
in this application have suggested that this occurrence has not been observed in reality.  
The increase in intra-ASEAN trade is observed to be primarily due to an increase in 
economic size of countries and other gravitational factors instead of the intra-regional 
bias associated with the only form of economic integration in the region: AFTA.  
 
Taking this additional piece of empirical evidence into consideration, the result posts a 
remark on previous gravity analyses that conducted cross-sectional research without 
solving for certain econometric issues and failing to consider AFTA’s sluggish 
expansion over the period of study. In addition, it also casts doubts on related research 
that simply measured ‘AFTA-effects’ in comparative terms with other RTAs. Indeed, 
this case study has shown that not only issues concerning unobserved heterogeneous 
factors, the importance of the time dimension and idiosyncratic shocks have to be 
controlled for in the gravity specification, but the appropriate selection of countries to 
be included in the analysis is also required as long as a consistent and independent 
estimate of ‘AFTA-effects’ on intra-regional trade flows is the research’s objective.  
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4: The So-Called ‘Gravity Framework’ Revisited: ASEAN’s Major Trading Partners  
    and Trade Effects of AFTA on Intra-ASEAN and Extra-ASEAN Trade Flows 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This part of the thesis aims to extend the preceding analysis employing the renowned 
gravity framework to assess trade flows of ASEAN countries and their key trading 
partners. Traditionally, ‘AFTA-effects’ are observed in order to determine whether the 
formal economic integration within the region has altered external trade ties at all, and 
vice versa. For many, the deficiency of empirical evidence concerning ‘AFTA-effects’ 
on the ASEAN region’s trade flows may already be disconcerting, but their records on 
external trade ties are actually worse. Considering the large amount of ex-ante as well as 
ex-post research on RTA-effects across the globe over recent years, the shortage of 
studies concerning ‘AFTA-effects’ on its own regional trade ties and beyond is certainly 
not new. Given such limited resources, mixed results have, in addition, been found 
regarding the upshot of AFTA on intra-regional and extra-regional trade ties
1
. The range 
of countries included, differences in time frames observed, heterogeneous sets of 
variables considered as well as dissimilarities in the empirical methodologies applied, in 
general, cause variations in the estimated results. Although these issues are generally 
common in empirical investigations, this chapter aims to point out that with regards to 
measuring trade effects of AFTA on both intra-regional and extra-regional trade flows, 
one needs to be more careful in all these aspects.  
 
                                                          
1
 Details of some of the related literature are explained in the following section.  
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By observing empirical studies that measured trade effects of a particular RTA or ones 
that quantified many RTAs’ effects in a single study, it is often found that, besides 
including RTA-membership countries, the general method is to incorporate as many 
countries as possible into the ‘Gravity Model’ specified. This technique is often claimed 
to be capable of describing the complexity of the world’s trade relationships and in 
many applications, it is referred to as ‘the world model of the gravity specification in 
international trade’. This chapter perceives that this procedure, although it suits the 
common objectives of many empirical studies in attempting to compare and contrast 
types of RTAs and their effects on relevant countries’ trade flows internationally, is 
plausibly not as sturdy if the research’s focus is more specific i.e. to find independent 
RTA-effects of AFTA.  
 
Given the impressive number of empirical applications on an evaluation of RTAs’-
effects, it seems that the choice of countries included is primarily subject to the 
availability of data rather than other causes. Basically, ‘the more the merrier’ can be 
stated as the norm in this field of research as a large number of countries being included 
in the gravity specification is usually preferred over a small number. As earlier 
mentioned, as long as the objective of the research is to examine the world’s trade 
relationships or to generalize RTA(s)-effects at the global level, this approach is not 
unusual. What is evident in reality is that even in studies that claimed to put an 
emphasis on evaluating ‘AFTA-effects’ on ASEAN’s trade flows exclusively, this same 
technique had still been utilised. In such applications, much attention was paid to 
covering large numbers of countries regardless of their importance or relevance (as 
traders) to the domain: ASEAN countries. In many cases, the choice of countries 
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selected to be included in the gravity specification were ones that ASEAN members had 
never traded with at all. To sum up, it can be said that countries were rather selected 
rather arbitrarily and this could be one of the reasons explaining why not much 
information regarding the impact of AFTA on its key trading partners has been 
accessible. 
 
As AFTA is unique in its development
2
, specific measures have to be considered if 
‘AFTA-effects’ are to be accurately and independently evaluated. Chapter 3 of this thesis 
has shown an alternative method in which an empirical investigation specifically within 
the ASEAN border was set up to evaluate AFTA’s role in boosting intra-regional trade. 
The reason that this facet of AFTA’s performance has been emphasized is simply 
because it is one of the most important objectives that ASEAN-membership countries 
have hoped to achieve through the establishment of the free trade zone
3
. As the focus is 
on the trade effects of AFTA, the key empirical result, however, indicates that the 
overall ‘AFTA-effects’ on the regional trade flows are negative. This can be elaborated 
further in that trade relationships in the form of trade diversion have outweighed trade 
creation over the period of study. Before proceeding further, the chapter perceives this 
piece of evidence to be worth revisiting and investigating in detail. Given the negative 
and significant estimated value of -0.35077028 on the dynamic AFTAijt dummy 
variable, this can thus be interpreted to show that negative trade effects have become 
prominent since the completion of AFTA in 1999
4
. As the study also distinguishes 
                                                          
2
 See background information on the establishment of AFTA in Chapter 1.  
3
 See Tongzon (2002, p.182).  
4
 It is important to note that the AFTAijt dummy only captures trade effects occurring from AFTA when 
both trading partners are members at the same time. As it is evident, this is written in the dynamic form 
which takes into account the time dimension. The interpretation of this dummy variable is thus different 
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between cases in which AFTA members are exporters and importers, the negative 
‘AFTA-effects’ on regional trade flows can, in fact, be explained by I-AFTAijt and J-
AFTAijt dummies which are the so-called ‘export-effects’ and ‘import-effects’, 
respectively. The positive and significant coefficient estimate of 0.53951921 on I-
AFTAijt designates that trade had been increased as early members plausibly enhanced 
their trade (exports) to the delayed ones. Such an increase was, however, short-lived as 
eventually every country in the region became a member of AFTA. Once this happened, 
this dummy variable stopped picking up any ‘export-effects’ generated from 
membership exporters to non-membership importers. On the other hand, as the negative 
and significant estimate of -1.778512 on J-AFTAijt was observed, it can be said that 
early AFTA-membership importers did decrease imports from delayed members. This 
could certainly be the case because the current AFTA-membership countries would 
prefer to import products among themselves rather than from delayed members since, 
ceteris paribus, trade costs incurred would be smaller; tariffs would be lower or non-
existent. Considering the reduction of early members’ imports from delayed members, 
import diversion was therefore recorded. Theoretically, it could be interpreted that 
members’ import structure had basically been switched from non-members’ goods to 
members’ goods, implying further that new trade had not been induced. AFTA 
members probably ended up trading with less cost efficient (more expensive) 
membership producers as Viner (1950) explained in the concept of trade diversion. 
Comparing the positive impact of ‘export-effects’ with the negative influence from 
‘import-effects’, as the latter was more prominent, this was perceived to drive ‘AFTA-
effects’ to be negative, on the whole. From these results, it can be said that ASEAN 
                                                                                                                                                                          
from traditional accounts that measure only the membership status of AFTA without considering the time 
that each trader joins the zone.  
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members have not been able to eliminate trade barriers and overcome general obstacles 
in order to increase intra-regional trade, even if there have been signs of improvement 
since the formation of AFTA
5
. There are more than a few reasons for these 
unimpressive trade effects of AFTA. One of the key reasons could plausibly be the 
similarity in endowments and products traded as narrated in the key characteristics of 
ASEAN economies in Chapter 1. A large degree of similarity in products traded has 
made ASEAN countries less complementary to but more competitive with each other. 
This competition could undoubtedly cause difficulties in arriving at mutual agreements 
from regional trade liberalization. According to the book ‘The Economies of Southeast 
Asia’ by Tongzon (1998), identical if not similar factor endowments within ASEAN 
territories were, in addition, forecast as a root of significant trade diversion (Tongzon, 
1998, p.168). In association with Chapter 3’s findings, this discussion has proven to 
reflect the case empirically. The fact that ASEAN’s economy has contracted has also 
been regarded as an additional hindrance preventing intra-regional trade from expanding 
much further: even with the help of free trade zones such as AFTA. Furthermore, the 
incident of financial crisis in 1997 had in fact slowed down trade liberalization 
processes for the entire region, especially Thailand where the crisis was initiated. 
During that period, ASEAN countries’ trade policies were reversed to become more 
inward-looking as much attention was paid to adjusting for high debts as well as 
restructuring mainstream financial services for the entire region. This episode 
undoubtedly affected the growth of intra-ASEAN trade. Last but not least, past 
economic institutions and the political instability of ASEAN countries additionally 
constrained their ability to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by AFTA. 
                                                          
5
 This is so, for example, when ‘export-effects’ are concerned.  
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Provided the above grounds, institutional capacity needed to be improved and adequate 
legal and regulatory frameworks were required straight away if the region aimed to get 
back on track in liberalizing intra-regional trade.  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to point out that AFTA’s objectives are not limited to 
boosting trade within the ASEAN border. But, ASEAN also aims to enhance the region’ 
competitiveness. When AFTA was established in 1992, AFTA Reader (1993) collected 
the objectives of AFTA as stated below: 
 
 The ultimate objective of AFTA is to increase ASEAN’s competitive edge as a 
 production base geared for the world market. A critical step in this direction is 
 the liberalization of trade in the region through the elimination of intra-
 regional tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff barriers. This will have the 
 effect of making ASEAN’s manufacturing sectors more efficient and 
 competitive in the global market. At the same time, consumers will source  goods 
 from the more efficient producers in ASEAN, thus creating intra-ASEAN trade. 
 (“Questions and Answers on the CEPT,” 1993, p.1).  
 
 
Having abundant natural resources and labour-intensive economies
6
, the region is able 
to help in filling the world’s demands, supplying a number of primary agricultural 
goods as well as manufacturing products at competitive prices. The region is also good 
at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) as their labour force is not only large but 
their hiring costs are also cheaper than many parts of the world. By strengthening 
external trade links, the ASEAN market can definitely be diversified and expanded 
further in due course. Therefore while aiming to promote trade within the region 
directly AFTA members ought to utilize this integrated tariff preferential zone to 
increase production as well as to expand their trade outside the region at the same time. 
                                                          
6
 The only exception is Singapore as it is the country in the ASEAN region that has limited labour and no 
natural resources. 
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As a result, this could indirectly assist the region in achieving its ultimate goal of 
increasing intra-regional trade.  
 
Taking this viewpoint into consideration, an observation on external trade ties is thus 
necessary and perhaps equally important if one is to pass judgement on AFTA’s 
performance. In other words, linkages between intra-regional and extra-regional trade 
relationships are for this reason, hypothesized to signify how well AFTA has been 
working to achieve the ultimate ASEAN dream as aforementioned. By looking at 
external trade ties, this benefits the research further as more information regarding 
ASEAN’s trade relationships can be obtained, enabling us to evaluate AFTA’s 
performance in a larger domain. Doubt over whether ASEAN countries have become 
more closely integrated or rather more open towards a broader economy can then be 
additionally clarified via this approach.  
 
4.2 Related literature 
 
In the realm of research that aims to quantify RTA-effects, it is known that the ‘Gravity 
Model’ has stood the test of the time as a key empirical strategy. As elaborated in 
Chapter 3, it is evident that the gravity concept first started in the area of international 
trade in the 1960s when 2 trade economists employed the gravity framework to assess 
the flow of goods between countries at almost the same time. Tinbergen (1962) 
employed the ‘Gravity Model’ to study international trade flows of 18 countries in 
1959: while PÖyhonen (1963) proposed a similar model to explain the exchange of 
goods between 10 European countries in 1958. In the half century since then, the 
‘Gravity Model’ has been exploited to assess international trade flows. Constrained by 
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the limited amount of empirical research that has investigated the AFTA’s area, this 
section reviews related gravity-based literature that either aimed to study ‘AFTA-effects’ 
in particular, or literature that measured trade effects of many RTAs in general: 
including AFTA among other RTAs from different parts of the world. It is worth 
clarifying here that it is not coincidental that some of the literature reviewed here has 
also been mentioned in the preceding chapters. As the scope of this research has been 
extended to cover external trade ties, literature that studies such relationships, though 
reviewed already, will have to be mentioned here once more.  
 
Under the gravity framework, examining RTA-effects on external trade relationships 
has been used to capture whether a particular RTA has caused any extra-bloc trade. In 
fact, this notion was a trend in empirical studies during the period of the so-called 
‘second wave’: a time in which researchers were interested in finding whether a 
particular RTA or RTAs in general are building or stumbling blocs to multilateral trade 
liberalisation. Basically, in contrast to the ‘first wave’ period in which the traditional 
gravity-based research was confined to determining intra-bloc trade or the intra-bloc 
effects, gravitational assessments in the ‘second wave’ epoch were aimed at scrutinizing 
both intra-bloc effects and extra-bloc effects of RTA(s). This was done to gauge any 
undisclosed ways that a particular RTA may have increased members’ trade, either by 
diverting from countries outside the bloc or simply at the expense of multilateral trade.  
 
Recall that the benchmark method of assessing the impact of a particular RTA is to add 
the specific RTA-membership dummy variable into the ‘Gravity Model’. Any trade 
effects beyond those assumed to be generated by normal bilateral trade determinants are 
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seized by this RTA-membership dummy. It was as early as the first gravity framework, 
Tinbergen (1962), that this method was employed to capture effects of the specific RTA 
on its memberships’ trade flows. In detail, the dummy variable is given a value of 1 if 
particular trade-pairs are members of the same RTA of interest: otherwise it is given the 
value 0. The sign, value, and the significance level of the estimated coefficient on this 
particular RTA-membership dummy basically indicates how advantageous and 
influential that RTA has been to its members. For instance, the positive sign (and its 
significance level) on the specific RTA-membership dummy’s estimated coefficient 
implies that intra-bloc trade has been enhanced or trade creation has occurred because 
of the RTA: whereas the negative (and significant) estimated coefficient suggests that 
trade diversion has, instead, occurred. Nevertheless, one should not forget that there 
were no external trade relationships directly discussed in this traditional method. The 
RTA-effects are justified on the grounds of the so-called ‘gross trade effects’7 that are 
derived by referring on the overall impacts of the RTA on memberships’ trade flows 
only.   
  
As far as ‘second wave’ issues were concerned, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997)8 and 
Frankel and Wei (1998)
9
 were among the first to evaluate RTA-effects on non-
                                                          
7
 This term was invented by Balassa (1967). 
8
 The study investigated preferential effects of the EC and EFTA on 21 developed European countries 
using the first difference version of the ‘Gravity Model’. The period of study was from 1953 to 1992. 
Specifically, as the dependent variable was total trade, explanatory variables are specified in the product 
form (except the ‘distance’ variable).  
9
 The study employed the augmented ‘Gravity Model’ to investigate effects of regional blocs on 63 
countries’ trade flows under 6 regional groupings: EC, EFTA, CUSTA, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN 
GROUP and ASEAN. The ‘Gravity Model’ was modified to include the ‘remoteness’ variable  which 
captures the distance of each country from its average trading partner, in addition to the standard 
‘distance’ variable.  
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members’ trade flows empirically10. In doing so, an additional set of regional dummy 
variables was incorporated into the gravity specification in an attempt to capture trade 
diversion that the theoretical analysis has identified. As the first customary dummy is 
given the value of 1 when trade-pairs are members of this specific RTA, another RTA-
membership dummy variable is also given the value of 1 when only one country in this 
particular trade-pair belongs to this specific RTA. Albeit adding a new set of RTA-
membership dummy variables for each RTA, the interpretation of these dummies’ 
estimates is still similar to the traditional concept. As a positive sign on the first RTA-
membership dummy variable indicates that members of that particular RTA trade more 
with each other than would otherwise be predicted by normal bilateral trade 
determinants, the positive sign on the second dummy implies that the extent of trade 
between these RTA members and outside countries has been additionally enhanced. 
That is because, relative to random country-pairs that do not belong to the RTA of 
interest, the second dummy variable measures any additional trade generated between 
RTA members and non-RTA trading partners. This is one of the ways to account for 
extra-bloc trade effects of a particular RTA empirically. When the estimated sign on the 
second RTA-membership dummy’s coefficient is negative, it is interpreted that an 
increase in intra-bloc trade (that was formerly captured by the first RTA-membership 
dummy) has, in fact, come at the expense of lower extra-bloc trade. This implies further 
that a particular RTA exhibits a certain degree of trade diversion. One, nonetheless, has 
to compare the signs as well as the absolute values of both sets of RTA-membership 
dummies’ estimated coefficients in order to draw a conclusion toward the overall trade 
effects of the RTA of interest. On the condition that a positive value on the first RTA-
                                                          
10
 In fact, Frankel and Wei (1993) employed this concept as well but their application was intended to 
study trade bloc and currency bloc effects rather than the effects of the regional trade agreements.  
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membership dummy’s estimated coefficient exceeds the negative value on the second 
dummy’s estimate, trade creation is deemed to outweigh trade diversion. When that is 
the case, it can be said that despite it being a sign of trade diversion that non-RTA 
members are affected negatively by the RTA, its trade benefits, such as the amount of 
additional trade that is provided to membership countries is overpowering. What if the 
empirical result appears otherwise? Instead it can be summed up that the amount of 
trade diversion surpasses trade creation. In such circumstances, trade benefits created by 
the RTA are still applied to its members but the costs from trade diversion affecting 
outside countries exceed such gains. This results in a net trade diverting RTA or an 
economically inefficient one. With regard to ASEAN countries, Frankel and Wei (1998) 
found positive intra-ASEAN effects throughout the period of study. In addition, 
ASEAN was perceived to be an opened regional bloc as ASEAN’s imports from the rest 
of the world are deemed to have increased. These positive effects were diminishing, 
however, and the implementation of AFTA in 1992 was thought to be related to the 
reason for this descending correlation.    
 
Having a similar objective in examining RTA-effects, Soloaga and Winters (2001), 
however, added 3 sets of regional dummies for each RTA. This was aimed not only at 
distinguishing trade effects of this particular RTA on intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade but 
also at distinguishing extra-bloc effects on exports and extra-bloc effects on imports 
from one another. They argued that bloc-memberships’ importers and bloc-
memberships’ exporters should be affected differently by the RTA. In their findings, the 
first regional dummy is set up in the traditional way; it is given a value of 1 if both 
trading partners are members of the same RTA: otherwise, it is given the value 0. On 
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another regional dummy variable which is aimed at capturing extra-bloc effects on 
imports, the value of 1 is given if, in particular trade-pairs, an importer is an RTA-
member, regardless of whether her trade partner (an exporter) is a member of this RTA. 
On the last regional dummy variable which is imposed to quantify extra-bloc effects on 
exports, the value of 1 is given as long as, in each trade-pair, an exporting country in is 
in the RTA, regardless of whether the trading partner (an importer) is in the RTA or not. 
By imposing regional dummies in this way, an interpretation of these extra-bloc effects 
on imports and extra-bloc effects on exports is therefore different from an interpretation 
in the former case where there are only 2 sets of RTA-membership dummies imposed 
for each RTA. This is so because Soloaga and Winters (2001) perceived these extra-
bloc effects on imports and extra-bloc effects on exports to represent degrees of 
‘openness’ that RTA-membership traders could have imposed on their outside trading 
partners. This therefore enables the study to account for the overall imports and exports 
that RTA members have conducted among themselves and with non-members at the 
same time. In particular, the study employed the ‘Gravity Model’ to examine trade 
effects of 9 preferential trade agreements
11
 (PTAs) on 58 countries’ trade flows during 
the period of 1980-1996 using the Tobit model. As preferential effects among the 
ASEAN group of countries were also assessed, the estimated result, however, indicated 
negative intra-ASEAN effects in general. Even though such negative effects were not 
consistently significant, annual estimated results suggested that the negative sign was 
pronounced throughout the period of 1987-1995. With respect to its one and only RTA: 
AFTA, the study plotted these intra-ASEAN effects through time in order to identify 
changes that could be due to the formation of AFTA. However, in this case, it was 
                                                          
11
 They are ANDEAN, ASEAN, CACM, EFTA, EU, GCC, LAIA, MERCOSUR and NAFTA. 
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regarded that there was no indication of ‘AFTA-effects’ on members’ trade flows as 
intra-ASEAN trade did not increase at all after the implementation of AFTA. Given that 
external trade ties were also considered, the findings portrayed positive and significant 
estimated results on the ASEAN-imports and ASEAN-exports overall. This result could 
imply that ASEAN countries in fact depended on external trade ties rather than regional 
ones and these positive extra-ASEAN effects (on exports and imports) could be 
perceived as the outcome of the outward-oriented trading policies that the region has 
been pursuing thus far.  
 
Elliott and Iketmoto (2004) is another empirical account that evaluates the effectiveness 
of AFTA in increasing intra-ASEAN trade and its effects on non-members’ trading 
relationships. Using the OLS estimation method, the ‘Gravity Model’ was regressed on 
35 countries’ trade flows during the period of 1982-1999. In contrast to Soloaga and 
Winters (2001), when an independent ASEAN-bias was investigated, the result found 
that ASEAN members traded more with each other than would otherwise be predicted 
by normal trade determinants. With an emphasis on the effectiveness of AFTA, the 
study in addition summarized that this free trade zone had, to a certain extent, brought 
positive effects to intra-ASEAN trade flows as the estimated coefficient on the ASEAN-
membership dummy appeared to be positive and even increased in value in the years 
after AFTA’s establishment. Moreover, these effects were consistent even when other 
regional dummies: NAFTA, EU, and APEC, were also considered in the specification. 
This confirms that, in comparative terms, AFTA caused trade creation among its 
members. With respect to external trade relationships, this gravity study introduced 2 
additional sets of regional dummy variables to capture extra-bloc effects on imports and 
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extra-bloc effects on exports on top of the conventional RTA-membership dummy 
variables of ASEAN, EU, NAFTA and APEC and other standard gravity variables. The 
‘imRTAijk’ dummy variable which is imposed to measure extra-bloc effects on imports 
or extra-regional import bias was given the value of 1 only if the import country i is in 
the RTA k: otherwise, it was 0
12
. The ‘exRTAijk’ dummy variable that is incorporated to 
measure extra-bloc effects on exports or extra-export bias was given the value of 1 only 
if the export country j is in the RTA k, and 0 otherwise. Concerning ASEAN’s territory, 
the study found that all 3 dummies: ‘ASEANij’, ‘imASEANijASEAN’ and ‘exASEANijASEAN’ 
produced positive and significant estimated results throughout the period of study. This 
implies that ASEAN members had conducted trade among themselves and with 
outsiders more than predicted by the gravitational assumption. It is worth noting that as 
the timeframe of the research, 1982-1999, covered the phase of AFTA’s establishment 
in 1992, it was additionally inferred that ASEAN countries had exhibited the open 
regionalism concept instead of being the discriminating regional bloc many had 
expected.  
 
Another empirical account by Tang (2005) examined 3 FTAs namely NAFTA, 
ANZCER and AFTA, to find out whether there is trade creation among FTA members 
and whether trade diversion impinged upon non-FTA members in each regional zone. 
The ‘Gravity Model’ was therefore employed to assess 21 countries’ trade flows during 
1989-2000 and, in order to capture RTA-effects on both members’ and non-members’ 
trade flows, RTA-membership dummy variables were incorporated into the gravity 
specification in the same fashion as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997). With the 
                                                          
12
 The study used imports as the dependent variable.  
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emphasis on the ‘AFTA-effects’, the OLS’s estimated results presented positive 
estimates on both intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade flows
13
. This finding is in fact 
similar to Elliott and Iketmoto (2004) in the area in that AFTA was seen to cause trade 
creation among members without having caused trade diversion from non-members. For 
these reasons, it can be said that, despite the implementation of AFTA, ASEAN was 
perceived as an opened region keeping the level of trade among relevant countries, both 
members and non-members, far above what was estimated using standard gravity 
variables.  
 
In a similar timeframe, Kien and Hashimoto (2005) employed the ‘Gravity Model’ to 
assess AFTA’s performance during the period of 1988-200214. Similar to other 
conventional studies that were concerned with examining the effectiveness of RTAs, 
this paper measured ‘AFTA-effects’ in an interdependent context with other RTAs: 
NAFTA, EU and MERCOSER. Using the panel trade data of 39 countries, for each 
RTA, the paper imposed 3 forms of RTA-membership dummies, into the estimating 
gravity specification. The first RTA-membership dummy was given the value of 1 if 
both trading partners belonged to the particular RTA at time t, otherwise it was given a 
value of 0. The second RTA-membership dummy was aiming to signify import 
diversion was given the value of 1 if, in each trade-pair, only the import country was in 
the RTA at time t. Otherwise, it was given a value of 0. As the last RTA-membership 
dummy is aimed at observing export diversion, the value of 1 was given when, for a 
particular trade-pair, only the export country was in the RTA at a specific time t: 
Otherwise, it was given a value of 0. Regarding ‘AFTA-effects’, the study found AFTA 
                                                          
13
 The study covered 5 ASEAN countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.  
14
 The study used the Hausman Taylor as an estimation technique.  
149 
 
to be a beneficial RTA, promoting trade among members. When external trade ties were 
considered as well, such an increase in trade among members was, in addition, not 
diverted from outsiders. This study therefore concludes that AFTA did not cause any 
trade diversion effects to the rest of the world.  
 
Taking the empirical evidence reviewed into consideration, it is interesting to note that 
research generally incorporated a wide range of countries as well as different types of 
RTAs into the estimating gravity specification. This chapter asserts it was so because 
these traditional studies have the mutual interests of evaluating as well as comparing the 
effectiveness of numerous RTAs that were widespread across the globe during the 
1970s-1990s. Although perceived to be useful as this investigating framework contained 
large quantities of information, doubt was cast on more than a few accounts, as 
contradictory results on numerous estimated RTA(s)-effects were found, instead of 
consistent outcomes. As presented thus far, this is without a doubt inclusive of the 
‘AFTA-effects’ that had been estimated.  
 
4.3 Empirical approaches to assess trade effects of AFTA on intra-ASEAN and  
      extra-ASEAN trade flows  
 
Considering previous gravity-based research thus far, this study’s interest, however, 
differs from that of preceding empirical accounts as no comparisons across different 
RTAs and their effects are made. The chapter intends to be distinctive, focusing on 
examining the independent effects of AFTA within the ASEAN context as opposed to 
providing general comparisons of numerous RTAs’ effects situated in different parts of 
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the world. Otherwise, the ‘AFTA-effects’ this study aims to estimate could be influenced 
by larger RTAs that are considered in the gravity specification at the same time. As 
previously discussed in Chapter 3, the characteristics of AFTA are too different to 
simply be generalized and compared with other RTAs. This is especially so if the 
sovereign or confined effects of AFTA are the most important objective of the research. 
As the independent effects of AFTA are the focus, this chapter therefore conforms to 
the previous chapter in that the domain of this research is drawn to be specific to within 
ASEAN’s border. This is, nonetheless, not to say that the interdependent trading 
relationships of various RTAs across the globe are unimportant, but an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of AFTA on its members and important traders is urgently required for the 
region to plan far-sighted trade-related policies. This sort of empirical evidence is, 
however, far from sufficient.       
 
Given the research’s focus as stated above, the chapter has conducted primary yet 
detailed investigations and found that throughout the period that Chapter 3 investigates, 
1970-2007, ASEAN has not relied on the whole world but only on specific markets for 
international trade. This information brings the research to the viewpoint mentioned in 
Frankel and Wei (1996) which stated that the choice of countries included in the study 
is one of the major determinants that influences the RTA(s)-effects estimated. Certainly, 
this viewpoint will once again be proven to be valid here. The research by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997) is another account that focused on putting the appropriate choice of 
countries into the estimating equation; in their study only developed European countries 
were chosen to be included in the gravity specification. This approach was suggested as 
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it was perceived to be able to avoid mixed RTA(s)-effects that could be generated by 
including both developed and developing countries in the same ‘Gravity Model’:  
  
 We limit our sample to 21 industrial countries to reduce the danger of conflating 
 distinct industrial- and developing-country effects; it is the fact that the resulting 
 sample is heavily European that leads us to focus on the European Community 
 and The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
 1997, p. 143).    
 
Considering the relevant literature aforementioned together with the minimal size of 
ASEAN-trade in the world’s market, it certainly suffices to say that this study focuses 
on key external traders instead of including many countries that the region has not been 
trading with: or has had very little trade with thus far. For this reason, only ASEAN 
members and their important trading partners will be considered in this empirical 
application. By including only top trading partners in the analysis, this chapter expects 
to enhance the possibility of achieving a reliable outcome, especially with regard to the 
effectiveness of AFTA on intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade flows. In relation to 
Chapter 3, the timeframe of this study is thus kept the same, covering from 1970 to 
2007. This aims to afford comparisons of estimated results from both accounts directly. 
With such a long time span covered, this framework is not only able to explain the 
extent to which ASEAN countries have relied on outside traders but is also capable of 
informing us how important it is that this group of key traders has, at the same time, 
influenced ASEAN’s trade during times pre- and post-implementation of AFTA. With 
regards to empirical techniques, definitely, certain improvements in empirical 
methodologies and econometric modelling applications will be proposed, though the 
customary ‘Gravity Model’ is still relied on as an empirical tool.  
152 
 
In addition, it is somewhat surprising that the related literature that managed to cover all 
ASEAN countries is mostly in the form of the ex-ante type. These accounts generally 
employed the Computational General Equilibrium model (CGE)
15
 as an empirical tool. 
The majority of CGE-based accounts usually found that RTA benefits membership 
countries as welfare is predicted to increase if RTA takes place. However, CGE-based 
accounts have been criticized for providing underestimated results as the estimating 
model usually imposes strong assumptions such as perfect competition in product 
markets and static price effects, in order to simplify the estimation procedures 
(Plummer, 2006). Moreover, these accounts usually assume a specific model structure 
with certain functional parameters to represent the estimating countries in a base year 
prior to the formation of the RTA. That is because the objective of CGE studies is to 
calculate welfare effects from the RTA in case tariff preferences for that particular RTA 
are actually occurred. In this regard, Dee and Gali (2003) which studied trade and 
investment effects of PTAs, highlighted one of CGE’s strongest assumptions, which is 
namely the fixed terms of trade assumption, which actually prohibits examination on the 
terms of trade effects or the terms of trade changes from the PTA. This is, indeed, a very 
serious shortcoming as one of the objectives of examining RTA(s)-effects on trade 
flows is to find whether that particular RTA will alter relevant countries’ terms of trade. 
Given all abovementioned concerns and limitations of CGE fundamentals, there is thus 
a gap in this field of research, not only that there was no CGE account that specifically 
focused on AFTA or included all ASEAN countries into the specification but also when 
the research’s interest was the ex-post effects of AFTA. Due to these reasons plus the 
fact that AFTA has been at work for years, this is another point at which the ‘Gravity 
                                                          
15
 See De Rosa (1999), Park (1998), Robinson and Thierfelder (2002), Gilbert (2003) , DeRosa and 
Gilbert (2005). 
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Model’ is deemed an appropriate empirical tool to study ‘AFTA-effects’ on relevant 
countries’ trade. In contrast to the CGE principles that focus on finding the welfare 
effects of a particular RTA, the gravity framework’s aim is to measure trade effects of 
the actual RTA on real trade flows data. This is simply because the gravity concept 
perceives that welfare effects are unobservable thus one cannot measure these effects 
directly (Dee and Gali, 2003). Nevertheless, taking into consideration particular 
literature that studied ‘AFTA-effects’ on the gravity framework ex-post, there has not 
been a study that includes all AFTA members in the specification. In general, previous 
studies were limited, covering ASEAN-5 or, with a better data coverage, ASEAN-6 
only. The slow progress of an establishment as well as the completion of AFTA has 
been mentioned as a major reason for this loophole. Since AFTA has now been joined 
by every country in the region, it is thus necessary to update the empirical analysis to 
include ASEAN-10 in the examination concerning ‘AFTA-effects’ ex-post.  
 
As abovementioned, this study aims to construct a gravitational framework to evaluate 
ex-post effects of AFTA on intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade flows. Despite the 
fact that the ‘Gravity Model’ was criticized for its weak theoretical foundations in its 
early years, a large quantity of research has, over time, asserted and confirmed that the 
model has valid theoretical grounds. Chapter 2 of this thesis has presented some key 
literature that elaborated the model’s theoretical foundations in detail. As these concerns 
have passed, current issues have shifted to stress on technical notes, selecting the most 
appropriate if not the best empirical methodologies to employ the gravity framework to 
assess international trade flows. As can be seen from the empirical accounts reviewed 
earlier in this chapter, the ‘Gravity Model’ was generally conducted under the cross-
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sectional framework having employed the simple OLS method as an estimator. 
Although satisfying outcomes have been delivered, the majority of these optimistic 
results were found without having controlled for heterogeneous or country-specific 
factors
16
. As elaborated in Chapter 3, beside standard gravity variables, trade flows 
across nations may be shaped by country-specific or trade-pair-specific factors that are 
usually unobservable. These factors range from cultural and historical ties, forms of 
government, technological developments and preferences to trade as well as the 
propensity to export and import. It is known that without controlling for heterogeneities 
in the cross-section analyses, it is highly likely that incorrect or biased estimates would 
be obtained. This problem is far from acceptable, especially when the coefficients 
estimated on the trade effects of a specific RTA are the focus. From the empirical 
frameworks mentioned thus far, however, the only exception is Kien and Hashimoto 
(2005) as this study attempted to control for heterogeneous issues explicitly.    
 
In order to control for heterogeneities or country-specific biases in the cross-sectional 
gravity framework, the traditional empirical technique used is to impose country-
specific variables that trading partners are considered to have in common
17
. These 
country-specific factors are usually captured in the format of dummy variables as they 
are enumerative in general. Even so, this method has a flaw in reality as one does not 
know exactly what determinants are responsible for heterogeneities within and between 
certain trade-pairs. Thus, by attempting to use a number of dummy variables to capture 
various specific features in each trade-pair in the estimating gravity equation, it is 
doubtful whether heterogeneous issues will be controlled for completely. This weakness 
                                                          
16
 See Soloaga and Winters (2001), Elliott and Ikemoto (2004), Tang (2005).  
17
 See Frankel and Wei (1993a, 1993b), Benedictis and Taglioni (2011).  
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of using dummy variables to control for heterogeneity bias in the cross-section gravity 
specification was also mentioned by Brun et al. (2005). In an attempt to estimate the 
role of distance or the so-called ‘distance puzzle’ in the gravity framework18, the 
traditional method of using dummy variables to control for unobserved heterogeneous 
issues was instead perceived to post bias to the distance variable estimated:   
 
 “…because the dummy variables capture only part of the unobservable  
   heterogeneity of country pairs, the remaining unobservable heterogeneity could 
  potentially bias estimates of the coefficient for distance” (Brun et al., 2005, 
  p.102). 
 
Despite the fact that this chapter does not actually share the same interest as Brun et al 
(2005), the viewpoint whereby the use of dummy variables alone is not the perfect 
strategy to solve for heterogeneity biases is shared. This study believes that, without the 
proper empirical techniques being applied, the biased results not only suggest erroneous 
information on ‘AFTA-effects’ but also mislead relevant policy implications later on.  
 
In addition, traditional cross-section gravity research is prone to endogeneity bias which 
can be observed when there are correlations between explanatory variables and the error 
term. To be precise, the source of correlations causing the potential endogeneity of 
explanatory variables can be derived from omitted variable issues, simultaneity and 
measurement errors that are commonly observed in the cross-section work (Wooldridge, 
2002, p.50). With the focus on an evaluation of RTA(s)-effects on trade flows, the RTA 
dummy variable is often dubious as to whether it is econometrically endogenous. Even 
so, there had only been a small number of previous cross-section studies that addressed 
                                                          
18
 The gravity equation was estimated on the panel data of 130 countries over 35 years (from 1962-1996) 
using variations of the panel data model.  
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these issues directly
19
 thus far as gravity-based research, in general, assumed that 
RTA(s)-membership dummies are exogenous. Chapter 3 of this thesis selectively 
reviewed recent empirical accounts that attempted to control for the potential 
endogeneity of RTA(s) though the results obtained were rather disappointing. These 
accounts employed the Instrumental Variables (IV) method and the Heckman control 
functions on the cross-section data. The concept works by firstly constructing the Probit 
function that predicts the formation of RTA(s). After that, the researcher needs to find a 
set of instruments for a set of exogenous variables that are not included in the gravity 
equation variables. These instruments have to be correlated with the probability of a 
country pair forming an RTA but uncorrelated with the gravity equation’s error term. 
This was the critical point as each researcher’s decision in choosing appropriate 
instruments was subjective. The difficulty in finding appropriate instruments, in 
addition, existed as the exogeneity requirement is undoubtedly not easy to fulfil in 
empirical analysis. Even though there was the test of over-identifying restrictions which 
could be employed to check whether the instruments were exogenous to the gravity 
equation error term, this test often failed and the results on the RTA(s)-effects were 
sensitive to the choice of instruments chosen. Last but not least, both the IV and the 
Heckman control function were fragile in solving endogeneity bias in the cross-section 
setting as a number of variables that are correlated cross-sectionally with the probability 
of forming a particular RTA are highly likely correlated with trade flows cross-
sectionally. As there has not been an appropriate cross-sectional technique to solve for 
this type of bias, alternative empirical techniques were, for this reason, sought after.  
 
                                                          
19
 See Trefler (1993), Lee and Swagel (1997), Baier and Bergstrand (2002, 2004) and Magee (2003).  
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Thus, in order to deal with drawbacks persisting in cross-section gravity analyses and to 
find liable inferences about the RTA(s)-effects estimated, Baier and Bergstrand, (2007) 
which attempted to investigate the so-called ‘Average Treatment Effects’ of FTAs 
across the globe
20
, followed the econometric textbook, Wooldridge (2000), employing 
the panel data framework as a better option. This method is generally suggested as one 
practical solution to handle the presence of unobserved heterogeneities which are one of 
the major sources of endogeneity bias of RTA(s)-memberships and, moreover, to 
disentangle transition probabilities among cross-sectional populations over time
21
. In 
detail, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) mentioned this problem in their work that;  
 
 First, several plausible reasons exist to suggest that the quantitative (long-run) 
 effects of FTAs on trade flows using standard cross-section gravity equation are 
 biased; we argue that unobservable heterogeneity most likely biases estimates 
 downward. Second,…traditional estimates of the effect of FTAs on bilateral 
 trade flows have tended to be underestimated by as much as 75-85%. 
 Third,…the most plausible estimates of the average effect of an FTA on a 
 bilateral trade flow are obtained from a theoretically-motivated gravity equation 
 using panel data with  bilateral fixed and country-and-time effects or differenced 
 panel data with country-and-time effects (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, p.74). 
 
Nevertheless, as previously discussed in Chapter 3, in order to control for the potential 
endogeneity of a particular RTA, one, first of all, needs to figure out how that specific 
RTA is formed. If country-pairs share economic characteristics that potentially 
influence them to form the RTA or the particular RTA is perceived to be a trade-
induced RTA, this RTA should be treated as an endogenous variable. Basically, the 
factor that trade economists use to judge whether a particular RTA is endogenously 
                                                          
20
 The study included 96 potential trading partners during the period of 1960-2000 (The data was 
collected every 5 years starting from 1960 and continuing from 1965,…2000). The FTA dummy variables 
were imposed to capture full FTAs and Customs Unions only. 
21
 As pointed out in the previous chapter, Baltagi (2001) had gathered several advantages of using the 
panel data framework in his book titled: ‘Econometric Analysis of Panel Data’. The brief contents have 
already been summarized in page 82 of this thesis. 
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formed is to observe whether membership countries have ‘chosen well’ in coming into 
the RTA; this involves seeing whether countries already have high trade flows or are 
highly likely to have welfare enhancing effects that will probably lead them to form the 
RTA with each other (See Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). On the contrary, if reasons for 
forming the RTA between countries are far from economic or not related to trade such 
as historical, political or even cultural factors, the RTA of interest can be treated as an 
exogenous variable. It is hence once again worth recalling the fact that AFTA 
membership countries do have diverse characteristics not only in terms of economic but 
also in historical settings, social values as well as political environments. In addition, 
the intra-regional trade level was initially fairly low as ASEAN countries did prefer to 
trade with countries outside the region. For these reasons, there were thus limited 
opportunities to induce trade creation effects if these countries formed an RTA with 
each other. It is, nonetheless, evident that the establishment of AFTA was initiated 
because of political reasons rather than other causes. Taking into account Baier and 
Bergstand (2007)’s quote stated above plus the information about AFTA establishment, 
former AFTA members had not ‘chosen well’ by constructing this free trade zone. In 
summary, this chapter agrees with Chapter 3 in the sense that AFTA should be 
considered as an exogenous RTA in this fashion.  
 
Trade economists, however, believe that there are other unobservable factors which are 
included in the gravity equation’s error tem that may be correlated with the decision to 
form an RTA. This, according to Baier and Bergstand (2007) is another source of 
endogeneity bias in the cross-section gravity equation as the determinants of any 
particular RTA are likely to be cross-sectional. For this reason, this issue can be 
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controlled for by putting appropriate variables into that cross-sectional gravity equation 
setting. If such issues are not known, the use of the panel data structure with specific 
fixed effects can be employed to tackle this estimating problem as Baier and Bergstand 
(2007) simply perceived the endogeneity issue as a part of the unobserved heterogeneity 
or omitted variable biases that are commonly found in the panel data structure.      
 
As one of the objectives of this research is to improve if not correct estimating problems 
found in the cross-section gravity equation, the panel data framework is, at this point, a 
better method to implement. Another viewpoint that supports the use of the panel data 
framework in estimating the gravity equation has also been noted by Benedictis and 
Taglioni (2011) in the book’s chapter: ‘The Gravity Model in International Trade’. 
Selected aspects are indicated below: 
 
 Even though elements such as distance and size are best captured by cross 
 sections with the panel not adding much content in short horizons, in most cases 
 panel specifications should be preferred to cross-section specifications because 
 of the inability of the latter to properly account for the omitted variable bias. 
 On the other hand, policy effects, such as the trade promotion of free trade 
 agreements or custom unions, are always better identified in panels, 
 through the time series dimension. Indeed, in the cross section specification 
 they are highly collinear with the distance (Benedictis and Taglioni, 2011, p.61).  
 
 
In general, there are various gravity-based studies that are in support of the panel data 
framework. Focusing only on studies that aim to evaluate RTA(s)-effects on trade 
flows, these can be seen in Coe and Hoffmaister (1999), Carrere (2002, 2006), 
Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003), for instance. 
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Taking into account all key advantages of implementing the panel data analysis 
mentioned in the literature reviewed, this chapter perceives it is well-founded to employ 
the panel methodology to assess intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade flows in this 
way. Given that this application is developed further from an empirical examination 
conducted in Chapter 3, the panel on all ASEAN countries is extended to include 
additional traders outside the region. In order to select key traders, the paper goes back 
as far as 1970, as that was the time in which the regionalism concept was becoming 
widespread across Europe and starting to spread to other parts of the world. It was also 
the time when ASEAN countries were in the process of transforming their international 
trade strategies. The import substitution approach which was literally the heart of the 
region’s international trading policy, aiming to protect domestic industries, was 
gradually replaced by the export promoting regime in 1980s (Tongzon, 2002, p.31). 
Partly influenced by the worldwide wave of regionalism, the ASEAN countries slowly 
developed into an opened trading zone and AFTA was eventually established as a 
product of the formal regional trade liberalization in 1992. In choosing the time frame 
of the examination, the chapter perceives that observing ASEAN’s trade relationships 
for certain years may not be appropriate if the research’s aim is to examine the effects of 
AFTA on the membership’s trade flows as well as to investigate how the region’s trade 
relationships have generally been influenced by external traders, and vice versa. For 
these reasons, the paper imposes the period of study to be 1970 to 2007, which is 
actually the same time-span as in the previous chapter. Once again, this is aimed at 
allowing a comparison between this piece of empirical evidence and the one in Chapter 
3. In addition, the year 2007 is selected as the last year of an empirical investigation 
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because it was the time that the most recent data on ASEAN’s trade was obtainable at 
the time of conducting this thesis.   
 
As far as the choice of countries to be included in the gravity specification is concerned, 
this chapter lists ASEAN’s major trading partners for every decade (an exception 
applies to the last period which covers only 7 years). Interestingly, it is found that 
ASEAN countries have notably traded with a particular group of countries throughout 
this lengthy period. Therefore, the chapter selects the top 10 external traders that have 
been seen to trade consistently with the region. Combined with all 10 members of 
AFTA, the full sample of countries included in the analysis is listed below.  
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Table 4.1: The List of Countries Included in the Gravitational Framework 
 
Country Country Name  Country 
 
Country Name 
 
1  Brunei 11  Japan 
2  Indonesia 12 Korea 
3  Malaysia 13 China 
4  The Philippines  14 United States 
5 Singapore 15 United Kingdom 
6 Thailand 16 Netherland 
7  Cambodia 17 Germany 
8  Laos 18 Hong Kong 
9  Myanmar 19 Australia 
10  Vietnam 20 India 
 
                    
4.3.1 Variables and data Sources 
 
In order to construct the panel data used in the specification of the ‘Gravity Model’, it is 
important to point out that this analysis focuses on the consistency of data. Therefore, 
the sources of data used are not just the usual ones, but also those that are able to 
provide historical records of every country. In addition, great attention has been paid to 
standardizing data using the same base year: 2005 (i.e. monetary value is recorded in 
term of 2005US$) so any estimated values are consistent as well as correct. On top of 
standard gravity variables
22
, this paper conforms to numerous gravity analyses in 
including additional factors which are theoretically perceived to be important in 
                                                          
22
 The standard gravity variables are countries’ incomes, populations and distances.   
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explaining international trade flows in the database. Considering 20 trading partners 
over 38 years, this application is comprised of 14,440 observations. Even though this 
chapter requires more information as another 10 external traders are included in the data 
set, it is worth noting that all of the data used in this chapter are, in actual fact, derived 
from the same sources as the variables mentioned in Chapter 3.  
 
The UN COMTRADE data is the fundamental source of trade data employed in this 
empirical application. The Economics Research Services: United States Department of 
Agriculture (ERS/USDA), once again, provides annual real gross domestic products 
(GDPs) as well as historical GDP deflators used to standardize data into real terms 
(2005US$). It, in addition, gives historical data on countries’ populations and nominal 
exchange rates. Information on geodesic distances and the measure of linguistic 
similarity are derived from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales
23
 (CEPII) data base. Additional details of all the variables included in 
the gravity specification, their expected estimated signs, subsequent interpretations and 
implications are similar to what has been discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
4.3.2 Methodologies and modelling issues  
 
Regional dummy issues: the AFTA-membership dummies 
This variable is aimed at measuring the extent of trade liberalization (tariffs and non-
tariffs) within the region. As the literature reviewed shows, it was as early as the 1960s 
that empirical accounts concerning an examination of international trade flows did 
                                                          
23
 Institute for Research on the International Economy (in English).  
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employ the RTA-membership dummies or the so-called ‘regional dummies’ to capture 
RTA(s)-effects on relevant countries’ trade flows. In most cases, these ‘regional 
dummies’ were perceived in a static form i.e. invariable through time. This was so 
because past empirical studies usually conducted cross-sectional specification of the 
gravity equation. In such applications, the fact that traders are members of a particular 
RTA is accounted for without observing further exactly when these countries entered 
into the liberalized zone. The ‘regional dummies’ are given the value of 1 as long as 
trade-pairs are both members of the RTA of interest; otherwise the given value is 0. 
However, as literature reviews showed, cross-section gravity analyses were criticized as 
being prone to several biases, thus the time-invariant ‘regional dummies’ specified were 
also called into question for producing incorrect estimates on RTA(s)-effects of interest.  
 
Nevertheless, given that the panel data framework is suggested as an alternative 
approach in this application, the ‘time’ dimension should be taken into account when 
specifying any RTA-membership dummy variables. As the independent ‘AFTA-effects’ 
are to be observed the AFTA-dummy variable is captured in the form of AFTAijt. This 
dummy is given the value of 1 when trade-pairs are in AFTA at the same time, 
otherwise it is given the value of 0. Whilst the importance of the time dimension is 
included in the specification, the AFTA-membership dummy picks up not only the 
membership status of trade-pairs but also the year that each country entered into the free 
trade zone. This chapter perceives that this method is appropriate for this study as the 
ASEAN countries did not all join AFTA in the same year. Thus, on top of ‘AFTA-
effects’ that are assumed to impact AFTA members and non-AFTA members (external 
traders) differently, this time-variant dummy: AFTAijt is able to distinguish between the 
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trade effects of AFTA on early members and delayed ones. Most of the time, the 
coefficient estimated on this variable is expected to be positive if intra-ASEAN trade is 
increased as a result of AFTA.   
 
In order to form an empirical specification, the standard ‘Gravity Model’ is augmented 
to incorporate additional variables that are perceived to be important for trade flows. 
Even though the new data set is to be scrutinized, the panel data’s gravity specification 
can be written in the same set-up as previously indicated in Eq. (3.8) which is : 
 
                                                            
                                                                        (4.1)              
    
and,     
 
                                                                                                                       (4.2)                       
  
where: 
Xijt  : Real exports of country i to country j at time t,  
Yit,Yjt  : Real GDP of country i and country  j at time t, respectively,  
Pit, Pjt   : Population of country i and country j at time t, respectively,  
Dij  : Geographical distance between countries i and country j,  
Langij : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both countries; country i and country j 
   have common languages. Otherwise, it is 0, 
REXijt  : Real exchange rate of country i to country j at time t,   
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AFTAijt : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both countries, country i and country j 
  are members of AFTA at time t. Otherwise it is 0, 
γ0  : An unknown constant term (the portion of intercept that is common to all 
  years and trade-pairs), 
γij  : Unobserved heterogeneities or bilateral effects specific to each trade pair,  
εijt    : An error component term which is assumed to be well-behaved; i.i.d with zero 
     mean and constant variance  
 
Panel models: Random Effects Model (REM) versus Fixed Effects Model (FEM)  
In choosing between the random effects model (REM) and the fixed effects model 
(FEM), this paper follows microeconometric theories suggested by Wooldridge (2002) 
in that one needs to find whether the unobserved bilateral effects (γij) are correlated with 
other observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002, p.252). If correlations between 
unobserved effects (γij) and explanatory variables are detected, the FEM is more robust 
than the REM. This is so because the REM has a strong assumption that the explanatory 
variables have to be uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneous terms (γij) in order for 
the estimates to be consistent. Without a doubt, this strong restriction is easily violated, 
especially in the long panel data format as it is unlikely that there would be no 
correlations between the heterogeneous terms (γij) and the regressands. If this happens, 
the REM is therefore prone to produce biased estimates. The FEM, on the other hand, 
does not require this assumption and will always be consistent, regardless of whether 
there are correlations between unobserved effects (γij) and explanatory variables.  
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In order to check for this problem, the paper formally conducts the Hausman Test 
(1978), testing against the null hypothesis of no correlations between unobserved 
bilateral effects (γij) and the explanatory variables. The large value of the Chi-squared 
statistic suggests that there are correlations between unobserved heterogeneity factors 
(γij) and explanatory variables at high degrees. If this is the case, the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the appropriate panel data model is the FEM. Otherwise, the REM is 
sufficient.  
 
4.3.3 Empirical results 
 
This section presents estimated results of the ‘Gravity Model’ as empirically specified 
in Eq. (4.1). As the study has to choose the most appropriate panel data models, the 
results from the REM and FEM are compared in Table 4.2. The Hausman Test (1978) 
statistic is shown in Figure 4.1 accordingly.  
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Table 4.2: Results of the ‘Gravity Model’ Estimates: the Random Effects Model 
       (REM) versus the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) 
 
 
Dependent Variable :  
Real Exports 
 
REM FEM 
Exporter's GDP (Yit) 
0.7983431*** 
(0.0324788) 
0.66326402*** 
(0.0492697) 
Importer’s GDP (Yjt) 
0.62163926*** 
(0.030097) 
0.58850261*** 
(0.044179) 
Exporter’s Population (Pit) 
0.26554482*** 
(0.0606697) 
0.76322359*** 
(0.1413635) 
Importer’s Population (Pjt) 
-0.10498592* 
(0.0605192) 
-0.16366754 
(0.1309496) 
Distance (Dij) 
0.05193959 
(0.1267231) 
- 
Real Exchange Rate (REXijt) 
0.15993055*** 
(0.0090757) 
0.18075834*** 
(0.0099494) 
Language (Langij) 
1.9558936*** 
(0.2749449) 
- 
AFTA-effects (AFTAijt) 
0.32974124*** 
(0.0546795) 
0.35916163*** 
(0.0581501) 
Constant  
-22.458393*** 
(1.367092) 
-24.741225*** 
(1.932801) 
 
Note: *** denotes significant at 99%, ** and * denotes significant at 95% and 90% respectively. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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            Figure 4.1: The Hausman Test Comparing the Estimates from the REM and the FEM 
 
Considering the differences in estimates provided by the REM and FEM, together with 
the Hausman Test (1978)’s results abovementioned, these pieces of evidence suggest 
that unobserved heterogeneities (γij) have influenced results. The null hypothesis in 
which there are no correlations between the unobserved heterogeneous factors (γij) and 
explanatory variables is evidently rejected. Even though the signs, the significant levels 
and the absolute values on the AFTA-membership dummy (AFTAijt) estimates are quite 
similar in both REM and FEM estimations, estimated results on other variables are very 
different in terms of values and significant levels. Thus, one should be cautious of 
depending on the results of past research that intuitively employed the REM without 
conducting the appropriate statistical test to check for unobserved heterogeneity issues. 
Considering the estimated results in Table 4.2, in general, it can be seen that the REM 
tends to bias results downwards.  
 
Since the FEM is preferred, it is evident that almost all of the estimated coefficients in 
the FEM show the expected signs and are highly significant statistically. The economic 
sizes which are captured by trading partners’ GDPs (Yit, Yjt) produce the expected 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
                Prob>chi2 =   
     0 . 0 0 0 0 
                          =   
     1 3 1 . 2 3 
                  chi2( 6 ) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg                                                                                
      bothfta        . 3 5 9 1 6 1 6       . 3 2 9 7 4 1 2          . 0 2 9 4 2 0 4          . 0 1 9 7 8 8 3 
     lnxratxy        . 1 8 0 7 5 8 3       . 1 5 9 9 3 0 6          . 0 2 0 8 2 7 8          . 0 0 4 0 7 7 1 
       lnpopy       - . 1 6 3 6 6 7 5      - . 1 0 4 9 8 5 9         - . 0 5 8 6 8 1 6          . 1 1 6 1 2 5 9 
       lnpopx        . 7 6 3 2 2 3 6       . 2 6 5 5 4 4 8          . 4 9 7 6 7 8 8          . 1 2 7 6 8 2 5 
       lngdpy        . 5 8 8 5 0 2 6       . 6 2 1 6 3 9 3         - . 0 3 3 1 3 6 7          . 0 3 2 3 4 1 2 
      lngdpx  
       . 6 6 3 2 6 4       . 7 9 8 3 4 3 1         - . 1 3 5 0 7 9 1           . 0 3 7 0 4 9 
                                                                               
                      fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
                     (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
                       Coefficients       
. hausman fe re 
170 
 
positive sign and are highly significant at 99%. As these variables are perceived as 
proxies to measure for the level of demand in the importing country and the level of 
supply in the exporting country, the positive and significant coefficients imply that 
richer countries do, in fact, trade more. Considering another size variable, population, it 
is evident that the estimated coefficients on the exporter’s population (Pit) and the 
importer’s population (Pjt) give different signs in this case. The estimated coefficient on 
Pit is positive while that of Pjt is negative. It is, however, common in gravity research 
that the signs on population variables are interchangeable. In this case, only the former 
estimate is significant at 99%. This can be interpreted in terms of the size of exporting 
economies (in terms of population) being positively related to trade (exports). The large 
domestic market implies that the country could enjoy the economies of scale in 
production which also indicate the ability to supply goods domestically and 
internationally. The estimated coefficient on the bilateral exchange rate variable 
(REXijt) provides the positive sign as expected and it is highly significant at 99%. This 
basically indicates that depreciation in an exporting country’s currency promotes 
exports. This is because when the exporting country’s currency becomes less expensive 
relative to her trading partners, these trading partners are highly likely to increase the 
amount of trade (imports) with the exporting country, ceteris paribus.  
 
As one of the main objectives of this paper is an assessment of AFTA’s impacts on the 
relevant countries’ trade relationships, the positive and highly significant (at 99%) 
estimate on the AFTA-membership dummy variable (AFTAijt) implies that AFTA has 
been effective in increasing intra-regional trade in this dataset. Nonetheless, one should 
not take this result as the final conclusion. This is so because this chapter aims to 
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examine ‘AFTA-effects’ on relevant countries’ trade flows in the long period panel data 
framework. When covering 4 decades, the effects of the time dimension need to be 
considered including whether it plays any parts in driving trade flows between sampling 
countries.  
 
Thus, besides controlling for cross-sectional biases and the unobserved heterogeneous 
effects (γij), we need to test for the importance of the ‘time-effects’: whether it is 
important enough to be included in the FEM specification. If these effects are included 
in the gravity specification, one is able to distinguish natural representations of bilateral 
trade flows across traders from the impacts of the business cycle through this long 
episode of study. In order to verify the importance of the ‘time’ dimension or the so-
called ‘time effects’ in the gravity specification, the STATA command conducting the 
statistical joint test has to be implemented. As the statistical test’s result portrays the F-
statistic of F (37, 9058) = 9.05 with Prob > F = 0.0000, this accordingly signifies the 
significance of the time dimension in this study. Therefore, it suggests that the ‘time 
effects’ should be included in an estimating gravity equation.  
 
According to the book ‘An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using STATA’ by 
Baum (2006), failure to include the ‘time effects’ in the specification of a model which 
requires doing so will bring about variations that would be captured by the individual 
fixed effects. Taking this viewpoint into consideration, even the FEM which, in this 
case, proved to be consistent, could undoubtedly produce a biased estimate on the 
‘AFTA-effects’ of interest.   
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In order to avoid biased ‘AFTA-effects’ being estimated, the gravity specification 
previously stated in Eq. (4.1) has to be re-specified including the ‘time effects’. 
Following Baum (2006), this specification is named the two-way fixed effects model (2-
way FEM). The gravity specification can be written as: 
 
                                                               
                                                                                        (4.3) 
 
and, 
 
                           (4.4) 
            
 
                                     ; if  T = t    : T = 1970,1971,…,2007                                      (4.5) 
       
       =           
                          ; if T ≠ t 
 
where :  
 
Xijt  : Real exports of country i to country j at time t,  
Yit,Yjt  : Real GDP of country i and country  j at time t, respectively,  
Pit, Pjt   : Population of country i and country j at time t, respectively,  
Dij  : Geographical distance between countries i and country j,  
Langij : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both countries; country i and country j
   have common languages. Otherwise, it is 0, 
REXijt  : Real exchange rate of country i to country j at time t,   
1 
0 
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AFTAijt : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both countries, country i and country j 
   are members of AFTA at time t. Otherwise it is 0, 
γ0  : An unknown constant term (the portion of intercept that is common to all 
   years and trade-pairs), 
γij  : Unobserved heterogeneities or bilateral effects specific to each trade pairs,  
γt            : Time effects,  
εijt    : An error component term which is assumed to be well-behaved; i.i.d with zero 
     mean and constant variance.  
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Table 4.3: Results of the ‘Gravity Model’ Estimates: the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) 
       and the Two-Way Fixed Effects Model (2-way FEM)   
 
 
Dependent Variable :  
Real Exports 
 
FEM 2-way FEM 
Exporter's GDP (Yit) 
0.66326402*** 
(0.0492697) 
0.75870505*** 
(0.0540402) 
Importer’s GDP (Yjt) 
0.58850261*** 
(0.044179) 
0.73148512***   
(0.0496958) 
Exporter’s Population (Pit) 
0.76322359*** 
(0.1413635) 
1.4290107*** 
(0.1517552) 
Importer’s Population (Pjt) 
-0.16366754 
(0.1309496) 
0.57072289*** 
(0.1500368) 
Distance (Dij) 
- - 
Real Exchange Rate (REXijt) 
0.18075834*** 
(0.0099494) 
0.17658444*** 
(0.0099433) 
Language (Langij) 
- - 
AFTA-effects (AFTAijt) 
0.35916163*** 
(0.0581501) 
0.08101158 
(0.0629329) 
Constant  
-24.741225*** 
(1.932801) 
-54.498996*** 
(3.921766) 
 
Note: *** denotes significant at 99%, ** and * denotes significant at 95% and 90%, respectively 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The time-effects are not included here in order to save space. 
The estimates are available upon request, however. 
 
As shown above, Table 4.3 provides the estimated results from the FEM and the 2-way 
FEM. After the ‘time effects’ are controlled for, all of the estimated values have been 
notably been altered even though their signs are retained. In addition, the significant 
levels of all the variables’ estimates are improved in the 2-way FEM. The only 
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exception is the importer’s population variable (Pjt); it was negative and insignificant in 
the FEM and it has become positive and significant at 99% in the 2-way FEM. This, 
consequently, implies that importer’s demand increases with the size of her population. 
With regard to the estimated coefficient of interest, AFTAijt, it is no longer significant in 
the 2-way FEM despite the positive sign it attained in this specification. This can be 
seen to imply that after controlling for factors that naturally contribute to the volume of 
trade as well as the effects of time, AFTA has not brought any dramatic changes to the 
region’s trade flows during this period. Any observations showing an increasing share 
of intra-ASEAN trade could be entirely due to the region’s above-average growth rate, 
with minimal explicit free trade effects. In addition, this result seems to be related to the 
viewpoint of Frankel and Wei (1996) mentioned earlier that states country choices as 
well as the number of RTAs (and their memberships) included in each gravity 
specification are key factors that influence estimated results. One could, in fact, 
compare the 2-way FEM’s estimates in this chapter with the 2-way FEM’s estimates in 
the previous chapter. What can be seen from these 2 empirical accounts is that the 
independent negative effects of AFTA as formerly observed in Chapter 3 are restricted 
to within ASEAN’s border. As also elaborated in Chapter 3, such a negative result on 
‘AFTA-effects’ could be because of the limited size of ASEAN economies as well as the 
similarity of products traded among AFTA members. When the domain of the research 
is extended to include additional key traders, those effects from AFTA, however, 
disappear. By broadening the boundaries and allowing for external trade relationships to 
be observed, the results obtained in this application are deemed to agree with the 
assumption made at the beginning of this chapter that ASEAN still stands a chance to 
benefit from AFTA if the region could exploit tariff preferences among members to 
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promote this regional zone as a production as well export base for the world’s market. 
Even though AFTA-membership countries may not have benefitted as much from this 
free trade area as expected, since trade effects found are still insignificant and 
negligible, it is a good sign that these effects are shown to be positive when external key 
traders are observed.    
 
This paper is also interested in examining whether AFTA has had a different impact on 
member countries when their statuses are different: exporters versus importers. To do 
so, the AFTAijt dummy variable is specified further to capture any additional trade 
effects that could occur to AFTA-members when these countries are being exporters or 
importers during each specific time period. Hence, in this case, AFTA-membership 
dummy variables are denoted further as I-AFTAijt and J-AFTAijt, respectively, in order 
to detect the so-called ‘export-effects’ and ‘import-effects’ that membership-exporters 
and membership-importers probably have on their trading partners in each trade-pair. 
While the first term is aimed at taking account of the fact that, in each trade-pair, only 
the exporting country is in AFTA, the latter considers the case in which an importing 
country is in AFTA. Furthermore, as the time dimension is also considered, these 
dummies; I-AFTAijt and J-AFTAijt actually measure ‘AFTA-effects’ on the trade flows 
of membership-exporters and membership-importers starting from the time when AFTA 
was comprised of only 6 members and continuing up to the point at which every 
country in the region was a member. This is one of the methods used to observe 
directions of trade especially when the flows of trade diversion are to be identified. In 
addition, given that the ‘export-effects’ and ‘import-effects’ are included in the 
specification, this enables the analysis to observe ‘AFTA-effects’ at the country-pair 
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level. As the positive sign on I-AFTAijt (J-AFTAijt) implies that the flows of AFTA 
members’ exports (AFTA members’ imports) to non-members have increased, the 
negative sign on these variables suggests the opposing relationship. If negative values 
are observed on I-AFTAijt and J-AFTAijt, they are referred to as export-diversion and 
import-diversion, respectively.   
 
By incorporating all the necessary explanatory variables, the full specification of the 
‘Gravity Model’ in this setting is therefore: 
 
                                                               
                                                                              (4.6) 
               
                                    (4.7)  
         
 
                                   ; if  T = t : T = 1970,1971,…,2007                                           (4.8) 
  
         =                            
                                   ; if T ≠ t 
 
where : 
 
Xijt  : Real exports of country i to country j at time t,  
Yit,Yjt  : Real GDP of country i and country  j at time t, respectively  
Pit, Pjt   : Population of country i and country j at time t, respectively  
Dij  : Geographical distance between countries i and country j,  
1 
0 
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Langij : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j share 
   communal languages. Otherwise, it is 0, 
REXijt  : Bilateral real exchange rate of country i to country j at time t,   
AFTAijt : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both country i and country j are   
   members of  AFTA at time t. Otherwise, it is 0, 
             : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 when an export country is a    
           member of AFTA. Otherwise, it is 0, 
             : A dummy variable takes the value of 1 when an import country is a                
           member of AFTA. Otherwise, it is 0, 
γ0  : An unknown constant term (the portion of intercept that is common to all 
   years and trade-pairs), 
γij  :Unobserved heterogeneities or bilateral effects specific to each trade-pair,  
γt   : Time effects,  
εijt    : An error component term which is assumed to be well-behaved; i.i.d with zero 
    mean and constant variance. 
 
The result of this specification is presented in the second column of Table 4.4. The 
table, in addition, includes results of other 2-way FEM’s gravity specifications of 
interest. The first column, once again, portrays estimated coefficients from the 2-way 
FEM formerly specified in Eq. 4.3
24
 in which only ‘AFTA-effects’ are investigated. 
While column 3 presents estimated results of the 2-way FEM with only ‘export-effects’ 
included, column 4 indicates the 2-way FEM with only ‘import-effects’ considered. The 
last column accordingly presents results of the 2-way FEM with all fixed effects: 
                                                          
24
 These estimated results are also indicated in the second column of Table 4.3. 
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‘AFTA-effects’, ‘export-effects’, and ‘import-effects’, that are included in the same 
specification.   
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Table 4.4: Results of the ‘Gravity Model’ Estimates: All 2-Way FEM Specifications 
 
Note: *** denotes significant at 99%, ** and * denotes significant at 95% and 90%, respectively 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The time-effects are not included here in order to save space. 
The estimates are available upon request, however 
 
 
Dependent Variable :  
Real Exports 
 
2-way FEM  
2-way FEM , 
export-effects 
,import effects  
2-way FEM , 
export-effects  
2-way FEM , 
import-effects   
2-way FEM, all 
effects  
Exporter's GDP (Yit) 
0.75870505*** 
(0.0540402) 
0.75719198*** 
 
(0.0540475) 
0.75749143*** 
(0.0540499) 
0.75958477*** 
(0.0540262) 
0.75330328*** 
(0.0540866) 
Importer’s GDP (Yjt) 
0.73148512*** 
(0.0496958) 
0.73730464*** 
 
(0.0496673) 
0.73702523*** 
(0.0496696) 
0.73497356*** 
(0.049645) 
0.7338249*** 
(0.0497012) 
Exporter’s Population 
(Pit) 
1.4290107*** 
(0.1517552) 
1.3592328*** 
 
(0.1562039) 
1.4104665*** 
(0.151853) 
1.427261*** 
(0.1491547) 
1.2344453*** 
(0.1715926) 
Importer’s Population 
(Pjt) 
0.57072289*** 
(0.1500368) 
0.77245532*** 
 
(0.1572529) 
0.70203567*** 
(0.1489768) 
0.71819679*** 
(0.1528408) 
0.66896574*** 
(0.1679169) 
Distance (Dij) - - - - 
 
- 
Language (Langij) - - - - - 
Real Exchange Rate 
(REXijt) 
0.17658444*** 
 
(0.0099433) 
0.17696346*** 
 
(0.0099431) 
0.17676297*** 
 
(0.0099436) 
0.17661588*** 
 
(0.0099429) 
0.1769566*** 
(0.0099423) 
AFTA-effects 
(AFTAijt) 
0.08101158 
 
(0.0629329) 
- - - 
0.13518249* 
(0.0769829) 
Export-effects  
(I-AFTAijt) 
- 
0.08045793 
 
(0.0549083) 
0.08953733 
 
(0.0545258) 
- 
0.13546262** 
(0.0632092) 
Import-effects   
(J-AFTAijt)   
- 
-0.07107052 
 
(0.0508313) 
- 
-0.07987946 
 
(0.0504778) 
-0.0283461 
(0.0563489) 
Constant  
-54.498996*** 
 
(3.921766) 
-56.82721*** 
 
(3.517883) 
-56.514116*** 
 
(3.510432) 
-57.081469*** 
 
(3.513323) 
-52.736089*** 
 
(4.218655) 
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As is evident in the second column of Table 4.4, when the so-called ‘export-effects’ (I-
AFTAijt) and ‘import-effects’ (J-AFTAijt) are incorporated in the estimating gravity 
equation, ‘export-effects’, or the extra-export bias of AFTA which have been derived at 
0.08045793 are larger than ‘import-effects’ which have been found at -0.07107052. 
Given that this study includes key trading partners outside the region and hence, by the 
definition of these terms, the positive sign on ‘export-effects’ (I-AFTAijt) implies that 
AFTA-membership countries have increased their trade in the form of exports to non-
members. The amount of trade increase includes any trade flows from the original 6 
AFTA members to CLMV countries that have increased during the period from 1992 to 
1999, as well as trade flows from any AFTA-membership exporters to outside traders 
throughout the period of study. Conversely, a negative sign on ‘import-effects’ (J-
AFTAijt) suggests that AFTA-membership countries have reduced imports from non-
members. In a similar vein to the interpretation given for ‘export-effects’, these ‘import-
effects’ cover any imports that the 6 AFTA founders have diverted from CLMV 
countries during the period of 1992-1999 and ones that come from external traders 
throughout the whole period of study. Taking this piece of information into 
consideration, this, to a certain extent, can be used to explain further why ‘AFTA-
effects’ on members’ trade flows have, in total, become positive in this application. 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in AFTA members’ exports to delayed members and to key 
external traders has played a part in benefiting membership countries because trade 
creation plausibly occurs as a consequence of this expansion in exports. It is evident that 
such an increase in the membership’s exports is large enough to outweigh the reduction 
in the membership’s imports from non-members or the import-diversion. This result 
therefore conforms to the discussions earlier mentioned which state that in order to 
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achieve the ultimate goal of increasing intra-ASEAN trade, besides aiming to enhance 
trade within the region directly, AFTA members should seek to increase their 
production as well as exports beyond their own territory. This detailed examination of 
directions of trade flows is able to indicate that AFTA can still be utilized as a trading 
hub, gathering regional products as well as facilitating exports to the rest of the world.  
 
In addition, this analysis performs two additional regressions analysing the ‘export-
effects’ (I-AFTAijt) and ‘import-effects’ (J-AFTAijt) separately in each gravity 
specification. As earlier mentioned, the estimated results are presented in the third and 
fourth column of Table 4.4, respectively. It can be seen that when only the I-AFTAijt 
dummy is included, the sign of this dummy’s estimated coefficient remains positive and 
the value obtained at 0.08953733 is close to the result provided in the second column 
which has the estimated value on the I-AFTAijt dummy of 0.08045793. Considering 
other variables’ estimates in this third column, it can be seen that estimated results 
remain similar in terms of their signs as well as significant levels as compared to the 
specification that examines ‘export-effects’ and ‘import-effects’ jointly. In the fourth 
column in which the extra-export bias is independently considered, the estimated value 
of -0.07987946 on the J-AFTAijt dummy variable is again very close to the specification 
that includes I-AFTAijt and J-AFTAijt jointly in the same specification (the estimated 
coefficient on J-AFTAijt is -0.07107052). Other explanatory variables’ estimates, in 
addition, retain their signs and significant levels in this specification, as compared to the 
other 2-way FEM specifications that theirs results are shown in the first, second and 
third columns of Table 4.4, respectively. This simply implies that the gravity 
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specifications conducted in this chapter are, to a certain extent, consistent and stable 
enough to examine intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade flows under this data set.  
 
The analysis, furthermore, applies Soloaga and Winters (2001)’s concept which 
suggests the inclusion of all RTA-membership dummies in the estimating gravity 
equation; in this case 3 AFTA-membership dummy variables: AFTAijt, I-AFTAijt, J-
AFTAijt are therefore included in the same specification. This aims to observe ‘AFTA-
effects’ on the membership’s trade as well as to separate export and import diversions, if 
any, altogether. The result of this specification is presented in the last column of Table 
4.4. In general, coefficients’ estimated values are similar to other 2-way FEM 
specifications formerly conducted. Considering ‘AFTA-effects’, ‘export-effects’ and 
‘import-effects’ which are the estimates of interest, their signs remain the same in this 
specification. In addition, the estimated coefficients on the AFTAijt and I-AFTAijt 
dummy variables are now significant at 90% and 95% levels, respectively. It is also 
evident that by including 3 types of AFTA-membership dummies at the same time, the 
estimated coefficients, especially on specific effects of AFTA, have improved in value, 
without any alterations in their signs. In detail, it can be seen that the estimated value of 
‘AFTA-effects’ (AFTAijt) is improved from 0.08101158 to 0.13518249. These positive 
‘AFTA-effects’ obtained are indeed perceived to be generated by ‘export-effects’ or an 
extra-export bias of AFTA when AFTA countries have increased exports to external 
traders. Such positive ‘export-effects’ are however counterbalanced by the import 
diversion or ‘import-effects’ generated by the fact that AFTA members have reduced 
imports from non-members (this also includes CLMV countries before they became 
members of AFTA). Given that ‘export-effects’ generated by AFTA-members are 
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captured at 0.13546262 while the ‘import-effects’ or import-diversion are derived at -
0.0283461, as the former is larger than latter, it implies that the positive trade benefits 
from AFTA overwhelm the negative effects. This reasonably explains the overall 
‘AFTA-effects’ in which the positive sign is obtained.  
 
However, as long as trade effects of AFTA are the focal point, this chapter suggests that 
one should be cautious in interpreting the specification which includes 3 specific 
AFTA-membership dummy variables: AFTAijt, I-AFTAijt, J-AFTAijt together. This is 
because by incorporating many RTA-membership dummies at one time, this so-called 
‘nested dummies calculation’25 could post a multicollinearity problem in estimates26, 
despite the improvement in estimated results. A simple way to detect whether there is 
multicollinearity among regional dummies is to examine standard errors and the t-
statistics of each regional dummy. In cases where there are multicollinearity issues 
among independent variables, the coefficient estimated for these variables will have 
high standard errors and low t-statistics. In certain cases, there will also be incidents of 
high magnitude or unexpected signs on the estimated coefficients as well as 
insignificant estimates despite the high R
2
. In this application, however, it is evident that 
the standard error of AFTAijt is 0.0769829, and the ones for I-AFTAijt and J-AFTAijt are 
0.0632092 and 0.0563489, respectively. These values are not high enough to conclude 
that multicollinearity issues exist here. The model’s specification is therefore 
acceptable.  
 
                                                          
25
 See Endo (2000).  
26
 Multicollinearity is a condition whereby independent variables are strongly correlated with each other.  
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This chapter, in addition, tests whether the model is well-fitted: that is to conduct the 
heteroskedasticity test checking for patterns of the empirically specified model’s 
residuals and the fitted values. The STATA programme has commands for this matter 
as well as providing the graphical presentation of the test results. Basically, one has to 
observe the scatter plot showing relationships between residuals and the fitted values, to 
see whether they depict any specific patterns. In the case that the model is well-fitted, 
there should be no obvious or specific relationships between the residuals and the fitted 
values. This is because the average residual for each country-pair would be 0 if the 
model is homoskedastic. Otherwise it indicates that the residual variance is instead 
heteroskedastic (non-constant). As the scatter plots of this test are presented in Figure 
4.2 below, it can be said that there is no specific shape between residuals and the fitted 
values in this specification.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: The Scatter Plot of the 2-Way FEM’s Residuals by Trade-pairs 
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However, the study also conducts a modified Wald test testing for the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity in the fixed effect regression model. The statistical result is presented 
in Figure 4.3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 4.3: Results of the Heteroskedasticity Test in the Two-Way Fixed Effects Model. 
 
Contrary to the graphical representation, the test result indicates that there is 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals: the test result suggests rejecting the null hypothesis 
of homoskedasticity. Nevertheless, it is important to address the fact that 
heteroskedasticity does not affect values of estimated coefficients, thus the 2-way 
FEM’s estimates as recorded in the last column of Table 4.4 are still applicable. As a 
common practice in empirical research, the solution to the case of heteroskedasticity in 
the panel data framework is to report the coefficients’ estimates with robust standard 
errors even though the estimated coefficients are unaltered. For that reason, this chapter 
also presents results with robust standard errors as a reference in an Appendix IV.  
  
In compliance with the previous chapter, the panel estimates for patterns of intra-
ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade flows during the period of 1970-2007 indicated by 
trade-pairs are accordingly presented in Figure 4.4 - Figure 4.7. This is done in order to 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
H0 : sigma (i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (370) = 4.9e+29 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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illustrate the trends of intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade flows pre- and post-
AFTA.  
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                             Figure 4.4: The Estimation of the ‘Gravity Model’ for Intra-ASEAN and Extra-ASEAN Trade Flows; Represented by Trade-Pairs  
               (1-100 trade-pairs) 
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                                 Figure 4.5: The Estimation of the ‘Gravity Model’ for Intra-ASEAN and Extra-ASEAN Trade Flows; Represented by Trade-Pairs  
                           (101-200 trade-pairs) 
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                           Figure 4.6: The Estimation of the ‘Gravity Model’ for Intra-ASEAN and Extra-ASEAN Trade Flows; Represented by Trade-Pairs  
                           (201-300 trade-pairs) 
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                                  Figure 4.7: The Estimation of the ‘Gravity Model’ for Intra-ASEAN and Extra-ASEAN Trade Flows; Represented by Trade-Pairs  
              (301-380 trade-pairs) 
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Given the images of trade patterns above, it can be said that trade flows have been 
slightly improved over time especially during the post-AFTA period.   
 
Considering results from all 2-way FEM’s specifications, they can be seen to imply that 
ASEAN countries could work as an integrated region via AFTA, continuing to maintain 
existing trade ties as well as generating new trade relationships with outside trading 
partners. As AFTA had been joined by all the countries in the region, tariff preferences 
which earlier AFTA members conceivably used to enjoy from trading with delayed 
members, CLMV countries, are no longer applicable. In order to exploit plausible trade 
opportunities, increasing intra-ASEAN trade volume, AFTA members ought to search 
for larger markets outside the region. As the result in the last column of Table 4.4 
portrays, one of possible explanations for the positive and highly significant ‘AFTA-
effects’ is likely perceived to be the expansion of AFTA members’ exports to key 
traders outside the region. This is so because while extra-export bias or ‘export-effects’ 
work to capture trade benefits occurring for membership traders, extra-import bias or 
‘import-effects’, on the contrary, detect the reduction in the membership’s imports from 
outsiders which probably were the most efficient (cheapest) producers pre-AFTA
27
. 
This increase in the extra-export bias of AFTA has, in addition, been accompanied by 
the least amount of AFTA-membership’s import diversion. As the flows of external 
trade generated are deemed to outweigh the flows of trade diversion in this application, 
the trade effects of AFTA are therefore concluded to be positive: being beneficial to its 
membership. Hence as long as AFTA countries keep expanding extra-regional trade 
                                                          
27
 This point is derived from the traditional concepts on trade creation and trade diversion introduced by 
Viner (1950). In principle, this concept states that if a particular RTA’s members increase membership 
trade but this is at the expense of outsiders or the rest of the world, this change in trade is perceived as if 
there is no new trade created. If the trade diversion is large, this specific RTA may end up being a trade 
diverting RTA.  
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without diverting much trade, especially on non-members’ imports, the positive trade 
effects from AFTA should be sustainable and probably will be improved, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
Nevertheless, the findings found in this chapter remind us of the fact that the formation 
of AFTA was initiated as well as governed by political factors. Thus, even though 
AFTA was established in 1992, trade relationships, especially with outside traders, have 
not been altered much at all. On the one hand, we have seen improvement in the 
effectiveness of AFTA; though the amount of trade created had not been extensive, it is 
larger than the amount of trade diversion, resulting in the overall beneficial effects of 
AFTA. On the other hand, this result also implies that AFTA members have not 
exploited the free trade status effectively, especially in increasing external trade flows 
with these important trading destinations who have shared a trading history for a long 
time. In conclusion, it can be said that the signing of AFTA was thus a part of the 
regionalism process rather than a true regionalization action of membership countries.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
The empirical analysis in this chapter examines the independent ‘AFTA-effects’ on both 
intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade flows using the renowned gravity framework. 
The panel data structure is, once again, proposed to control for several biases commonly 
observed in the cross-section gravity specification. As the research covers a long time 
frame, the ‘time effects’ are incorporated into the estimating ‘Gravity Model’ in order to 
control for any influence of ‘time’ that could affect sample countries’ trade flows. Thus, 
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the 2-way fixed effects model (2-way FEM) is, in conclusion, perceived to be the most 
appropriate estimation in this application. The ‘dynamic regional dummies’ are, in 
addition, incorporated to capture the fact that AFTA was gradually formed and to see 
whether any special events have brought noticeable impacts to AFTA’s trade at all.  
 
As the domain of this research is expanded to include key external traders, the estimated 
‘AFTA-effects’, in contrast to Chapter 3’s findings, portray a positive sign. This result 
confirms that, first of all, the choice of countries included in the ‘Gravity Model’ does 
influence estimated results, especially on the ‘AFTA-effects’ which are the interest of 
this paper. It can, in addition, be said that the negative ‘AFTA-effects’ previously 
obtained in Chapter 3 are suppressed within the ASEAN border. In the gravity 
specification in which all specific types of ‘dynamic regional dummies’: AFTAijt, I-
AFTAijt and J-AFTAijt are included, ‘AFTA-effects’ give the expected positive sign and 
are highly significant. By considering each regional dummy’s estimate, the paper finds 
that such positive and significant ‘AFTA-effects’ are deemed to be driven by ‘export-
effects’ or extra-export bias that I-AFTAijt captures, implying that ASEAN countries 
have expanded their trade (exports) to outside traders and delayed members post-AFTA. 
This result can be seen to imply that if ASEAN countries continue to exploit AFTA 
further as an integrating production centre, and a regional marketplace to supply the rest 
of the world’s demand, the intra-ASEAN trade could therefore be increased. If ASEAN 
countries, however, aim to increase intra-ASEAN trade by only focusing on trading 
among themselves, it will be difficult to observe positive and significant ‘AFTA-effects’ 
as expected. The latter is certainly what Chapter 3 has presented. As this chapter 
considers top traders outside the region, trading patterns estimated by the gravity 
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framework imply that ASEAN countries can certainly use AFTA as an export base to 
access larger markets. It can also be said that if AFTA brings about the increase in 
extra-export bias without much diversion in extra-import bias, the larger positive 
‘AFTA-effects’ are not far reaching. However, these results, in general, imply that since 
AFTA’s formation in 1992, ASEAN countries have not been effective in utilizing 
AFTA to increase intra-ASEAN trade. That is because, despite the positive and 
significant ‘AFTA-effects’ estimates obtained, the coefficient values are still considered 
minimal. At this point, in the face of minimal positive benefits among members, as 
AFTA has been completed and continues to work as an integrated region, it can, in 
conclusion, be perceived as a successful integration politically but not yet so 
economically.  
 
 
  
 
Part III : Theoretical Analysis  
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5: On the Course of RTA Expansion: Implications from the Gains from Trade and  
    Welfare Effects 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The objective of this chapter is to construct a theoretical framework explaining the 
incidence of RTA-membership’s expansion. In principle, given that the particular RTA 
is already formed, the paper aims to evaluate the economic effects that this RTA 
probably has on outside relevant countries. These economic impacts from the RTA that 
each country receives are then compared if a country opts to be another bloc member 
versus the case in which she continues trading without bloc-membership. As the key 
theoretical concept focuses on the economic aspect of the bloc’s expansion, any gains or 
losses from trade that the country experiences from the existing RTA are thus related to 
why a country should follow into the existing bloc or, in other words, whether joining 
the existing bloc is a cost-effective action.  
 
Nevertheless, before laying out any discussions, first of all, it is worth recalling the 
empirical framework that was employed in previous chapters; under the renowned 
‘Gravity Framework’, the so-called ‘AFTA-effects’ were examined under the 
assumption that AFTA dummy variable is treated as an exogenous factor. Although this 
assumption is deemed rather strong, it is certainly the norm in gravity-based studies that 
seek to measure trade effects of RTA(s) on relevant countries’ trade flows. Given that 
the RTA of interest existed with a specific number of members, researches usually go 
on to investigate whether this particular RTA benefits relevant countries’ trade: both 
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members and non-members. Taking into consideration this norm, however, the chapter 
not only attempts to evaluate RTA-effects on relevant countries’ economies but also 
intends to discuss underlying forces that conceivably drive this particular RTA to 
expand. As a consequence, the chapter needs to relate how these non-membership 
countries are influenced by the existing RTA with their incentives towards RTA-
membership application. Given that the economic impact of the RTA is the most 
important factor in this situation, these outside countries should become the next RTA-
members only if they perceive that trading with membership status benefits them more 
than doing so without it. Provided these relationships, it can be seen that RTA-
membership is allowed to be endogenous in this dialogue as countries can choose 
whether to engage in the existing RTA or continue to trade without RTA-membership. 
Outside countries do not necessarily have to follow into the bloc if it is not 
economically feasible to do so.  
 
Despite the fact that an endogenous RTA-membership assumption seems to be 
contradictory to the exogeneity assumption on the AFTA-membership dummy earlier 
hypothesized in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this paper perceives that both conjectures are 
acceptable as they certainly serve different purposes. However, it is important to state 
here that this paper does not intend to claim that RTA-membership has to be 
endogenous all the time. The endogeneity of RTA-membership is aimed at easing the 
discussion in which economic reasons are the cause of RTA-membership expansion in 
this chapter specifically. Nevertheless, with regard to AFTA, for some, the theoretical 
examinations on RTA-membership expansion provided here may look as if they are 
connected to the AFTA context as the zone was not completed at once but gradually 
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expanded over time. From the historical note provided in Chapter 1, it is, however, 
evident that AFTA is a politically driven RTA. Countries have to join into this regional 
format as long as they are located in the South East Asia region, confirming that they 
have no escape from AFTA-membership. The exogenous assumption of AFTA-
membership is thus valid in their case as AFTA was not an economically formed or 
trade-driven RTA. Notwithstanding the fact that the endogeneity assumption of RTA-
membership may not directly relate to AFTA, the theoretical analysis in this chapter is 
yet able to provide an alternative viewpoint if ASEAN countries have had the 
opportunity to choose to engage in AFTA at all. It is plausibly feasible that ‘AFTA-
effects’ on each member’s trade could have turned out to be more profitable than 
currently observed if economic outcomes had been directly prioritized. Even so, one 
shall not forget that the true intention of this chapter is not to discuss the proliferation of 
AFTA in particular, but to offer theoretical discussions to scrutinize the course of RTA-
membership expansion in the general context. Any theoretical outlines that this study 
aims to develop are therefore new and independent from any previous work. 
 
5.2 Related literature 
 
5.2.1 Intuitive accounts  
 
In the realm of discussions which address the occurrence of RTA-membership 
expansion, it is interesting to observe that they are predominantly determined by 
intuitive notions.  The study theorizes that there are 2 major schools of thoughts in this 
regard. The first one is known as the ‘static’ approach, associating the ‘static’ trade 
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bloc-effects taking place on members’ trade flows, with non-members’ incentives on 
whether to follow into the bloc. This approach is, in fact, comprised of 2 fundamental 
concepts that have been derived from 1) the ‘net trade effects’ by Viner (1950) and 2) 
the ‘gross trade effects’ by Balassa (1967). This ‘static’ idea was celebrated during the 
so-called ‘first wave’ era of regionalism as it was the period in which countries were 
interested in taking part in preferential liberalization, especially in the form of regional 
trade liberalization. The formation of the European Economic Community
1
 in 1958 
together with its enlargement were, for instance, key events of the era. Conversely, the 
second approach is known as the ‘dynamic’ analysis, attempting to scrutinize directly 
countries’ incentives that lead to the formation and the proliferation of the RTA. This 
notion was, in fact, developed during the so-called ‘second wave’ of regionalism or as 
Bhagwati et al. (1999) named it as the ‘second regionalism’. To be precise, it was the 
period during which many economists and politicians started to raise concerns over 
whether RTAs are building blocs or stumbling blocs to multilateral trade liberalization. 
As regionalism was largely practiced during that period, researchers were in doubt that 
multilateralism or the world’s free trade ideology would be able to achieve anything at 
all. In addition, there seemed to be more than a few occasions where trade benefits 
generated from RTAs were limited to within the membership. As this implies that 
benefiting RTAs could still be harmful to relevant non-members, these non-membership 
countries would, therefore, be safer or better off if following into a particular RTA as 
well. Thus, given that relevant countries’ decisions as well as their incentives in joining 
the particular RTA were examined, these were linked further to explain the incidence of 
                                                          
1
 It is now the European Union (EU).  
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RTA(s)-membership expansion at the same time. The following sections, for these 
reasons, elaborate these 2 intuitive notions in detail.  
 
The ‘static’ approach towards RTA-membership expansion 
 
The most primitive discussion that touched upon the incidence of RTA-membership 
expansion is the ‘net trade effects’ approach. It relates the ‘static’ RTA-effects on trade 
originated by Viner in 1950, which traditionally examines trade creation and trade 
diversion of a particular RTA, with how non-members make decisions towards joining a 
particular bloc. Given that the RTA is already established, it is worth recalling a 
circumstance in which RTA-membership traders have redirected their trade within the 
integrated area as a result of tariff liberalization. This includes the redirection of trade 
from higher-cost members to lower-cost ones and the creation of new trade ties due to 
improvements in each member's comparative advantage. This, according to Viner 
(1950), can be inferred as trade creation. Even though the concept of trade creation is 
deemed to be beneficial to RTA-membership countries, this does not confirm that a 
particular RTA is overall benign or economically efficient. One therefore has to 
examine further whether such increases in members’ trade are actually compensated for 
by the diversion of trade that RTA members have previously conducted with the more 
cost-efficient traders during the pre-RTA period to the less cost-efficient ones which 
however become RTA members post-RTA formation. If this takes place, it indicates 
that trade diversion certainly occurred. As this relationship is not easy to distinguish, in 
empirical analyses concerning RTA-effects on trade flows, one usually relies on the 
traditional ‘Gravity Model’ to find trade effects during the pre-RTA and the post-RTA 
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trading situations to see whether there are any reductions in the trade that these current 
RTA members conduct with non-RTA traders or the rest of the world, post-RTA. By 
combining the effects of trade creation and trade diversion together, one is able to 
obtain Viner (1950)’s ‘net trade effects’ which are used to conclude the overall effects 
of a particular RTA. When trade creation exceeds trade diversion, a particular RTA is 
thus perceived as a cost-effective integration, benefiting the membership as a whole. If, 
however, trade diversion ends up outweighing trade creation, an economic integration is 
instead concluded to be not so benign in general and, in particular, harmful to relevant 
non-member traders
2
.  
 
Similarly, the so-called ‘gross trade effects’ of Balassa (1967) are linked to non-RTA 
members’ incentives to join the existing RTA, although this concept actually examines 
RTA-effects on the membership’s trade flows in particular. Once again, the renowned 
‘Gravity Model’ is usually employed to measure any trade effects that member countries 
received from the RTA. When the ‘gross trade effects’ of a particular RTA are trade 
creating, this is deemed to boost non-members’ incentives to seek RTA-membership 
status. Joining the existing RTA is, once again, seen as a safe haven strategy as these 
non-membership countries are believed to aim for similar gains to those that the current 
RTA members have received as part of a particular bloc. Moreover, it is likely that these 
non-member countries are concerned about losing existing trade ties as well as any 
negotiating power in international markets if they continue to trade from outside the 
integrated zone while everyone else is participating. The situation could be worse in 
principle if this particular RTA increases further in size. Hence, following into the bloc 
                                                          
2
 As noted in an overview by Bhagwati et al (1999), that according to the definition given by Viner 
(1950), a trade diverting FTA can still benefit the membership’s welfare even though it implies that non-
member countries’ welfare is damaged in general.  
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is, in comparison to standing still, regarded as a secure path to protect oneself from 
being left out a priori. On the contrary, if a particular RTA is concluded to be a trade 
diverting one, as earlier explained, it implies that the memberships’ trade ties - ex-post - 
have been switched from the most cost-efficient non-members to the less cost-efficient 
members. Nevertheless, it is not possible to separate effects of trade creation and trade 
diversion from one another in this case, as this ‘gross trade effects’ approach only 
accounts for effects of a particular RTA on its intra-bloc trade. One has to keep in mind 
that there is no direct examination of the RTA-effects on non-members’ trade flows in 
this matter. Thus, in such an application, a trade diverting RTA plausibly means that 
there is not much trade created among RTA members in general or the particular RTA 
has failed to increase trade flows within the membership overall.  
 
From the economic intuitions abovementioned, it can be summarized that both ‘net 
trade effects’ and ‘gross trade effects’ concepts do focus on the positive trade impacts 
of the RTA in explaining bloc-membership expansion. As long as the ‘net trade effects’ 
illustrate that a particular RTA is net trade creating, outside (non-RTA) countries are 
recommended to seek RTA-membership status as this could be regarded as a safe haven 
strategy: especially when others are doing so. In a similar vein, research that employs 
the ‘gross trade effects’ concept focuses on the positive effects of an RTA. Provided 
that the RTA of interest has arrived at ‘gross trade creation’, it is concluded that the 
RTA is relatively beneficial to its membership and hence it is suggested that non-
membership countries follow into the RTA in order to obtain a similar outcome. 
Although the ‘net trade effects’ notion does address the negative upshot of the RTA via 
trade diversion, such an outcome is seen as an additional force driving non-members 
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towards RTA-membership. To be precise, the size of the trade diversion, diverted from 
non-RTA members or the rest of the world, additionally implies that non-members 
should be inclined to join the bloc as participating in the RTA is considered one of the 
ways to avoid encountering further losses. Given this explanation, the underlying forces 
that drive a bloc to expand remain ambiguous.  
 
The ‘dynamic’ approach towards RTA-membership expansion 
 
It was briefly aforementioned that the ‘dynamic’ analysis was actually created to clarify 
the concerns whether RTAs are building blocs or stumbling blocs to multilateral trade 
liberalization, this approach, by and large, explains RTA-membership expansion in the 
political economy framework. The following questions are disentangled : What 
incentives cause countries to want to engage in the existing RTA? What incentives 
cause members to allow new entries? What are the incentives for members to seek 
multilateral liberalization?. As this involves politics, countries’ decisions are, in general, 
assumed to be responding to special interest groups that support politicians. As one of 
the most common objectives of politicians is to get re-elected, policies are aimed at 
satisfying the supporting groups with the strong anticipation of receiving their votes in 
return. Considering this view point, a country’s decision on whether to participate in an 
existing RTA of interest is nothing but another set of policies that the government 
exercises to meet such an objective. Analogous intuitions are also applicable for the 
current RTA members deciding whether to accept newcomers or to prevent them from 
coming in the bloc. Even though this ‘dynamic’ notion was later developed into some 
theoretical literature, it is somewhat surprising that the majority did focus specifically 
on causes of regionalism i.e. how the RTA is formed, rather than seeking explanations 
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of how the bloc expands
3
. Another group of theoretical accounts that claimed to 
elaborate on the proliferation of the RTA in fact viewed the RTA and multilateral trade 
liberalization as 2 distinct kinds of trade agreement i.e. on regional versus multilateral 
levels
4
. In such cases, research does not directly explain the mechanisms underlying the 
proliferation of a particular RTA but illustrates a country’s incentive structure in 
choosing between the regional form of trade liberalization and the multilateral 
liberalization separately. Indeed, this is done in order to maximize the political support 
of the governing parties. As this ‘dynamic’ approach was intended to provide answers 
for the ‘second wave issues’, general discussions have therefore been focused on 
analysing current RTA members’ incentives specifically on whether to take a step 
forward to multilateral free trade or to continue trading under the regional liberalization 
scheme. For these reasons, there seems to be limited research that touches directly upon 
non-members’ incentives or the so-called ‘third country effects’ in this matter.  
 
5.2.2 Theoretical accounts  
 
Apart from the intuitive notions abovementioned, to the extent that theoretical 
assessments are concerned, there are also a few accounts that uniquely discuss the 
incidence of bloc-membership expansion by looking at non-members’ incentives to join 
the bloc. Within this limited amount of research, Baldwin (1995)’s was the first account 
that studied non-members’ incentives theoretically. Since this chapter’s interest also lies 
within this realm of research, attempting to scrutinize what drives non-members’ 
decisions to integrate into the bloc, Baldwin (1995)’s work is worth describing in detail 
                                                          
3
 See Grossman and Helpman (1995), Baldwin (1997), Yi (1996), Freund (2000), Aghion et al. (2007). 
4
 See Levy (1997), Krishna (1998).  
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here. Similar to other research at the time, his study was another account that aimed to 
elucidate the ‘second wave issues’. In particular, the research attempted to explain the 
scenario whereby countries appeared to liberalize regionally rather than multilaterally, 
hence, enlarged RTAs existed in different parts of the world. Given that a particular 
RTA has already been formed, Baldwin (1995) examined 2 fundamental scenarios 
which were assumed to influence non-member countries to seek bloc-membership 
status. In doing so, Baldwin (1995) observed that the growth of regionalism, which was 
widespread in many parts of the world during the 1980s and 1990s, was caused by 
sequential lobbying for RTA-membership in each country or, as Baldwin (1995) named 
this, the so-called ‘domino effects’. Starting with a positive model of RTA-membership, 
a country is assumed to be indifferent to the choice between staying still and acquiring 
membership status from this RTA initially. With the focus on politics, the political 
equilibrium in which the pro-RTA membership and the anti-RTA membership forces 
are in balance is in addition presumed to exist in each country. The pro-RTA 
membership force is linked to the country’s exporting sector which is expected to gain 
from preferential tariffs and privileged access if it joins the existing RTA, and, on the 
contrary, to suffer from tariff barriers and other kinds of discrimination if it stays out. 
The anti-RTA membership force is associated with a country’s import competing sector 
wherein increases in competition are foreseen to come from RTA-member competitors. 
Other non-economic objections against joining the RTA are also added into this anti-
RTA membership force. Furthermore, an equilibrium in which the economic benefits of 
membership to the last member of the bloc equal its non-economic costs is assumed to 
exist within the RTA itself. Thus, when there is a deepening of an existing integration, 
this is considered to violate this equilibrium as closer integration signals more 
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profitability to be generated within the bloc. While the RTA members could enjoy tariff 
preferences and enlarged market access, non-members face additional discrimination 
after the integration is tightened. Such change disrupts not only an initial political 
equilibrium within the bloc but also equilibria among non-members.  
 
Similar relationships can be observed at the country level. The deepening of integration 
within an existing bloc is perceived as an idiosyncratic shock to the country’s political 
equilibrium. The pro-RTA agents as well as the anti-RTA ones lobby the government in 
order to protect the sector in which each associates. As Baldwin (1995) assumed further 
that the size of a trading sector is positively linked to the political power, and since, in 
general, the export sector is systematically larger than the import sector, the shock will 
raise the pro-membership force more than the anti-membership force. If the pro-RTA 
force wins, the country ends up lobbying the government to apply for RTA-membership 
even though she was indifferent to the RTA connection previously. When one of the 
non-RTA members decides to join the existing RTA in the end, this additional member 
in the bloc heightens discrimination against remaining non-members. As previously, 
new political economy forces among non-RTA members will be formed as each 
country’s political equilibrium is now disturbed. Considering what is perceived to be an 
increase in discrimination coming from this enlarged bloc, together with the assumption 
that the export sector is usually larger than the import equivalent, the pro-RTA 
membership force in this particular non-RTA country will be increased more than the 
anti-RTA membership force. Basically, as long as a country’s pro-RTA movement 
outweighs the costs associated with the anti-RTA membership force, the bloc is able to 
expand and the so-called ‘domino effects’ persist. On the condition that the bloc is 
opened, this single incident of regional liberalization plausibly triggers a series of RTA-
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membership expansions. These ‘domino effects’ keep rolling until the RTA obtains a 
new political equilibrium. Such domino-like relationships in RTA-membership 
expansion have been acknowledged by many trade scholars and political economists 
hence it being referred to formerly as the ‘domino theory of regionalism’. 
 
However, it should not be forgotten that, according to Baldwin (1995), RTA-
membership expansion is acknowledged as a political process. Whether or not a country 
follows into any existing RTA, her decision is based on gaining (maximizing) political 
support rather than a country’s profits and welfare. Thus, it is not surprising that 
important features stated in traditional trade and regional integration research such as 
analyses on the terms of trade changes, examination of regional effects in different 
forms of trade creation and trade diversion, were not directly emphasized in the domino 
theory.  
 
With reference to the ‘domino effects’, Bhagwati (1991) and Harvie et al. (2006) had 
also shed light on these issues. In summary, RTA-membership expansion is regarded as 
being a result of the way in which relevant non-RTA countries respond to major global 
events such as economic crises as well as cases in which large economies form a RTA. 
This is because such events are perceived as ‘idiosyncratic shocks’, playing a vital role 
in influencing countries that are without RTA-membership status to engage in the 
existing RTA, or even to form their own. These actions are, once again, seen as a sort of 
security for non-RTA countries: avoiding or minimizing any negative consequences that 
are expected to occur from such idiosyncratic events.  
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Bhagwati (1999) is another account that underlines non-members’ incentive structure 
toward bloc membership. In the overview of his book, ‘Trading Bloc’, he looks at 
relevant countries’ incentives in forming and expanding trade blocs as a part of the so-
called ‘dynamic time-path question’ and asserted that such incentives require a study in 
the political economy framework:  
 
 “A meaningful examination of the incentives to form and to expand trade blocs 
   will therefore have to be in the new and growing field of political economy-
   theoretic analysis” (Bhagwati, 1999, p.19).  
 
With regard to the incidence of bloc-membership expansion, in summary, one needs to 
observe the relationships between 3 major forces which Bhagwati (1999) called 
‘agents’. They are 1) governments of member countries 2) interest groups in member 
countries and 3) interest groups and the government of outside countries. In order for 
the bloc to be successfully expanded, it was discussed that apart from a willingness to 
accept new members by RTA members’ governments and interest groups, another force 
that is essentially required is a readiness to participate in the bloc on the part of 
governments and interest groups in potential member countries. Although the discussion 
was alleged to be based around political economy factors, Bhagwati (1999) actually 
stated an economic reason, fear of trade diversion, to be one of the reasons that outside 
countries plausibly use to seek bloc-membership eventually.   
 
A recent international relations study by Solis et al. (2009) can also be classified under 
this research category. Despite the paper focussing exclusively on the case of FTA 
proliferation, the ideas concerning non-member’s incentives were likewise mentioned. 
The incidence of FTA expansion was perceived to be driven by the so-called 
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‘bandwagon effects’ that are generated once major traders signed any new FTAs. 
Basically it was discussed that, because of the novel FTA formation, new diffusions and 
positive attitudes toward the FTA or regionalism in general are said to be created among 
non-FTA countries. It can be seen that this view is similar to Baldwin(1995)’s ‘domino 
theory of regionalism’ in the area, in that the prior actions of their peers are the key 
factor affecting outside countries’ views and decisions on whether to follow into any 
existing regional blocs. Still, the term, ‘bandwagon effects’ is rather subjective as there 
were no explicit details stating its underlying relationships.  
 
Last but not least, the slackness of WTO negotiating processes as well as problems 
found in multilateral talks are another area that previous research has claimed to be 
driving growth and expansion of RTAs across the globe. Basically a global 
phenomenon whereby regionalism appears to have increased occurs because, in 
comparison to the multi-national level, it is easier for countries to achieve mutual 
agreements at a regional level
5
. 
 
As can be seen thus far, intuitive notions as well as theoretical accounts concerning 
RTA-membership expansion have been stressed strictly within the political economy 
and international relations frameworks. This was the case because, as previously 
mentioned, during the time that this literature emerged, global concerns were aimed at 
finding out whether regionalism would, in the end, harm multilateralism. Such doubt 
was basically viewed as a political problem rather than an economic one. Thus, this 
could be perceived as the major reason why there has not been much discussion 
                                                          
5
 See Krugman (1991), Bhagwati (2008). 
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concerning RTA-membership expansion in terms of pure economic analysis in general. 
It is, in fact, worse if one considers the analyses on RTA-membership expansion via the 
‘domino effects’ or non-members’ decision in particular. Moreover, economic literature 
that studied regional trade liberalization mainly focused on finding economic effects of 
the integration. That research, for this reason, often assumed or took for granted that the 
studied RTA expands. Empirical examinations in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are indeed 
within this category.  
 
Even though political economy research has been valuable, this chapter perceives that 
analyses are partial as discussions are subverted to satisfy political goals such as 
maximizing the votes from supporting groups. On top of that, most political economy 
research does not analyse regional trade agreements (RTAs) in particular, but 
investigates preferential trade agreements (PTAs) which are not necessarily regional. 
When the latter is the case, it is not surprising if politics were deemed to play the most 
important role in influencing the expansion of such blocs.  Nevertheless, it is important 
to remind the reader that this chapter aims to analyse regional trade blocs and their 
expansions specifically. Thus, key economic principles exhibited within the study of 
international trade such as profit and welfare-maximizing trading strategies will be 
discussed and emphasized. In addition to political economy perception, this chapter 
aims to point out that a pure economic theoretical viewpoint would certainly be a useful 
supplement to the discussion of the issues.  
 
 
 
212 
 
5.2.3 Empirical accounts  
 
With emphasis on assessing non-members’ decisions towards bloc-membership, another 
group of researchers explained this concept via an empirical approach: combining ‘net 
trade effects’ found under the conventional gravity framework and ‘domino effects’ of 
Baldwin (1995) together. Sapir (2001) employed the standard ‘Gravity Model’ to 
estimate 16 Western European countries’ trade flows in order to investigate the 
European Community (EC) expansion during 1960–1992. The results indicated that, as 
the EC expanded, members’ trade flows were increased while non-members’ ones 
decreased. These trade effects from the EC were measured in the form of trade creation 
and trade diversion in the traditional way. Even so, the study used the term ‘domino 
effects’ to characterize the corollary of trade diversion on non-EC countries’ decisions 
towards becoming bloc members;  it appears that non-member countries did apply for 
EC-membership afterwards. The study, in consequence, concluded that the so-called 
‘domino effects’ had influenced outside countries to follow into the bloc:  
 
  The empirical findings of the study support the hypothesis that “domino effects”
  have played an important role in Europe. These effects may be partly  responsible 
  for the successive enlargement of the European Community from its original 6 
  to its present 15 members (Sapir, 2001, p.386). 
 
In a similar vein, Roland (2006) applied the gravity framework to the study of the 
European Union’s (EU) expansion during 1962 – 2004. Notwithstanding the amount of 
trade diversion found (on non-members) as the bloc expanded, in this application, it was 
not concluded to be the basis for ‘domino effects’ per se. The research was finished with 
the result of the discrete choice model which was employed to access effects of the 
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domino variables
6
 on a country’s decision whether to join the bloc. Roland (2006) 
stated that:  
 
 Our gravity analysis has revealed that the expansion and deepening of the EU 
 had a  negative impact on non-members by causing trade diversion. This is a 
 necessary condition for the domino effects, but it is not sufficient…we need 
 to access the impact of domino variables on the probability that a particular 
 country applies for EU membership (Roland, 2006, p. 23).  
 
 
In conclusion, his empirical findings suggested that as the bloc size increases, the 
likelihood of non-members’ participation in the bloc likewise increases. The so-called 
‘domino effects’ were, as a result, considered valid to explain the case of the EU 
expansion in this application.  
 
The more recent research by Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010) also supported the view 
that the so-called ‘domino effects’ are an important force for FTA-membership 
expansion
7
. In addition to the gravity framework employed to assess trade effects of the 
RTA of interest, this research went further to form an empirical index: known as 
‘contagion effects’, to describe how contagious an FTA is with respect to third nations. 
As trade diversion is perceived to be a major trigger for the ‘contagion effects’ of the 
FTA, this is where there is a similarity to the ‘domino effects’ of Baldwin (1995). 
Nevertheless, the fundamental idea of the ‘contagion effects’ is actually simpler: given 
that a representative country is not yet a member of the FTA, the importance of this 
nation’s trading partners as well as the number of FTAs that trading partners have 
                                                          
6
 These variables are: (a) the size of EU bloc (b) degree of EU integration (c) trade uncertainty and (d) 
multilateral backlash.  
7
 This study extends the domino theory to allow for FTAs as the original work by Baldwin (1995) only 
focused on customs unions. Basically, the aim of the paper was to test for the ‘domino effects’, given the 
number of bilateral FTAs signed in the data set.  
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signed are a means to measure how contagious a particular FTA is to this nation. In 
brief, the contagious hypothesis stated that: 
 
  “A pair of countries should be more likely to sign a new FTA if either of them 
   has recently signed FTAs with the third nations that are the pairs’ exporting 
   rivals” (Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2010, p.2). 
 
By applying the spatial econometric techniques to the development of the structure of 
spatial interdependence in the contagion index, the research’s main findings confirmed 
that the index correctly captures the ‘contagion effects’ among the FTAs provided in the 
data set
8
.  
 
Even though these empirical accounts are insightful, it is evident that analyses were 
limited to findings found by the traditional ‘Gravity Model’, relating volumes and 
quantities of trade for relevant countries affected by a particular RTA with non-RTA 
members’ decisions towards applying for RTA-memberships. Relying solely on the 
trade-effects of RTAs, (trade creation and trade diversion) these analyses have been 
criticized as incomplete, especially when terms of trade as well as welfare effects are 
concerned
9
. This is mainly because a major component for welfare discussion, the 
information on ‘price’ or the so-called ‘price effects’, were not directly referred to in the 
empirical accounts aforementioned. According to Winters and Chang (2000) and Chang 
and Winters (2002) which both aimed to investigate RTA-effects on non-members’ 
welfare, the ‘price effects’ were pinpointed as a better indicator to explain that matter. 
Beginning in Winters and Chang (2000), economic impacts from Spanish accession to 
                                                          
8
 The data on FTAs comes from Hufbauer and Schott (2009). Data collection was limited to the year 2005 
for the completion of data on all variables.  
9
 See Winters (1997a), Winters (1997b) 
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the EC were observed on prices of Spanish imports of goods from major OECD 
countries
10
. Pricing games in which relevant suppliers compete within the Spanish 
market were used to indicate effects from the EC on both members’ and non-members’ 
trade flows. In principle, this can be explained in a Bertrand setting: when a foreign firm 
exports, its price depends not only on tariffs but also on other exporters’ prices. Thus, 
compared to the RTA-membership exporters which have received tariff preferences, 
ceteris paribus, the non-RTA exporters would have to reduce their prices accordingly in 
order to maintain their competitive edge. The degree of price change after the RTA has 
been established or expanded therefore implies how much non-RTA members’ terms of 
trade or welfare have been affected. Even though the study had difficulties acquiring 
data on prices and tariffs, their results suggested that tariff reduction on the EC’s 
exports to Spain reduced the pre-tariff prices of US and Japanese exporters in 
consequence
11
. With a better data set, Chang and Winters (2002) repeated the same 
procedures studying the ‘price effects’ of the MERCOSUR on non-members’ terms of 
trade. The results confirmed that the prices of non-members’ exports to the integrating 
market declined following the point at which the MERCOSUR granted tariff 
preferences to membership countries. In this instance, one can therefore conclude that, 
without raising any additional trade barriers on non-members, their terms of trade would 
still be negatively affected as a result of MERCOSUR nonetheless.  
 
Even though the importance of the ‘price effects’ was emphasized, it is however 
important to note that Winters and Chang (2000) and Chang and Winters (2002) did not 
go further to examine how the bloc expands. Given related literature reviewed thus far, 
                                                          
10
 The United States, Japan, France, West Germany , Italy and the United Kingdom  
11
 The model II shows that for every 1% reduction in EC costs, including tariffs, the US/EC post-tariff 
price increases by 0.56% and the Japanese /EC relative by 0.42% (Winters and Chang, 2000, p. 374).  
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it is evident that the majority of the pure economic analyses were conducted 
empirically. Theoretical literature in this field is, as a result, in demand. Considering 
related literature abovementioned as a guideline, this paper perceives that theoretical 
developments could be carried out by incorporating the volume or quantity effects of 
the RTA that is impacting on trade as well as implications of the ‘price effects’ into the 
discussion. To the best knowledge of the author, such matters have not been narrated 
formally in explaining bloc-membership expansion: hence this is the contribution of this 
chapter.  
 
5.3 Theoretical frameworks  
 
In order to explain RTA-membership expansion, one way to simplify the matter is to 
assume that a country’s decision is driven solely by economic impacts from this 
particular trade bloc. Here, the analysis conforms to Baldwin (1995)’s theory in that the 
study works on a positive model of RTA; the gains from trade of members and non-
members are compared when the RTA of interest is already established. Even though 
this concept can be applied to study other RTAs of different types and sizes, the chapter 
starts to formalize the analysis in the case where there is only one RTA. The key 
principle is that whether or not a country is in the bloc, her gains and losses vary, given 
that her trading partners are members or non-members of the specific RTA at the same 
time. It is thus possible for a country to foresee the gains and losses that will occur if 
she decides to be another bloc member or if she continues to trade from outside the zone 
without bloc-membership. By the same token, the chapter aims to apply the same 
principle to examine the welfare effects of a representative country. Given these 
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assumptions, this paper somewhat perceives the connection with the AFTA case. Even 
though AFTA was known to be a politically driven RTA, the fact that AFTA was 
gradually expanded plus the empirical evidence on the ‘AFTA-effects’ that have been 
found to be positive on members but not so on non-members (delayed members) bring 
about ideas that AFTA’s impacts especially on non-members’ trade flows could 
potentially be a factor that drives AFTA to be completed eventually as planned. 
However, one should not forget that, as abovementioned, this paper does not attempt to 
study the case of AFTA-membership expansion exclusively but aims to provide 
theoretical explanations for RTA-membership expansion that could be observed in 
general. Hence, by constructing the theoretical analysis in this way, any policy 
implications drawn in this analysis can, more or less, be applied to any endogenously 
formed RTA.   
 
5.3.1 The model  
 
Albeit inspired by the ‘domino effects’ concept by Baldwin (1995), the theoretical 
model which will be developed in this section is original. It combines standard profit 
maximizing ideology on the social utility function in order to derive the optimal set of 
outputs that a country could potentially produce and export. Assuming that every 
country is equal and the tariffs are symmetric worldwide, this output level is a vital 
factor to determine a country’s profits as well as welfare levels. Thus, suppose that there 
are i = 1, 2,.., N countries involved in international trade. For simplicity, all of these 
countries are assumed to be symmetric in size. In this setting, the importance of product 
differentiation is emphasized; the assumption in which all goods are differentiated by 
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place of origin is imposed. This can be seen as a sort of specialization and, to avoid 
complications in the calculation, it is assumed further that there is only one good 
produced in each country
12
. In addition, every country in the model is comprised of 2 
industries: tradable and non-tradable ones. Each country has identical homothetic 
preferences of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) type. If Cij is country j’s 
consumption on country i
th
 product, consumers in country j maximize social utility 
function given by:  
 
      
 
   
   
    
             ; 0 < σ < 1       (5.1) 
  
where σ is elasticity of substitution, Z denotes the set of non-tradable goods. When 
country i is the home country (i.e. i = j), the utility function represents a country’s utility 
on her own domestic consumption.  
 
Consumers in country j maximize Eq. (5.1) subject to the budget constraint given as: 
 
         
 
                    (5.2) 
   
To solve this utility maximization problem, the associated Lagrangian is formed: 
  
               
 
   
   
    
                      
 
           
  
                                                          
12
 This is similar to Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) in the area that each region is assumed to be 
specialized in the production of only one type of goods. This assumption is conducted to suppress finer 
classifications of goods.  
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To get the result, the first-order Lagrangian conditions and the following equations 
must hold at the solution values          : 
 
 
  
    
      
                      (5.3) 
  
 
   
   
                    = 0          (5.4) 
 
 
  
  
                
 
   –                             (5.5) 
  
From the first-order condition stated above, rearrange Eq. (5.3) and Eq. (5.4). As    , 
that implies : 
 
    
                             (5.6) 
  
Eq. (5.6) is, in fact, the inverse demand curve.  
 
And, the price elasticity of demand is: 
 
    
 
 
                       (5.7) 
   
In this economy, let’s assume for simplicity that labour is the only factor of production, 
and it can be used to produce either tradable or non-tradable goods. Assuming further 
that each unit of non-tradable goods (Z) requires 1 unit of labour: which its wage 
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normalizes as unity. What follows is wage in the economy is also unity. This is a 
partial-equilibrium setting in which wages are fixed. Applying the symmetric-country 
assumption, this allows the analysis to perceive all goods (N varieties from N countries) 
to be produced with the same cost function. In addition, this paper supposes that in each 
country, the industry cost of producing the goods is simply denoted by the constant 
return to scale production technology. 
 
               
 
                    (5.8) 
   
where     
 
    represents country j’s total production which comprises of country j’s 
consumption on her own products (i.e. when i = j)  as well as country i’s consumption 
on country j’s products, m is the labour input requirement per unit of output. And, li is 
labour used in producing total goods:     
 
   . 
 
Before proceeding to an examination of how the RTA affects trade relationships of 
members and non-members, the pre-RTA situation is worth looking at. This study starts 
from the situation where countries trade with some costs on tariffs. Let’s first assume 
that each country imposes tariffs; t, on all foreign imports. Treating tariffs as exogenous 
and symmetric, this simplifies the scenario as, for example, country i’s tariffs which are 
imposed on country j’s goods will be equal to the tariffs that country j applies on goods 
imported from country i. Thus, in this paper, one gets:  
 
  tij = tji  = t            (5.9)  
  
221 
 
According to the representative social utility function mentioned earlier in Eq. (5.1), it 
represents how country j imports from country i. As tariffs are prevalent in the pre-RTA 
situation, the tariffs: t, are applied by country j on country i
th
 goods. Consumer’s price 
in country j is therefore:  
 
                    
              (5.10) 
  
where Pij stands for the price of country i
th
 product in country j,    
  is the price that 
country i
th
 actually receives for its exports to country j. In the similar vein, the 
consumer’s price of country j’s product in country ith will be:  
 
                
                          (5.11) 
             
where Pji  is the price of country j’s product in country i
th
,    
  is the price that country j 
actually receives for its exports.  
 
Gains from trade/RTA 
Profits  
 
In this situation, let’s further assume that some countries are already RTA members. 
Given this assumption, it means that the import tariffs among members are waived 
while ones with non-RTA traders are still applied unchanged. As the world is comprised 
of N symmetric countries in this application, let’s impose M countries to be members of 
the particular RTA. In case country j is one of the bloc members, country j’s profits 
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(from selling her products in the tariff-free zone and in the rest of the world markets) 
can be written as:  
 
   
            
 
                
 
             
 
                          (5.12) 
        
The first term is the country’s revenue from trading with bloc members inclusive of her 
own domestic market and the second term is revenue from trading with the rest of the 
world. This form of profit function is also applied to other RTA-membership traders in 
the same way.  
 
Next, substitute the market price derived in Eq. (5.6) into the profit function above. 
Country j’s profit function when she is a part of the existing RTA is simplified as:  
 
              
         
     
 
         
        
 
             
 
                                 
         
                           
    
        
    
            
 
              
 
          (5.12.A) 
        
From the profit function above, maximizing over the choice of Cji, one can get the first-
order condition. Country j’s profit maximizing outputs or, in other words, the optimal 
set of exports that are sold to another RTA-membership trading partner are:  
 
              
 
   
 
 
                     (5.13)   
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However, when a trading partner is not a member of the RTA, country j’s profit 
maximizing outputs exported turn into: 
 
                  
   
   
 
 
                      (5.14) 
           
Substituting amounts of outputs derived in Eq. (13) and Eq. (14) back into the profit 
function stated in Eq. (12.A) gives: 
 
             
       
 
   
 
    
 
    
  
   
      
   
   
 
      
 
   
      
   
    (5.15) 
           
Rearrange Eq. (5.15). One gets:  
 
             
          
 
   
 
   
           
   
   
 
      
   
                                  
 
                            
 
   
 
   
          
   
   
 
   
                                              (5.15.A) 
     
Certainly, this equation also represents all RTA-membership countries’ profits written 
in terms of output levels in this application.  
 
In the case that a representative country: country j, is not in the RTA, her profit function 
therefore becomes: 
 
               
                                   
 
     
 
          (5.16) 
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The first term is country j’s revenue from trading in the domestic market; the second 
term is the revenue from trading with other trading partners. Because country j is now 
outside the bloc, it can be observed that, in this instance, tariffs are imposed on all 
country j’s exports regardless of whether their trade partners are members of the 
particular RTA.  
 
Following procedures conducted previously when country j is a member of the RTA, 
the market price derived in Eq. (5.6) is thus substituted into Eq. (5.16). Country j’s 
profit function when she is a non-RTA trader is thus derived as:  
 
              
           
            
               
 
     
 
                  
 
             
          
     –      
 
                
 
     
 
           (5.16.A) 
         
Finding the first-order condition, one gets the profit maximizing outputs that are sold to 
the domestic market as: 
 
                       
 
   
 
 
           (5.17) 
             
And amounts of products exported to each foreign market are: 
 
       
   
   
  
 
          (5.18)         
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In this case, the profit maximizing outputs exported to the RTA-membership trading 
partners and the non-RTA ones are equal as these destinations impose symmetric tariffs 
equal to t. Substituting these quantities of outputs back into Eq. (5.16.A), the profit 
function of country j when she is a non-RTA trader is therefore : 
 
           
        
 
   
 
 
     
 
   
        
   
   
 
    
 
    
   
   
                   (5.19)          
  
Rearranging the above equation, one gets: 
 
           
           
 
   
 
   
      
   
   
 
   
  
             
                                 
                               
 
   
 
   
          
   
   
 
   
  
                 (5.19.A)         
          
Now, one is able to compare a country’s profits if she decides to join the RTA to a case 
where she prefers to stay out. Given that M countries are in the RTA, a representative 
country: country j, decides to join the bloc if the profits that are foreseen to be received 
from participation are higher than the profits to be obtained from standing still. Thus, 
from Eq. (5.15.A) and Eq. (5.19.A), the proof to be carried out is finding that: 
 
   
      
                                                                  (5.20)        
 
To do so, the paper simply conducts:  
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  – 
 
   
        
 
   
 
   
          
   
   
 
   
        
 
                    
 
   
 
   
    
   
  – 
 
   
  
       (5.21)            
              
Considering Eq. (5.21), it is clear that     because in order for the RTA to be 
established, it requires, as a minimum, 2 countries to form the agreement. As a result, 
the first term:       is guaranteed positive. In addition, as   
 
   
 
   
      
   
  – 
 
   
  
 , 
the second term:    
 
   
 
   
    
   
  – 
 
   
  
    is also proven to be positive.  Since the RHS 
of Eq. (5.21) is confirmed to be positive, therefore it is true to state that:  
  
        
                                                                            QED 
 
In this setting, it is evident that there are basically 2 types of traders: the RTA members 
and the non-RTA traders: having tariffs as the only factor that differentiates the cost of 
trade among them. A representative country’s profit function changes depending on the 
trading status that she obtains: RTA member versus non-RTA member. With RTA-
membership status, a country’s profit function is accounted for by trading within the 
bloc and trading with the rest of world. When, as shown above, tariffs are exempted 
within the bloc, it can be seen that the amount of goods exported to each bloc member 
are larger, in comparison to the amount of goods that are exported to each the rest-of-
the-world country. On the contrary, without RTA-membership status, a country’s profit 
function is simply derived from trading in the domestic market and trading with the rest 
of the world. Apart from its own domestic market, this indicates that in all destinations 
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those goods are exported, a country has to pay for tariffs. Thus, comparing between 
these 2 instances; the amount of goods that the non-RTA country trades is definitely 
less than the RTA-membership case. In this framework, the amounts of goods traded 
directly reflect the revenues that these countries receive from trade. Therefore, it is 
unambiguous to conclude that the country’s profits when trading under the RTA-
membership status are higher than they would be if she traded from outside the zone.   
 
Welfare effects  
 
In this section, the study aims to analyse welfare effects when a representative country 
decides to join the existing RTA and compares that to the case in which she continues to 
trade without RTA-membership from outside the zone. As presented in Eq. (5.1) and 
Eq. (5.2), after the optimal set of consumptions has been consumed, a representative 
country: country j, spends the remaining income on non-tradable goods. Accordingly, 
one can define a representative country’s welfare as:  
 
                
 
   
   
    
                 
 
       (5.22) 
  
which after rearranging, it is simply equal to :  
 
       
             
 
   
   
                         (5.22.1) 
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where national income      is assumed to be consisted of 1) factor payments  2) profits 
from trading or, in other words, the return to the fixed factors of production and 3) tariff 
revenue.  
 
Therefore, one can write:  
 
           
                       (5.23) 
    
where L denotes factor payments or cost of labour,   
  presents profits from trade and    
signifies the tariff revenue, respectively. Thus, in case country j is a member of the 
RTA, by substituting profits as previously derived in Eq. (5.12.A) and the tariff revenue 
accrued from imports into the above equation, her national income can then be derived 
as: 
 
   
             
    
        
    
            
 
            
 
          
 
             (5.24) 
          
It can be seen that the tariff revenue received is cancelled by the tariffs paid whilst 
exporting to other non-RTA members at the same time. Rearranging the above equation 
gets:  
      
    
           
    
         
    
           
 
                                    (5.24.1)    
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Substitute the national income (  
   ) as derived above back into the social welfare 
function in Eq. (5.22.1). As a result, country j’s welfare when she is a RTA member is 
derived as: 
 
        
        
     
 
   
   
               
    
         
    
           
 
      
      
                 
 
   
 
      
     
 
   
   
                
 
         
 
         
  
                         
 
   
      
        
    
     
 
           
 
         
 
                
           (5.25)       
 
The above equation can be elaborated further. By substituting optimal sets of 
consumption (as now a representative country is observed when she imports) into the 
equation, country j’s welfare level is:  
 
          
 
   
    
 
   
 
    
   
      
   
   
 
      
   
        
 
   
 
    
 
      
   
   
 
      
 
          
            (5.26) 
    
We can apply the same procedures to the case whereby country j trades without RTA-
membership status.  The country’s income is therefore derived as:  
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                        (5.27) 
 
Substituting country j’s income stated above and the amount of tariff revenue received 
from imports into the social welfare function in Eq. (5.22.1). The country j’s welfare 
when she is not a member of the RTA thus becomes:   
 
           
        
        
 
   
   
         
        
                 
 
    
 
        
 
                              
 
   
   
     
 
   
    
    
                     
 
                      
 
                              
 
   
    
        
    
                   
 
                   (5.28) 
          
Next, the above equation can be elaborated further by substituting optimal sets of 
consumption into the social welfare function.  Doing so gets: 
 
             
 
   
  
 
   
 
   
      
   
   
 
        
   
       
 
   
 
 
     
   
   
 
        
 
               
                                  (5.29) 
          
At this instant, one is able to measure a representative country: country j’s, social 
welfare when she is in the RTA against the case whereby she is out of the zone. To 
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simplify the calculation, let’s denote that      
 
   
 
   
  
 and     
   
   
 
   
  
. Substitute 
these values into Eq. (5.26) and Eq. (5.29). One gets: 
  
                  
 
   
                                        (5.30)                                           
 
and, 
 
                 
 
   
                                          (5.31) 
           
Considering Eq. (5.30) and Eq. (5.31), in order to prove that country j’s welfare is larger 
when she obtains the RTA-membership status, one has to show that: 
 
                                  (5.32)    
          
To do so, one simply sets:  
 
                                                                  (5.33)  
        
Rearranging, that is: 
                       
                                  (5.34)   
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As    because of the assumption that it requires at least 2 countries to establish the 
RTA in this setting, this accordingly implies that       is positive. In addition, as 
 
 
   
 
   
  
    
   
   
 
   
  
  thus    , referring that the second term       is also 
positive.  
 
Undoubtedly, it is proven that                             as Eq. (5.32) 
suggests. Applying this proof to the welfare functions previously derived in Eq. (5.30) 
and Eq. (5.31), the result indicates that:                    .    QED 
 
Thus, in comparison to the case where the representative country trades from outside the 
zone, her welfare is definitely larger when she has RTA-membership status. Ceteris 
paribus, as far as both symmetric-country and symmetric-tariff assumptions apply, it 
can thus be implied that the welfare level of the RTA-membership country is higher 
than the non-RTA one in this application.     
       
5.3.2 An extension of the model: asymmetric tariffs 
 
The model above is simple yet informative enough to shed light on the basic structural 
effects of the RTA on the rest of the world. Even though it is built upon a symmetric 
assumption of countries’ size and tariff level, it seems that a tariff-free trade zone 
matters much more for the profits and welfare levels of relevant trading countries. In 
summary, it appears that there are always positive incentives for those nations who are 
left behind to join the existing bloc in order to avoid loss due to the existing integration. 
This result can plausibly be regarded as one of reasons to explain why new RTAs are 
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prevalent and more than a few RTAs across the globe have kept on expanding their 
memberships further. This is indeed similar to what Baldwin (1995)’s ‘domino theory of 
regionalism’ has suggested. Given that the RTA is formed, if outside countries perceive 
that joining this RTA is more beneficial than staying still, ceteris paribus, they should 
participate in this bloc as long as it is opened. Even though they cannot be certain about 
how much better off they would be, by being a part of the bloc, this more or less 
guarantees that they will not incur further losses from tariff discrimination. In this 
scenario, the potential member does not need to consider what will be occurred if other 
countries join the bloc. The analysis in this chapter only aims to explain what could 
have happened to profits and the welfare level if that particular country herself decides 
to take part in the existing RTA versus the case that she does nothing. It is true that in 
reality these outside countries may not necessarily join the existing blocs but form their 
own ones. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. To simplify the discussion, 
countries’ decisions are limited to the question of whether they should join the existing 
RTAs or not, given that the supply of RTA-membership is unconstrained.  
 
Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that, according to article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it is stipulated that countries that join a 
preferential tariff reducing agreement must not raise tariffs (or common external tariffs, 
if any) afterward. In the case of the Free Trade Area (FTA), membership countries 
eliminate tariffs among themselves yet are allowed to keep their initial tariffs against the 
rest of the world individually. A similar concept is applied to the Custom Union (CU) 
setting, but membership countries can adopt a common external tariff against the rest of 
the world in this case. Even so, the CU must not impose a common external tariff higher 
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than the members’ average pre-CU level. Considering this piece of information, the 
theoretical analysis provided thus far reasonably explains why article XXIV is 
essentially required to govern RTAs in general. At least in the symmetric (tariffs and 
countries’ size) setting demonstrated earlier, it is unambiguously detected that any gains 
from trade in the form of  profits and welfare levels that RTA-membership countries 
have enjoyed appear to be literally paid for by non-members’ losses13. RTA-
memberships certainly improve the terms of trade of participating countries, but 
deteriorate those in the rest of the world as long as the tariff rates of the zone toward the 
rest of the world remain constant. In addition, it can be said that the GATT’s provisions 
which generally prohibit an increase in external tariffs post-RTA, are not sufficient to 
thwart terms of trade effects that are generated by the RTA.  Not only is trade diversion 
confirmed to exist but the welfare effects that non-RTA countries experience have also 
been proved to be negative. Even though symmetric country size and identical tariff 
rates are rather strong assumptions, the unchanging external tariffs towards outside 
countries are, at least, realistic.  
 
Before discussing the extension of the model, recall that in the fundamental setting, 
every country has imposed symmetric tariffs: the import tariffs equal to t are assumed: ti 
= t ∀i, i = 1,…,N. Because of this rigid assumption, it drives tariff revenue that the 
country receives from imports to be equal to the tariffs that the country has to pay to the 
rest of the world in order to get products exported. This affects the country’s income (Y) 
because in finding the total earnings as stated in Eq. (5.23), these 2 effects from tariffs 
simply cancel out. The income of a representative country is, as a result, left to depend 
                                                          
13
 This plausibly explains the situation that a reduction of tariff rates toward the rest of the world was 
proposed after an economic integration is formed. See, for instance, Bhagwati (1993). 
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on factor payments (L) and profits from trading      only. Even though income (Y) is a 
part of the country’s social welfare      
      , by applying this symmetric tariff 
assumption, the effects from tariffs are deemed to be obscured in this case. One of the 
more realistic conjectures would be to relax such an assumption. Indeed, cases whereby 
tariff rates are different across countries and there is a disparity between a country’s 
tariff revenue and the amount of tariffs paid to get products exported are more often 
than not prominent.  
 
Following previous assumptions that there are N countries in this trading world having 
M countries engaged in the RTA that is exogenously formed, this section aims to 
elaborate the model further by making it more general than the initial setting. The paper 
does so by assuming that, in this situation, there are 2 countries: country a and country 
b, where their import tariffs imposed are different from the rest of the world. Basically, 
while assuming that the rest of the world’s countries impose import tariffs equal to tw 
individually, there are 2 specific countries: country a and country b that do impose 
import tariffs individually at ta and tb respectively. In addition, it is worth specifying 
further that ta > tb in order to simplify the calculation. To be precise, this study imposes 
the tariff rates of country a and country b this way as to distinguish the terms of trade 
effects which occur to the high-tariff country and the low-tariff country in differing 
circumstances. Figure.5.1 illustrates this fundamental situation below. 
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 Figure 5.1: The Framework Illustrates the Scenario in which All Countries Trade Post-RTA  
   
With such alterations, this study is able to draw a step closer to reality in explaining 
how countries with different tariff rates would be affected if they participated in the 
existing RTA. In order to provide a clear examination covering the necessary 
discussions, the analysis starts off criticizing this general asymmetric tariff setting. This 
part is, in fact, similar to an examination conducted earlier in the symmetric tariff 
context as the study once again aims to prove whether the RTA is beneficial to its 
participating countries. By doing so, the study also aims to compare the results of this 
general asymmetric tariff model to the symmetric tariff one directly.  
 
Even though it is suggested in Figure 5.1 that there are now 3 asymmetric tariff rates in 
this trading world, the study chooses to examine country a as an example here. This 
study perceives it is possible to do so since the calculation procedures are the same even 
     RTA 
i : tw 
 i : tw 
 
b : tb 
 
a : ta 
 
i : tw 
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if one considers other representative countries in this case. Hence, when this 
representative country: country a, decides to join the existing RTA, trade relationships 
can be drawn as Figure 5.2 illustrates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
    Figure 5.2: The Framework Illustrates the Scenario in which Country a Joins the Existing RTA
14
 
 
As far as economic effects are considered as a key influence driving a country’s 
decision to join an existing RTA, a representative country : country a’s profits and 
welfare effects if joining into the particular RTA are then compared to her profits and 
welfare effects when she continues to trade without any RTA-membership. Details are 
elaborated below:  
  
 
                                                          
14
 The red arrows represent country a’s trade relationships while the black arrows represent trade 
relationships of other trading countries. 
     RTA 
 
i : tw 
 
i : tw 
 
b : tb 
 
i : tw 
 
a : ta 
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Gains from trade/RTA 
Profits 
 
Country a’s profit function is written in a similar vein to Eq. (5.12). When country a is 
an RTA member, the profit function can be written as: 
 
              
            
 
                  
 
             
 
                  (A.1) 
          
As the market price remains the same as previously derived in Eq. (5.6), substituting 
this value into the above equation, country a’s profit function when she is one of the 
RTA members is derived as: 
 
             
         
     
 
         
          
 
             
 
             
    
                          
    
        
            
 
                    
 
           (A.2)          
         
Considering Eq. (A.2), it is important to state that                 . That is because 
when                . 
 
Given the profit function above, in order to find country a’s optimal set of exports, one 
has to maximize over the choice of    : obtaining the first order condition. By doing so, 
country a’s optimal set of exports to another trader within the bloc equal: 
 
                       
 
   
 
 
                                                                                      (A.3) 
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And, country a’s optimal set of exports to a non-RTA trader is: 
 
       
     
   
  
 
                                      (A.4)       
 
Substituting amounts of output derived in Eq. (A.3) and Eq. (A.4) back into the profit 
function given in Eq. (A.2), country a’s profits when she is one of RTA members is: 
 
             
       
 
   
 
 
       
 
   
     
     
   
 
 
   
      
     
   
        
     
   
 
 
           
                              
 
   
 
 
      
     
   
 
 
   
     
 
                   (A.5) 
        
and, the above equation can be simplified as:  
 
               
 
   
 
    
 
     
 
   
       
     
   
 
      
 
    
     
   
                     
 
               
 
   
 
    
 
    
  
   
      
     
   
 
      
 
   
        
   
                 (A.5.1) 
       
Rearrange the above equation. One finally gets: 
 
              
          
 
   
 
   
           
     
   
 
      
   
                 (A.5.2) 
       
On the other hand, when country a does not join the RTA, her trade relationships are 
basically illustrated by Figure. 5.1, having the profit function written as: 
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          (A.6) 
        
Again, substitute the market price derived in Eq. (6) into the above equation. Country 
a’s profit function becomes: 
 
             
           
            
                 
 
     
 
         
                            
         
            
 
       
 
             
 
                  (A.7) 
           
From Eq. (A.7), with regard to tariffs, one has to note that                 . That is 
because as when                  . 
 
Taking Eq. (A.7) into consideration, the first-order condition is thus conducted in order 
to find the country’s profit maximizing outputs. As a result, the profit maximizing 
outputs that country a sells to the domestic market are derived as: 
 
                   
 
   
 
 
           (A.8)                      
 
whereas the amount that she exports into each foreign market, regardless of whether it is 
the RTA member is: 
 
                 
     
   
  
 
           (A.9)        
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As Eq. (A.9) suggests, it can be seen that when country a trades without having RTA-
membership status, her profit maximizing outputs exported to RTA-membership traders 
and non-RTA ones are directly determined by the import tariffs that each country 
imposes individually.   
 
Next, substituting the optimal sets of exports as derived in Eq. (A.8) and Eq. (A.9) back 
into Eq. (A.7). Country a’s profits become: 
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Rearrange the above equation. One gets: 
 
               
 
   
  
 
      
 
   
        
     
   
 
 
            
     
   
                                        
 
             
 
   
  
 
   
  
   
    
        
   
 
   
                            (A.10.1)          
         
Rearranging the above equation gets:  
 
              
          
 
   
 
   
     
     
   
 
   
                             (A.10.2)
      
Next, profits of a representative country: country a, when she is one of RTA members 
versus when she is not in the RTA, are compared. Following procedures conducted in 
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the symmetric tariff case, in order to prove whether   
      
      , one compares 
Eq. (A.5.2) and Eq. (A.10.2) finding that    
      
         or not. After doing 
algebra, this can be observed as: 
 
              
      
              
 
   
 
   
    
     
   
 
   
  
                       (A.11)
         
From the above equation, as it requires at least 2 countries to negotiate the RTA, this 
implies that    . The term       is, thus, positive. In addition, it is evident that  
 
 
   
 
   
    
     
   
 
   
   therefore Eq. (A.11) is confirmed as a positive term. As it is so, 
one is able to state that  
       
      . This implies that in comparison to the case 
whereby the country trades without RTA-membership status, ceteris paribus, the RTA-
membership country’s profits are proved to be larger in this asymmetric tariff situation.
                                QED 
                  
Welfare effects  
 
In a similar vein, when a representative country, country a, decides to join the existing 
RTA, her welfare is expected to alter. The following section therefore compares and 
contrasts welfare effects when a country decides to join the existing RTA, with the case 
that she continues to stay outside the zone.   
 
In order to derive the social welfare function in the form of Eq. (5.22.1), one first needs 
to find country a’s national income:   
   . In this case, it is: 
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                                           (A.12) 
 
Substitute the value of national income:   
   , as derived in Eq. (A.12) back into the 
social welfare function in Eq. (5.22.1). Country a’s welfare function when she is in the 
RTA is: 
 
  
       
         
      
 
   
   
        
        
    
     
 
    
 
           
 
           
                                                            
 
     
 
    
 
                         
 
   
 
      
      
 
   
 
        
         
    
          
 
         
                                        
 
     
 
            
 
                            (A.13)                 
    
Again, considering Eq. (A.13), one has to take note that                  and when 
                  
    
Next, substitute optimal sets of consumptions as well as exports as previously derived in 
Eq. (A.3) and Eq. (A.4) into the above equation. One gets: 
 
  
            
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
    
 
   
  
     
   
 
 
   
     
   
 
          
                            
     
   
 
 
   
     
   
              
     
   
 
      
 
      
 
   
 
 
       
244 
 
                            
     
   
 
 
       
 
     
 
      
     
   
 
 
                    (A.14)                 
         
Rearranging the above equation, country a’s welfare can be derived as: 
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In order to find country a’s welfare if she decides to trade from outside the bloc, by the 
same token, one has to have derived country a’s national income first. In this situation, 
  
       is defined as: 
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Substitute the value of   
       into the social welfare function as stated in Eq. (5.22.1). 
If country a chooses to trade without RTA-membership status, her welfare is of this 
form: 
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Next, substitute optimal sets of consumptions and exports as formerly derived in Eq. 
(A.8) and Eq. (A.9) into the social welfare equation above. Country a’s welfare can be 
written in the form of consumption levels as: 
 
  
             
 
   
  
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
        
     
   
 
 
   
     
   
   
                                 
     
   
 
 
   
     
   
      
 
       
 
        
     
   
 
 
     
 
   
 
 
   
                      
     
   
         
 
  
       
     
   
 
 
                            (A.17)              
     
Rearranging the above equation gets: 
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Next, compare Eq. (A.14.1) and Eq. (A.17.1) in order to find whether    
    
  
       . In order to do so, let’s first denote     
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       and     
     
   
         in order to facilitate the calculation.  
 
Accordingly, equation (A.14.1) can thus be simplified as:  
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Eq. (A.17.1) is likewise simplified as: 
    
  
        
 
   
 
 
         
     
   
 
 
                 
     
   
 
 
                    (A.19)         
 
Comparing Eq. (A.18) and Eq. (A.19), since labour forces in both countries: L, are 
equal by the assumption, one only requires to observe the remaining terms. Let’s start 
comparing between   
 
   
 
 
          and  
 
   
 
 
     . One simply conducts: 
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Considering Eq. (A.20), as it needs at least 2 countries to form the RTA, this implies 
that     .  The term       is as a result positive. In addition, the term    
  
 
   
  
 
   
      is confirmed to be positive therefore this further implies that 
  
 
   
 
 
           
 
   
 
 
     . 
 
Next, consider another remaining term finding if,  
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One of ways to prove the above condition is to conduct whether:  
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By doing so, one gets: 
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Considering Eq. (A.21), as     , the term       is confirmed as a negative term. 
As     
     
   
  
 
   
        is proven to be positive therefore this term:   
 
 
     
   
 
 
 
       has become negative. This implies that    
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Lastly, one has to consider whether   
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the same manner, this is to prove that    
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By doing so, one gets: 
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From Eq. (A.22), as    , the term        is confirmed to be negative. The   term 
which is denoted as    
     
   
          is as well confirmed to be positive thus the 
term:  
 
 
     
   
 
 
 
       is in conclusion a negative term. This therefore implies that 
  
     
   
 
 
               
     
   
 
 
         .   
 
In this case, it is ambiguous to confirm that   
        
       ,vice versa. Certainly, 
the size of the RTA as represented by M as well as tariff asymmetries of the home 
country and her trading partners have influenced the result such that it is inconclusive. 
In contrast to the findings in the symmetric tariff assumption setting, it is not 
straightforward to conclude that a country would have larger welfare gains with RTA-
membership status than when she trades without such membership. By relaxing the 
symmetric tariff assumption, the country needs more information in order to conclude 
that joining the existing RTA is definitely beneficial. From results obtained above, it is 
evident that even though this scenario suggests that the RTA member would still benefit 
more in terms of profits (as she could export to and consume more outputs from other 
RTA-membership countries), she would at the same time lose a certain amount of tariff 
revenue that could be obtained if she continued to trade from outside the zone. From the 
profit function stated, this is so simply because trading within the RTA is tariff-free. On 
the other hand, although being a non-RTA trader would bring in inferior profits to the 
country, ceteris paribus, her tariff revenue would still be larger than a case where she 
trades with RTA-membership status. As can be seen, these 2 effects from tariffs work in 
opposite directions; the conclusion on the terms of trade effects or welfare effects is 
inconclusive in this case.         QED 
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 As the model suggests, more information on the size of the RTA, exporting 
destinations’ tariffs as well as the numbers of countries are required in order to figure 
out the definite outcome on the welfare effects in this scenario. This therefore suggests a 
need for the empirical analysis in which, besides fundamental data on the bloc’s size 
and market price of products, tariff data in each product category is required if one is 
interested in determining the whole economy’s impacts from joining or not joining this 
particular RTA. However, this can be difficult to implement in reality as requirement on 
data is high. In addition, each country has classified their products differently plus each 
may not even produce or trade the same product categories at all, thus, to consider the 
whole economy’s gains and losses from trade, is definitely not an easy task. In this 
scenario, a researcher may study the gains and losses from trade via a product-by-
product approach or within specific product categories as this would less data in 
general.        
 
As far as theoretical explanations are concerned here, in the following section, this 
study divides this asymmetric tariff case further into 3 sub-sections. First of all, the 
study plans to scrutinize further whether a higher import tariff country, in comparison to 
a lower import tariff one, would incur higher gains (or losses) from becoming part of 
the existing RTA. Likewise, these countries’ profits as well as welfare levels are 
compared pre- and post-RTA in order to derive the answer. On top of that, the study 
takes a closer look at the case in which these countries are asked to conform to a single 
common tariff rate, (i.e. the rate which is equal to the rest of the world’s tariffs) instead 
of imposing exclusive rates of import tariffs individually, after the RTA-membership 
status is obtained. The study lastly investigates whether it is better for a RTA-
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membership country to conform to the common tariff approach or if it is better for her 
to continue to impose her own tariffs separately. For these reasons, profits as well as 
welfare levels of countries where common import tariffs are strictly imposed have to be 
measured up against the case in which countries are free to keep import tariffs at the 
pre-RTA levels independently. Details of the discussion are narrated in the sequence 
below.  
 
5.3.2 (A) In this case, in order to find out whether a higher-tariff country would benefit 
more from engaging in the RTA than a lower-tariff one, profits and welfare levels of 
representative countries: country a and country b , have to be compared and contrasted. 
Recall that in this setting, the only differences between these 2 representative countries: 
country a and country b are the rates of import tariffs they impose. Even so, this change 
does not affect the fundamental setting of the model as long as the rest of the world’s 
tariffs are kept unaltered post-RTA period. The situation is illustrated below. 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
      
     Figure 5.3: The Framework Illustrates the     
     Scenario in which Country a Joins the  
     Existing RTA 
       Figure 5.4: The Framework Illustrates the    
       Scenario in which Country b Joins the  
       Existing RTA 
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Gains from trade/RTA 
Profits 
 
If country a decides to join the existing RTA, her profits can be derived as: 
 
             
            
 
                  
 
             
 
                 (A.23)        
              
Repeating the procedures previously conducted in Section 5.3.2 [Eq. (A.2) to Eq. 
(A.7)], country a’s profits when she is a member of the RTA have been derived in Eq. 
(A.8). It is in this form:  
 
             
          
 
   
 
   
           
     
   
 
      
   
                  (A.24) 
          
Considering the above equation, one needs to keep in mind that                  as 
when               . 
 
Subsequently, country b’s profits are to be observed accordingly. If country b decides to 
join the existing RTA, her profits can be written as: 
  
             
            
 
                  
 
             
 
                    (A.25) 
                           
As every country is assumed to have identical homothetic preferences of the CES type, 
one is thus able to put the market price derived in Eq. (5.6) into country b’s profit 
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function above. If country b has obtained RTA-membership status, her profit function is 
therefore indicated as: 
 
              
         
     
 
         
          
 
             
 
     
 
                           
    
        
    
              
 
              
 
        (A.26) 
  
Ceteris paribus,                . That is because when              . 
Obtaining the first-order condition, country b’s profit maximizing outputs exported to 
the RTA member are derived accordingly as: 
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And, country b’s profit maximizing outputs exported to each non-RTA partner is: 
 
                 
     
   
  
 
                                                                                              (A.28) 
                     
From sets of profit maximizing outputs above, substitute them back into the profit 
function stated in Eq. (A.26). Country b’s profits when she is one of the RTA members 
are therefore: 
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                                             (A.29)               
               
Considering profits of country a and country b as defined in Eq. (A.24) and Eq. (A.29) 
respectively, it is evident that consumptions within the RTA area are identical in both 
equations. Therefore, the only difference between them is the term;   
     
   
 
      
   
   in 
country a and   
     
   
 
      
   
   in country b.  
 
According to the fundamental assumption that country a has higher import tariffs than 
country b:       , this further implies that           . Thus, considering the terms  
  
     
   
 
      
   
   and   
     
   
 
      
   
  , as  both representative countries trade with 
every country in this setting and the fact that the first term contains      while the 
second term contains     , this therefore makes  
 
 
     
   
 
   
  
   
 
 
     
   
 
   
  
       
 
     .  
 
For these reasons, it can be said that   
     
   
 
      
   
      
     
   
 
      
   
  . One is 
thus able to conclude that, ceteris paribus,   
      
   . The profits of a higher-tariff 
country i.e. country a is larger than the profits of the lower-tariff country i.e. country b 
in this circumstance.                      QED 
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Welfare effects  
 
This section observes what happens to a country’s welfare if the symmetric tariff 
assumption is violated. Recall that country a’s welfare when she is the member of the 
RTA is derived in Eq. (A.13). That is: 
 
  
       
         
     
 
   
 
   
   
      
 
   
 
     
   
         
   
 
     
     
 
     
    
                                                       
 
     
 
            
 
             (A.30)     
 
After substituting optimal sets of consumption and exports into the above equation, 
country a’s welfare is written as previously observed in Eq. (A.14.1) as: 
 
  
           
 
   
 
    
 
     
 
   
  
 
   
       
     
   
 
 
           
 
   
  
     
   
        
                         
     
   
 
 
          
     
   
                                               (A.31)                           
 
Next, one has to find country b’s welfare level when she decides to join the existing 
RTA. In order to do so, one first needs to observe country b’s income which is:  
 
  
             
    
        
    
              
 
            
 
            
 
         
                     (A.32) 
       
Substituting country b’s income into the social welfare function formerly stated in Eq. 
(5.22.1), one gets: 
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Substitute optimal sets of consumption as well as exports as derived in Eq. (A.27) and 
Eq. (A.28) into the above equation. Country b’s welfare when she is in the RTA is: 
 
  
           
 
   
 
    
 
     
 
   
  
 
   
       
     
   
 
 
           
 
   
  
     
   
        
                          
     
   
 
 
          
     
   
                                              (A.34) 
                 
In order to compare welfare levels of both representative countries, Eq. (A.31) and Eq. 
(A.34) are observed accordingly. It can be seen that the first term: 
  
 
   
 
    
 
     
 
   
  
 
   
    , which represents consumption levels among RTA-
membership countries, are identical in both equations. Also, by assumption, these 2 
representative countries have the same size of labour force: L. One, therefore, needs to 
consider the remaining terms in both equations only.  
 
Let’s first denote  
            . For these reasons, in country a, one considers the 
remaining terms:  
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Simplifying the above equation further one gets: 
         
       
 
 
   
  
     
   
     
 
     
   
 
 
 
          
 
      
     
   
 
   
                                         (A.35.1) 
                          
Similar procedures are conducted for country b. Let’s first denote that  
           . 
One therefore observes remaining terms:   
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And, the above equation can be rearranged as: 
 
      
 
 
   
  
     
   
     
 
     
   
 
 
 
          
 
      
     
   
 
   
                                          (A.36.1)            
         
One is able to compare welfare levels in both equations via Eq. (A.35.1) and Eq. 
(A.36.1). According to the assumption given that country a has higher import tariffs 
than country b:        , this can as well be referred as         . Therefore , by 
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considering the first term of both Eq. (A.35.1) and Eq. (A.36.1), ceteris paribus, it can 
be stated that   
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Next, one has to compare whether          
     
   
 
   
             
     
   
 
   
   in order 
to conclude that       . For simplicity, let’s rewrite these terms as  
 
 
     
   
 
    
  
 
       
and  
 
 
     
   
 
    
  
 
      , respectively.  According to the same fundamental assumption 
given that country a has higher import tariffs than country b :       , this indeed 
implies that  
 
 
     
   
 
    
  
 
        
 
 
     
   
 
    
  
 
     . Hence, it is evident to conclude that 
      .  Bringing  
       
   . It is therefore proven that the welfare level in the 
higher-tariff country is higher than that which the lower-tariff country receives in this 
setting.                      QED 
 
5.3.2 (B) As opposed to allowing the representative countries: country a and country b, 
to set import tariffs individually, this section aims to analyze gains from trade as well as 
welfare effects when these countries are required to set common tariffs equal to tw 
which is in fact equal to the tariffs in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the question to 
be answered remains the same: which country benefits more from being a part of the 
RTA in this situation? Before analyzing countries’ profits and welfare outcomes, the 
frameworks below illustrate trade relationships in this scenario. 
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Figure 5.5: The Framework Illustrates the  
Scenario in which Country a is Asked to Set the 
Import Tariffs at tw  
Figure 5.6: The Framework Illustrates the 
Scenario in which Country b is Asked to Set the 
Import Tariffs at tw 
 
As in the previous case, one needs to compare these representative countries’ gains from 
trade, which are written in terms of profits and welfare levels in order to find out who 
benefits more from receiving RTA-membership status. Hence, we shall begin by 
considering countries’ profit functions first.  
 
Gains from trade/RTA 
Profits  
 
Recall that the profit function when country a decides to join the existing RTA is: 
 
             
            
 
                  
 
             
 
                 (A.37)                
         
while country b’s profit function is: 
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                   (A.38)       
           
Considering countries’ profit functions stated above, it is evident that, when these 
countries are asked to set common import tariffs equal to    post-RTA, their profits are 
actually unaffected. Both profit functions remain the same as indicated in Section 5.3.2 
(A). It is certainly so because, as Eq. (A.37) and Eq. (A.38) present, tariffs in all 
destinations where goods are exported still remain the same: unchanged.  
 
It should not be forgotten that the assumption concerning common import tariffs only 
applies to goods entering the RTA area. Thus, when countries’ profits, which are 
derived from trading in both domestic and foreign markets, are considered, import 
tariffs do not play a role here. For these reasons, as country a and country b export to all 
trading partners in the world in this setting, other things being equal, country a would 
gain larger benefits from joining the existing RTA when compared to country b. 
However, this outcome is observed under the condition that each obtains RTA-
membership status independently. This is because country a would still be able to 
export more in total given that country b’s tariffs have been lower than country a’s since 
the pre-RTA period. This section simply compares the outcomes of Figure 5.5 and 
Figure 5.6 in this regard. In conclusion, the results are unaltered as the high-import tariff 
country’s profits are larger than what the low-import tariff country obtains: 
 
       
       
        QED 
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Welfare effects  
 
Next, these 2 representative countries’ welfare levels are to be observed. As derived 
previously in Eq. (A.13), country a’s welfare function when she joins the RTA is:   
 
  
       
         
   
  
 
   
 
   
   
      
 
   
 
     
   
         
   
 
     
     
 
     
    
                                        
 
     
 
            
 
                            (A.39) 
    
The above equation can be written in terms of consumption level, that is:  
 
      
              
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
    
 
   
 
       
     
   
 
 
  
  
     
   
   
                                 
     
   
 
 
   
     
   
              
     
   
 
      
 
      
 
   
 
 
       
                                 
     
   
 
 
       
 
     
 
      
     
   
 
 
                        (A.40)    
        
In this case, country a is asked to impose import tariffs equal to the rest of the world. 
This implies that other countries’ exports to country a are now responsible to pay for the 
tariff at the rate equal to         . Thus, the above welfare function can be rewritten 
as: 
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Next, country b’s welfare has to be considered. Let’s recall   
     from Eq. (A.33). 
That is: 
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Rewriting the above equation in terms of consumption level gets: 
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As country b is as well asked to impose import tariffs equal to the rest of the world’s 
tariffs, this further implies that         . The above welfare function is thus rewritten 
again as: 
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                                  (A.44) 
               
In order to find whether   
       
   , one can simply compare Eq. (A.41) and Eq. 
(A.44). As it is evident that consumption levels in the RTA area are identical for both 
cases, theirs import tariffs are equal at tw and theirs labour forces: L, are also equivalent, 
these 2 equations can thus be reduced to: 
 
For country a, one can observe:   
 
   
      
     
   
 
      
   
         
     
   
 
      
 
      
     
   
 
 
         
 
               
 
 
     
   
 
      
  
     
     
   
 
      
 
  
                                                    (A.45)                
   
And, for country b, it is:  
 
  
      
     
   
 
      
   
         
     
   
 
      
 
      
     
   
 
 
          
            
 
 
     
   
 
      
  
     
     
   
 
      
 
  
                                                       (A.46)         
    
By comparing Eq. (A.45) and Eq. (A.46), one is able to prove whether  
       
   . 
In order to do so, let us consider the first term in both equations. Because of the 
263 
 
fundamental assumption given that country a has higher import tariffs than country b:  
      , this further implies that           bringing  
 
 
     
   
 
      
  
     
 
 
     
   
 
      
  
  in 
conclusion.  
 
Next, one needs to compare remaining terms finding whether    
     
   
 
      
 
       
      
     
   
 
      
 
         . It is evident that the term:   
     
   
 
      
 
       
   contains     while    
     
   
 
      
 
          involves    .  As far as the same 
assumption in which country a has higher import tariffs than country b:         
applies, this clearly suggests that   
     
   
 
      
 
              
     
   
 
      
 
       
   in this application. Considering above relationships, this as a result indicates 
         
   . As this is so, it can be stated further to conclude that   
       
    
in this case. When the common import tariffs are set, for example, to be equal to those 
in the rest of the world, countries that initially have higher import tariffs would still 
benefit more from participating in the RTA than ones that impose lower import tariffs, 
ceteris paribus. This section has proven that this is true in terms of profits as well as the 
welfare levels
15
 of relevant countries.                                                              QED 
                                                  
5.3.2(C) Given that the preceding section has addressed gains from trade and welfare 
effects when representative countries are asked to conform to the rest of the world’s 
tariffs, the last question that this chapter aims to clarify is whether it is better for the 
                                                          
15
 According to trading relationships stated thus far, it can be seen that, other things being equal, the 
higher-import tariff country pays smaller amounts of tariffs to the rest of the world in comparison to the 
lower-import tariff country when trade is conducted. 
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representative countries: country a and country b, to do so. Or, it is yet better for them 
to continue imposing individual tariff rates:  ta and tb, independently post-RTA.  
 
Gains from trade/RTA 
Profits 
 
Let’s start by comparing the profits of both representative countries. Once again, recall 
that the profit function when country a decides to join the existing RTA is: 
 
              
            
 
                  
 
             
 
                 (A.47) 
                  
and, country b’s profit function is: 
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Considering these 2 representative countries’ profit functions separately, it is evident 
that each country’s profits would remain unaltered, though there are changes in the 
import tariffs imposed within each country. Basically, as long as one keeps all the 
previous assumptions: that every country trades in this scenario, and import tariffs 
imposed by the rest of the world are unchanged, these representative countries would 
have to pay the same amount of tariffs in order to get their products exported. As 
previously observed in sections 5.3.2 (A) and 5.3.2 (B), the profits of country a and 
country b are not affected by this assumption. Thus, in each country, there is no 
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alteration in the gains from trade in terms of profits even if a country changes its import 
tariffs post-RTA.                                                QED 
                                     
Welfare effects  
 
Even though each country’s profits are unaffected post-RTA, one needs to consider 
welfare levels. To avoid repetitions, the study chooses to focuses on country a as an 
example. Recall that country a’s welfare function as previously derived in Eq. (A.13) is:  
 
  
       
         
   
  
 
   
 
   
   
      
 
   
 
     
   
         
   
 
     
     
 
     
    
                                                      
 
     
 
            
 
              (A.49) 
        
When country a is assumed to impose import tariffs equal to   , her welfare function 
can thus be written in the form of consumption levels as: 
 
  
          
 
   
  
 
   
 
   
     
 
   
 
     
 
    
     
   
 
   
      
     
   
 
       
   
    
                              
     
   
 
      
 
      
 
   
 
    
 
      
     
   
 
      
 
    
       
 
      
     
   
 
 
                                  (A.50) 
             
Similarly, when country a is assumed to impose import tariffs at tw, her welfare is 
written in terms of consumption levels as: 
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                                                 (A.51) 
 
One needs to compare Eq. (A.50) and Eq. (A.51) in order to find which case produces 
larger welfare effects for country a. As consumption levels within the RTA area are 
identical in both equations, one can observe the remaining terms which are stated 
below. 
 
Considering the circumstance in which import tariffs equal to    are imposed, the 
remaining terms are:  
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Rewriting the above equation gets: 
 
            
     
 
 
   
  
     
   
     
 
     
   
 
 
 
                         (A.53) 
while, if country a imposes import tariffs equal to   . One considers the remaining 
terms which are: 
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The above equation can thus be rewritten as: 
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In order to find which case is the larger between   
  and    ,one has to compare Eq. 
(A.53) and Eq. (A.55). In order to conclude, one has to know the value of     and     . 
That is because if          , it suggests that    
      . However, in practice, this 
condition may not be easily observed.  
 
In order to answer whether the country should choose to impose import tariffs 
individually or to conform to the rest of the world’s tariff rate after becoming an RTA 
member, the country actually needs to find out what type of RTA she is going to 
participate in first. That is because the key point here is that, in reality, forms of RTA 
are moderated by Article XXIV of the WTO. In this study, 2 famous forms of RTA: 1) 
the Free Trade Area (FTA) and 2) the Custom Union (CU) are selectively analysed as 
an example. In addition, given exporting destinations’ tariffs, the country has to 
consider her import tariffs at the pre-RTA period too whether it is lower or higher by 
the world’s tariffs and by how much. That is because by knowing the type of RTA and 
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her import tariffs pre-RTA, the country could use this information to estimate any gains 
versus losses that could occur to her terms of trade before making a decision whether to 
join any particular form of RTA.    
 
According to Article XXIV, if the RTA is actually in the FTA format, the country is not 
allowed to raise their post-FTA tariffs to a level higher than the pre-FTA situation. If 
the CU is, however, being considered, after the country has become a part of the bloc, 
membership countries are not allowed to raise tariffs to a level higher than members’ 
average pre-CU level. Applying these restrictions to the basic settings of the model 
above, this simply means that, if the FTA is considered and initially          , country 
a is able to raise post-FTA’s tariff as high as the    level. If this is the case, country a’s 
welfare, when she continues to impose import tariffs at    post-FTA, would definitely 
be higher than the case where she decides to conform to the common tariff rate at   . 
As it is evidently suggested, undoubtedly, country a will be better off if imposing her 
own import tariffs individually in this circumstance. On the other hand, if initially    
    , in principle, the country could be better off by conforming to the rest of world’s 
tariffs at     after participating in the RTA. Nevertheless, this is not possible in reality 
because of the restriction stated in Article XXIV which says that the country is not 
allowed to raise post-FTA’s tariffs to a point higher than the pre-FTA level. As country 
a’s post-RTA tariffs cannot be increased above the current stage, which is    , she will 
not benefit as much as the case in which she had higher tariff rates than the rest of the 
world to begin with.  
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This notion can be employed to discuss a country’s welfare effects under the CU setting 
in the same way. Article XXIV prevents membership countries from increasing a 
common tariff rate to point higher than the members’ average pre-CU level, thus if the 
representative country has very low import tariffs at the outset i.e.         , the 
country is able to increase post-CU tariffs as high as     in this case. Contrary to the 
FTA setting, in this circumstance, the country would be better off conforming to the 
common tariff rate after joining the CU, compared to imposing individual tariffs. 
Nevertheless, if the country has high import tariffs to begin with, i.e.         , the 
country could not increase post-CU tariffs to be higher than     as long as Article XXIV 
applies. In fact, the country has to reduce tariffs in order to conform to the average CU-
members’ tariffs at    . The country has to lose tariff revenue in this regard if it aims to 
be a part of this CU. Thus, in the case that a country has high import tariffs initially, it 
might be better if she engages in a form of FTA as initial tariffs could still be imposed. 
As is evident, the impact on a country’s welfare is dependent on the differing 
liberalization requirements between FTA and CU settings. 
 
5.4 Conclusion and policy implications  
 
This chapter has attempted to provide a theoretical note explaining the incidence of 
bloc-membership expansion. Having the political economy framework: ‘domino theory 
of regionalism’ of Baldwin (1995), as an inspiration, this paper however addresses the 
pure economic perspective, focussing on non-members’ decisions towards bloc-
membership. Given a positive model of the RTA, economic effects are compared if a 
potential member succeeds in becoming a part of the bloc versus the case that she 
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continues to trade from outside the liberalized zone. These effects are described in the 
form of gains/ losses from trade as well as changes in welfare levels that this particular 
country foresees receiving in such cases. In order to explain this issue, the chapter 
develops the basic model assuming countries’ size and import tariffs are symmetric. In 
conclusion, the findings suggest that, ceteris paribus, a country’s gains from trade and 
welfare effects are superior when they have bloc-membership status, in comparison to 
the case where they trades without it. This implies that, even without any political 
motives i.e. to maximize key supporting groups in order to get votes in return, the pure 
economic reasons developed within this context also provide similar outcomes to 
Baldwin(1995)’s ‘domino theory of regionalism’ which states that a country should join 
the existing RTA as long as it is possible to do so. This theoretical explanation, though 
uncomplicated, does provide the essential mechanisms of a country’s economic 
incentives towards RTA-membership. If the country foresees earning more in terms of 
profits and welfare by being a part of the RTA, why should they stay outside? It is not 
reasonable to do so in this context where the world is driven by the economic motives. 
Despite relying on different frameworks, the findings in this symmetric case indeed 
support Baldwin (1995)’s work in the sense that the formation of the RTA does 
generate a positive vibe or the so-called ‘domino effects’ to relevant countries to follow 
into the existing bloc.    
 
When the symmetric tariff assumption is relaxed, the results are, however, not as 
straightforward. While the RTA-membership country’s profits are still proved to be 
larger than the non-RTA trader in the asymmetric tariff setting, their welfare effects are 
ambiguous. Information concerning the bloc’s size as well as the degree of difference in 
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tariffs between countries is essentially required to draw the final conclusion in this 
regard. It is important to note that when a country becomes an RTA trader, though her 
profits are larger than the pre-RTA situation, she would have to lose a certain amount of 
income that would otherwise be obtained since trading within the RTA is tariff-free. By 
the same token, when a country continues to trade from outside the bloc, though her 
profits would be less than what would be obtained if she participated in the RTA, her 
income in the form of tariff revenue would be higher. Without explicit information 
being given, it is thus impossible to state which case should cause a country to have 
larger welfare gains.  
 
The chapter has also compared gains/losses from trade as well as welfare levels of high-
tariff and low-tariff countries in the case where each participates in the RTA versus the 
case where each trades without any RTA-membership. Ceteris paribus, a higher-tariff 
country will definitely have higher profits and welfare levels as compared to a lower-
tariff country if the RTA-membership is attained. This is true in both cases 1) when the 
country is able to keep import tariffs individually post-RTA and 2) when the country is 
asked to conform to the rest of the world’s tariff rates post-RTA. Because of this result, 
the chapter also extends the analysis to evaluate these 2 cases, in particular, aiming to 
find which case is better if a country manages to join the RTA. The result identifies that 
import tariffs do not play a role in altering a country’s profits as long as the rest of the 
world’s tariffs are constant. However, for welfare effects, the tariff rates do play a 
significant role here. The country’s welfare effects are larger when the tariff rate that the 
country has, conforms to the rest of the world:  tw is higher than the individual tariff 
rate, ta. Even so, this outcome may not be reached in reality as Article XXIV prohibits a 
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membership country from increasing tariffs post-RTA to be higher than the pre-RTA 
situation. Nevertheless, the results from this theoretical framework imply that even if 
Article XXIV does not allow RTA-members’ tariffs to increase post-RTA, it is not 
enough to keep non-members from incurring a loss when they engage in international 
trade, especially when others have obtained RTA-membership. The asymmetric tariff 
assumption can thus be regarded as a merit rather than a restriction of the model 
because, to a certain extent, this assumption is not far from reality. The findings in this 
model could also be perceived as an incentive or economic motivation for outside 
countries to join the existing RTA in order to compensate for such loss or to avoid 
encountering it. In spite of some rigidity in the model, this theoretical framework 
facilitates the understanding of the effects of RTAs on relevant outside countries or their 
potential members. The paper believes that this type of analysis is needed and can be 
applied further to measure the realistic motivation for a nation to decide whether to 
participate in any existing blocs.  
 
In conclusion, despite limited information, countries should always estimate potential 
economic outcomes before joining any form of RTA if the aim is to maximize the 
country’s profits and welfare gains. In practice, this can be done by constructing 
empirical studies and finding averaged forecasts on trade effects from the RTA, given 
all other relevant trading partners’ information. Otherwise, there is no guarantee 
whether joining the bloc will be as beneficial as expected theoretically. In reality, not 
only countries’ sizes and their tariffs are asymmetric but also other specific issues such 
as non-tariff barriers which are tough to impose any specific value. Thus, on top of 
having RTA-membership or not, countries are required to consider other dominant 
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factors which potentially alter gains from trade at the same time. Last but not least, the 
country should know its relative position in terms of tariff levels: whether its tariffs are 
lower or higher than the rest of the world’s averaged tariffs and if possible, by how 
much. This information could assist the country in choosing the most appropriate form 
of RTA in the sense that trade benefits from RTA are maximized.  
 
 
6: Concluding Remarks  
 
This thesis basically covers 3 major studies. The first has evaluated the trade effects of 
ASEAN’s Free Trade Area, the so-called AFTA, which has been existence since 1992. 
The renowned ‘Gravity Model’ is selected as an empirical tool in this fashion. As the 
independent effects of AFTA are the focus, the thesis includes only AFTA members in 
the empirical examination. In contrast to numerous gravitational studies which are 
usually employed in the cross-section setting, the fixed effects panel data model is 
constructed here; the thesis perceives it is able to correct for numerous estimating biases 
commonly observed in traditional cross-sectional research. The thesis has also specified 
the ‘time-effects’ in the estimating gravity equation. That is because, considering the 
period of study, from 1970-2007, this long time span should be controlled for; otherwise 
any special events which occurred could affect trade flows within the region and bring 
about bias on the ‘AFTA-effects’ estimated. The thesis is, in addition, very careful to 
specify AFTA-membership dummies. As AFTA is unique in the sense that it was 
gradually expanded, the ‘dynamic regional dummies’ has thus been implemented to 
capture any ‘AFTA-effects’ that could happen to each member at a particular time. In 
brief, the new empirical work outlined in Chapter 3, in general, suggests that the correct 
specification of the estimating ‘Gravity Model’ does matter estimated results. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to numerous RTAs that have been found to benefit members, 
the empirical investigation in this application shows that AFTA has not done so as 
negative and significant effects on the AFTA dummy variables are observed. Part of the 
reason for this negative finding is the rigorous statistical test that has been applied to 
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choose the correct estimating gravity framework. In the past, this was assessed, at best, 
using intuitive notion or relying on the point estimates from cross-sections.   
 
With the focus on policies, such unsatisfactory findings on the ‘AFTA-effects’ therefore 
suggest that member countries perhaps need to improve if not to reform their 
international trade strategies. In fact, this piece of empirical evidence reminds us that 
there are benefits as well as costs associated with being AFTA and the latter have been 
shown to outweigh the former in this application. While the benefits from being 
RTA(s)-members are largely covered, the costs associated with trade and investment 
liberalization are not usually spelled out in any research. This can consequently be 
considered as an area for future research. In reality, these costs can refer to any social 
issues and adjustment problems which occur during the integration processes. For the 
case of ASEAN countries, the similarity of products produced, different levels of 
economic development and priorities among member countries have been key factors 
behind this substandard progress of AFTA. In addition, the enlargement of 
ASEAN/AFTA with the entry of CLMV countries makes it more difficult to arrive at 
agreements that will bring mutual benefits to everyone as economic conditions and 
political orientation within this group of countries are very different from those of early 
AFTA members. This further suggests that AFTA countries indeed require other 
alternatives, if increasing intra-ASEAN trade is one of the key objectives. Apart from 
using tariff liberalization to boost trade within the region directly, countries need to look 
beyond the ASEAN’s territory as outside markets are certainly larger than their own. By 
enjoying tariff preferences initiated by AFTA, member countries are able to develop 
into cost-effective producers more easily than previously. With approximately 500 
276 
 
million people, ASEAN is indeed a good source of labour. This factor plus the fact that 
the region has abundant natural resources, means they can straightforwardly 
complement the world’s demand, especially in manufacturing and agricultural products. 
However, ASEAN countries should put their dependence on extra-ASEAN trade 
regionally instead of individually if maximizing the potential economic benefits from 
AFTA is the ultimate objective. For this reason, commitments in strengthening regional 
economic cooperation need to be turned into action urgently.   
 
This point therefore brings us to the second empirical study which investigates trade 
effects of AFTA on both intra-region and extra-region trade flows. In this instance, the 
‘Gravity Model’ is, once again, employed as an empirical tool. As the thesis perceives 
that the choice of countries included in the gravity estimation is another influential 
factor shaping the ‘AFTA-effects’, instead of including many countries and various 
RTAs into the gravity estimation, only key external traders are selected. Hence, in 
addition to 10 ASEAN members, the thesis chooses another 10 external traders, the top 
10 in terms of trade volume, which have been trading consistently with ASEAN since 
1970, to be included in the estimating gravity equation. It is interesting to observe that 
AFTA has been relying on the same group of trading destinations for a long period of 
time. Other empirical issues are, in addition, controlled for in the same fashion as in the 
first empirical study. With the focus on ‘AFTA-effects’ estimated, this study, in contrast 
to the first empirical chapter, finds the positive effects on AFTA dummy variables. This 
result implies that AFTA still stands a chance to benefit its members if they keep their 
dependence on external trade ties. In this application, ASEAN countries can utilize 
AFTA as a production base in order to produce products supplying the world’s demands 
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at competitive prices. However, in this instance, the value of the ‘AFTA-effects’ 
estimated are still minimal which can be interpreted as suggesting that AFTA members 
have not actually utilized this form of regional cooperation properly. Any external trade 
ties that membership countries have relied on are aimed at serving individual interests 
rather than regional ones. Even though these major trading partners have been trading 
with the region for almost 4 decades, there have not been substantive changes occurred 
in this time. In addition, the year 1992, which was the time of AFTA’s establishment, 
did not show any great impacts on intra-ASEAN trade flows. 
 
Nonetheless, as AFTA countries continue to share a market-oriented philosophy and 
implement export-oriented trading policies, their economic relations with developed and 
developing countries will continue to be strong. This can facilitate the region in 
acheiving overall economic developments as planned, if the region works harder as a 
group to promote extra-regional trade further. ASEAN members could work via tariff 
preferences within AFTA so as to increase the international competiveness of ASEAN 
industries, making the whole region an integrated investment location. In principle, 
regional economic integration in the form of a free trade area allows member countries 
to keep their respective policies towards the rest of the world. Thus, by abolishing intra-
regional trade barriers, these countries can promote the tariff preferential zone to attract 
local or foreign investors directly. As a result, this action will make AFTA’s 
manufacturing sector more efficient and more competitive internationally. As more 
trade and investments move towards the region, other positive benefits are thus 
expected to follow. Among these are, exploitation of economies of scale and 
competition-induced efficiency as well as greater consumer surplus from a greater 
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variety of products being produced. The empirical findings in this instance, however, 
suggest that tariff liberalization alone is not sufficient to bring such desired economic 
outcomes to the region. AFTA members need to liberalize if not eliminate other non-
tariff barriers. Moreover, harmonization of product standards, macroeconomic 
consultations, coordination of foreign investment policies and cooperation in transport 
and logistics systems are essentially required to promote the free trade zone further. 
These measures are, in fact, perceived to help by speeding up regional economic 
cooperation and, in consequence, enhancing intra-ASEAN trade flows. Nevertheless, as 
earlier mentioned, AFTA members need to keep working together as a region to 
promote trade with outsiders. This is another challenging task for members as they, 
once again, need to put regional priorities in front of their own ones. The choice 
between regional liberalization and unilateral liberalization undoubtedly requires a 
different political context as greater commitments and efforts are accordingly required 
from member states to implement regional trade policies or to arrive at any reciprocal 
agreements.   
 
Apart from the 2 interconnected empirical studies that examine trade effects of AFTA 
and ASEAN’s trade flows, specifically; the last assessment provides an independent 
theoretical research discussing the incidence of RTA-membership expansion in the 
general framework. The study is, in fact, inspired by the famous theoretical work of 
Baldwin (1995): the so-called ‘domino theory of regionalism’. Nevertheless, while 
Baldwin (1995)’s theory perceives RTA-membership expansion as a political process, 
this study treats the procedure as an economic one. Given that a particular RTA is 
formed, it is reasonable that relevant non-members, before joining the bloc, estimate 
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gains versus losses from trade that this RTA may have produced on their terms of trade. 
These outcomes are, in consequence, derived in the form of profits and welfare effects. 
In order to do so the thesis, in fact, divides the analysis further into 2 major sections: 
symmetric tariffs and asymmetric tariffs. As the supply of RTA-membership is assumed 
to be unconstrained and economic motives are the only factor that countries rely on in 
order to decide whether to follow into the existing RTA, the theoretical findings suggest 
that countries should always engage in the existing bloc as long as their gains from trade 
with the bloc-membership status outweigh their losses from not having it. In the 
symmetric tariffs setting, this outcome is true in both profit and welfare terms. Under 
the asymmetric tariffs assumption, welfare effects are inconclusive, though the upshot 
on profits confirms that joining the RTA benefits participating countries more than 
otherwise. Even though this theoretical outline is a standalone chapter examining RTA-
membership expansion in general, with the concern on AFTA, the findings developed 
here may help in explaining its unimpressive conclusion. That is because ASEAN 
members’ decisions are driven by political rather than economic concerns thus all have 
to join AFTA eventually. In order to meet one of the regional cooperation’s 
requirements, ASEAN countries do not have a choice as to whether they become bloc 
members. Regardless of whether they can maximize gains from trade from being a part 
of the bloc, ASEAN countries have to engage into the zone eventually. Yet, as the 
objective of this theoretical study is to investigate any expanding RTAs, as long as the 
data on the bloc’s size, countries’ profit and production functions and each country’s 
tariff rates are available, the research should be able to calculate the country’s potential 
gains and losses from having RTA-membership.   
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Besides aiming to fill the gap in this field of research, in summary, the author certainly 
wishes that the empirical evidence and theoretical framework developed in this thesis 
will be useful for anyone who is interested to learn about the only formal form of 
economic integration of ASEAN: AFTA. The research highlights the importance of 
using the correct specification of the ‘Gravity Model’ and other related empirical 
methodologies in evaluating ‘AFTA-effects’. This ideology, in fact, can also be applied 
to other literature that aims to measure any RTA(s)-effects in the same fashion. As 
aforementioned, even though the theoretical framework developed in the Chapter 5 is 
not directly applied to AFTA, its findings can still be used to explain the empirical 
results found in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. With regard to the AFTA context, the 
theoretical findings remind us that far sighted policies are required if the best economic 
outcome is to be expected. In designing any international trade-related policies, 
countries need to focus on pursuing economic success whilst perhaps keeping their 
political motives to a minimum. The trade outcome from ASEAN countries, though 
with the formation of AFTA, certainly underlines the fact that political stability alone 
may not necessarily bring success to intra-regional trade growth. There are other 
underlying mechanisms that need to be improved in order to achieve remarkable success 
for the whole region via this long-established free trade zone.    
 
 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix I 
The Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme is a cooperative arrangement among 
ASEAN members that would reduce intra-regional tariffs and remove non-tariff 
barriers. It is the main instrument for making ASEAN a free trade area. This means that 
ASEAN members shall have common effective tariffs among themselves in AFTA, but 
the level of tariffs with non-ASEAN countries shall continue to be determined 
individually. In principle, AFTA covers all manufactured and agricultural products. The 
products covered under the CEPT are categorized as: 
 
1) The Inclusion List (IL) refers to products that have to undergo immediate 
liberalisation through reduction in the CEPT, removal of quantitative restrictions and 
other non-tariff barriers. 
2) The Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) refers to products that can be excluded from 
trade liberalisation for a temporary period of time. These products will have to be 
transferred to the IL eventually. 
 3) The Sensitive List (SL) contains mainly unprocessed agricultural products. These 
products are given a longer time frame to be included in the liberalization process.  
4) The General Exception List (GE) refers to products that are permanently excluded 
from the liberalization process. These products are deemed important to a nation 
security, public morals, human, animal, plant life and health, and articles of artistic, 
historic and archaeological value.   
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Appendix II 
Key elements of the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) 
i) ATIGA consolidates and streamlines all the provisions in the CEPT-AFTA, and 
formalizes several ministerial decisions. As a result, the ATIGA becomes a single legal 
instrument for government officials who implement and enforce the Agreement, as well 
as for private sector who are the beneficiaries.  
 
ii) The ATIGA annex provides the full tariff reduction schedule for each Member State 
and spells out the tariff rates to be applied on each product for each year up to 2015. 
This makes tariff reduction schedules transparent and predictable for the business 
community. A single legal enactment to effectively implement the stipulated reduction 
schedule up to 2015 is also expected.  
 
iii) The ATIGA comprise elements to ensure the realisation of free flow of goods in 
ASEAN, including the following: tariff liberalisation, removal of non-tariff barriers, 
rules of origin, trade facilitation, customs, standards and conformance, and sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary measures. The ATIGA contains comprehensive coverage of 
commitments related to trade in goods, and mechanisms of its implementation as well 
as institutional arrangements. This would allow for synergy of actions being undertaken 
by the various ASEAN sectoral bodies.  
 
iv) With the objectives of eliminating non-tariff barriers, the provisions on non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) in the ATIGA have been enhanced further through codification of 
measures, as well as establishment of a mechanism to monitor the committed 
elimination of non-tariff barriers.  
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v) The ATIGA places emphasis on trade facilitation measures by including the ASEAN 
Framework on Trade Facilitation. Subsequently, ASEAN has developed the Trade 
Facilitation Work Programme for the period of 2009-2015. 
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Appendix III  
 
Results of the ‘Gravity Model’ Estimates: the Two-Way Fixed Effects Model  
(2-Way FEM) with Robust Standard Errors 
 
Dependent Variable :  
Real Exports 
AFTA-context 
(2-way FEM)  
Exporter's GDP (Yit) 
1.2153623*** 
(0.4604465) 
Importer’s GDP(Yjt) 
0.73517878 
(0.5116873) 
Exporter’s Population (Pit) 
0.79549044 
(1.153098) 
Importer’s Population (Pjt) 
-1.0911003 
(2.143607) 
Distance (Dij) - 
Real Exchange Rate (REXijt) 
0.20079673*** 
(0.0619948) 
Common Language (Langij) - 
AFTA-effects (AFTAijt) 
-0.35077028 
(0.2732298) 
Constant 
-28.379009 
(45.38853) 
 
Note: *** denotes significant at 99%, ** and * denotes significant at 95% and 90%, respectively 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  
The time-effects are not included here in order to save space.  
The estimates are, however, available upon request. 
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Appendix IV 
 
Results of the ‘Gravity Model’ Estimates: 2-Way FEM 
 
Dependent Variable :  
Real Exports 
AFTA-context 
(2-way FEM)  
Exporter's GDP (Yit) 
 0.75870505*** 
(0.2073276) 
Importer’s GDP(Yjt) 
0.73148512*** 
 (0.1508567) 
Exporter’s Population (Pit) 
1.4290107** 
(0.639968) 
Importer’s Population (Pjt) 
0.57072289 
(0.4475124) 
Distance (Dij) - 
Real Exchange Rate (REXijt) 
0.17658444*** 
(0.0337136) 
Common Language (Langij) - 
AFTA-effects (AFTAijt) 
0.08101158 
(0.1800355) 
Constant 11.92325*** 
 
Note: *** denotes significant at 99%, ** and * denotes significant at 95% and 90%, respectively 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  
The time-effects are not included here in order to save space.  
The estimates are, however, available upon request. 
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